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OHIO STATE 
LAW JOURNAL 


Volume 11 Autumn, 1950 Number 4 








Ohio’s Reported Decisions—An Integrated 
Survey 
Ervin H. Pollack* and J. Russell Leach** 


Ohio, like New York and Pennsylvania, is a state whose 
judicial decisions have been variously published and extensively 
duplicated. The opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court alone may be 
found in more than seven hundred and seventy volumes, yet the 
official sets comprise only one hundred and seventy-one volumes. 
Although much of this reporting is duplication, many opinions of 
the Supreme Court are found only in private publications, since 
the reporting of the official sets is selective and limited. The unoffi- 
cial decisions are constantly referred to in Ohio, notwithstanding 
the edict of the Ohio General Assembly! that only officially re- 
ported cases “shall be recognized and receive the official sanction” 
of the courts. 


In view of this practice and the volume of Ohio judicial de- 
cisions which have been published in reports and legal periodicals. 
this article attempts to survey the extensive repositories of Ohio 
court law. No attempt is made at this time to include non-legal 
periodicals and newspapers which occasionally published court 
opinions. The bringing to light of the few decisions which were 
published in newspapers during the early years of the state is 
deserving of independent treatment; therefore, these publications 
are not included in this study. One further limitation is employed: 
annotated, selected, and special reports, such as the Public Utilities 
Reports and the American Law Reports, are not listed, although 
these publications include Ohio decisions. Since their coverage is 
generally national in scope and the printing of Ohio cases in them 
is not representative of original reporting, these materials are 
omitted from this survey. 

Generally, the publications reviewed are arranged chronolog- 





* Associate Professor of Law and Law Librarian, College of Law, The 
Ohio State University. 

** Reference Librarian, College of Law, The Ohio State University. 

1 Onto Gen. Cone § 1483. 


413 











414 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


ically under the courts reported. Reference is only made to the 
courts incidentally; therefore, the reader should direct his interest 
elsewhere for detailed, historical studies of the Ohio judicial 
system.’ 

The Ohio Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions 

The Ohio Supreme Court was established by the Ohio Con- 
stitution of 18023 and modified and continued by the Constitution 
of 1851.4 The court first consisted of three judges’ but was in- 
creased over the years to its current aggregate of a chief justice 
and six judges.® Originally, the jurisdiction of the court was 
determined by the general assembly but this has been changed 
so that today the jurisdiction is determined generally by the Consti- 
tution.’ From 1816 to 1852, the judges were required to ride the 
circuit, holding a term once a year in each county, and during 
the early years more often acted as a trial court rather than under 
their appellate authority.® 

In 1875, a constitutional provision was adopted establishing 
a Supreme Court Commission to assist the Supreme Court in 
clearing its docket and giving the assembly authority to establish 
similar commissions should the docket of the Supreme Court 
again become crowded.’ The first Commission sat from 1876 to 
1879 and a second Commission served from 1883 to 1885. While 
the Constitution still provides authority for such commissions, 
later revisions of the jurisdiction of the Court have seemingly 
made the provision obsolete. The Commissions’ decisions were 
published with those of the Supreme Court. 

Given below are the various publications which include the 
opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court. 

Tappan’s Reports, in one volume, was originally published 
in 1831. The volume primarily reports opinions of Judge Benjamin 
Tappan, the President Judge of the Common Pleas Courts in the 
Fifth Circuit of the state. It does, however, contain one Supreme 
Court opinion; that of Judge McLean in the case of Landerback 
v. Moore’® which is a landmark case involving a suit for slander. 
This opinion was rendered in 1817 and is the earliest Supreme 
Court case published in any standard legal publication. 





2See Amer, The Growth and Development of the Ohio Judicial System, 
in 1 MarsHatt, A History or THE Courts AND LAwyers oF Ouro, Chap. XIII 
(1934); Aumann, The Development of the Judicial System of Ohio, 41 Onto 
ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HistTortcaL Society PusiicaTions 195 (1932). 

3 Art. 3. 

4 Art. 4. 

5 ConsTITUTION OF OnrIo, 1802, Art. 3 

6 CONSTITUTION OF OnxrIO, 1851, Art. 4 

7 Ibid. 

8 Aumann, supra, 202. 

9 Art. 4 § 21. 
10 Tapp. 317. 


§ 2. 
§ 2 


























1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 415 


Wright’s Reports, in one volume, reports four hundred and 
ninety-eight Supreme Court cases in which Judge John C. Wright 
participated from 1831 to 1834. Although five of these opinions 
were reported in the Ohio Reports, Judge Wright again reported 
them to correct errors. The great majority of these cases were 
heard on the circuit. 

The Ohio Reports, in twenty volumes, constitutes Ohio’s first 
set of official court reports. It reports selected cases heard on the 
circuit and in special session. The practice in the later volumes 
was to omit all circuit cases and report only those of the special 
session, at which times the court was known as the Supreme 
Court in Bank. This practice may have been influenced by the 
holding over of some of the more important or complex circuit 
cases to the special sessions.'! The cases reported in the set cover 
the period from 1821 to 1852, at which time Ohio’s second Consti- 
tution became effective. 

The Ohio Reports, Century Edition, consists of reprints of the 
official Ohio Reports with annotations mene by the publisher, 
the Laning Company. 

The Ohio Reports, Extra Annotated, is a set in which the 
original plates were used to reproduce copies of the official set 
and includes at the end of each volume annotations prepared by 
George F. Longsdorf. This series was published by the W. H. An- 
derson Company. 

The Western Law Journal, in ten volumes, published reports 
of cases in the Supreme, District, Common Pleas and Probate 
Courts, the Cincinnati and Cleveland Superior Courts, and the 
Cincinnati Commercial Court. These cases, covering a period 
from 1840 to 1853, are reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, 
volume 1. 

The Ohio State Reports, the current official set, began pub- 
lication in 1852 and succeeded the Ohio Reports. This publication 
prints the opinions of the Supreme Court, as established by the 
constitution of 1851 and continued by later amendments. To date, 
one hundred and fifty-one bound volumes have been published. 
These reports have no official advance sheets. 

The Ohio State Reports, Century Edition, consists of reprints 
of the official set from volumes 1 through 60, covering the period 
to 1899. This publication was annotated by its publishers, the 
Laning Company, and was a companion set to the Ohio Reports, 
Century Edition. 





11 The requirement that the judges hold court in each county resulted in 
their traveling on horseback for six months of each year. Since the same 
legal issues were settled differently by the various judges sitting in divers 
counties, much confusion in the law resulted. This was obviated substan- 
tially by having the court sit in bank. See Aumann, supra at 203. 











416 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


The Ohio State Reports, Extra Annotated, was a companion set 
to the Ohio Reports, Extra Annotated. Published by the W. H. 
Anderson Company, it consists of the first eighty-four volumes 
of the official Ohio State Reports and covers the period 1853 
to 1912. 

The American Law Register, a Philadelphia publication, re- 
ported cases from the Supreme, District, Common Pleas, Probate, 
Cincinnati Superior, and Montgomery County Superior Courts. 
Volume 3 of the Ohio Decisions Reprint republished these cases 
with the exception of those found in other Ohio reports or reprinted 
elsewhere in the set. This, of course, excluded most of the Supreme 
Court cases, since they were printed in the official reports. The 
Reprint covers thirty-four volumes of the Register from 1853 to 
1885, volumes 1 through 9 of the old series and volumes 1 through 
25 of the new. 

The Weekly Law Bulletin, in sixty-six volumes, reported 
cases in the Ohio courts from 1876 to 1921. In addition to Supreme 
Court cases, this periodical reported the opinions of the following 
courts: District, Circuit, Courts of Appeals, Common Pleas, Pro- 
bate, Cincinnati Superior, Cincinnati Insolvency, Municipal or 
Police, and Federal. The opinions in volumes 1 through 30 of the 
Bulletin, except for those of the Supreme Court, were reprinted 
in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, volumes 7 through 11. Due to the 
title and ownership changes and publication consolidations, this 
periodical has been known by various names. It was originally 
called the Weekly Cincinnati Law Bulletin and was published by 
Carl G. Jahn at Cincinnati. In 1883, at volume 10, the word “Cin- 
cinnati” was dropped from its title and it was called The Weekly 
Law Bulletin. In 1885, the Bulletin combined with the Ohio Law 
Journal, a periodical published at Columbus. The combined volumes 
continued the volume number of the Bulletin, but were called the 
Weekly Law Bulletin and the Ohio Law Journal. The periodical 
continued without change until 1902, when the Jahn publications 
were sold to The Laning Company of Norwalk, Ohio, the pub- 
lisher of the Ohio Legal News, a competing periodical. The next 
volume was numbered “47” and the new publication was called 
the Ohio Law Bulletin. It continued the Weekly Law Bulletin, 
Ohio Law Journal and Ohio Legal News, preserving the features 
of the Bulletin and the News. In August, 1909, the Laning Com- 
pany sold the Bulletin to the American Publishers Company of 
Norwalk, and W. T. Tossell, the former assistant editor, became 
its editor. No name changes were involved and the periodical 
continued as before. In February, 1917, the ownership again 
changed; this time it was sold to the Ohio Law Publishing Company 
of Norwalk, but no editorial or policy changes were made. In 1921 
the final volume, number 66, was issued and the periodical merged 




















1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 417 


with a competing publication, The Ohio Law Reporter, published 
by The Ohio Law Reporter Company of Cincinnati. The com- 
bined publication was entitled The Ohio Law Bulletin and Re- 
porter; however, this title did not receive popular usage and the 
Bulletin died a natural death. 

The North Eastern Reporter, in two hundred volumes, printed 
opinions of the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals as well as 
those of the courts of the states of New York, Massachusetts, Indi- 
ana, and Illinois. This key-numbered publication of the West 
Publishing Company covered the period 1885 to 1936. 

The North Eastern Reporter, Second Series, a current pub- 
lication, is a continuation of the North Eastern Reporter. In ad- 
dition to the court opinions published in the First Series this set, 
beginning with volume 67 in 1946, has included opinions from the 
Ohio Common Pleas, Probate, and Municipal Courts. The set is 
kept current by advance sheets. Its Ohio Edition included the 
Ohio Supplement, which is discussed below under the Common 
Pleas and Probate Courts. 

The Ohio Supreme Court Decisions (Unreported Cases) is 
a one volume publication containing records, briefs and holdings 
of the Supreme Court from 1889 to 1899. Syllabi were added by 
the publishers, The Laning Company, giving the points of law 
deduced. No opinions in these cases were ever rendered by the 
court. 

The Ohio Legal News, sometimes called the Toledo Legal News, 
published opinions of the Supreme Court, the Circuit Court for 
the Sixth Judical District, the Common Pleas and Probate Courts 
of Lucas County, the Federal Courts in the Toledo area, and se- 
lected opinions of other Ohio and out-of-state courts. The News 
was primarily a periodical and only the first two volumes, cover- 
ing the period 1894 to 1895, reported cases. As mentioned above, 
this publication merged with the Weekly Law Bulletin. 

The Ohio Decisions, a set which is more fully discussed under 
the Common Pleas and Probate Courts, contains certain Supreme 
Court and Supreme Court Commission cases not included in the 
official reports. This set, however, was intended to supplement the 
official reports of the Supreme Court and primarily reported opin- 
ions of the nisi prius courts. 

The Ohio Law Reporter, a periodical, published the unreported 
Supreme Court opinions in its first two volumes.'? Later volumes 
of this periodical published opinions of other Ohio and federal 
courts. 

The Ohio Opinions, another current series, reports opinions of 
the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals, Common Pleas Courts, Pro- 





12 A more complete account of this publication will be found in a later 
discussion under the heading “The Federal Courts.” 















418 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Voi. 11 


bate Courts, Municipal Courts, and Federal Courts which bear on 
Ohio law. The Opinions, a cooperative venture of The Ohio Law 
Reporter Company and The W. H. Anderson Company, began in 
1934 and to date forty bound volumes have been issued. The set 
has annotations to earlier cases in point and to Ohio Jurisprudence. 
The first volumes of the Opinions succeeded the last volume, num- 
ber 40, of the old Ohio Law Reporter and volume 32 of the Ohio 
Nisi Prius Reports, New Series. The Ohio Opinions is kept current 
by a weekly supplement, which, although called the Ohio Law Re- 
porter, carries the volume number and pagination of the future 
bound volumes of the Ohio Opinions. The advance sheet Reporter 
also includes a periodical index and other miscellaneous features, 
yet its function is restricted to that of an advance sheet. 

The Gongwer State Reports is a current mimeograph service 
which provides information regarding cases filed in the Ohio Su- 
preme Court. A synopsis of the case, its history and issues are pro- 
vided for each case filed. In addition, it reports the decisions on 
all cases and prints digests of the opinions of the court. 

The Ohio Bar, a publication of the Ohio State Bar Associ- 
ation, contains advance opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court, Courts 
of Appeals, nisi prius and federal courts. The advance opinions 
have the pagination of the future bound volumes of the Ohio State 
Reports, Ohio Appellate Reports, and the Ohio Law Abstract. 

The District Courts 

The District Courts were established by the Constitution of 
1851 and were discontinued by a constitutional amendment of 1883 
which created the Circuit Courts.'’ A creature of compromise, the 
District Courts never enjoyed any degree of popularity. One group 
advocated an independent intermediate court and favored relieving 
the Supreme Court judges of the burdensome task of circuit rid- 
ing. The adversaries of this proposal opposed a separate inter- 
mediate court and favored the increasing of the membership of 
the Supreme Court. They feared that the Supreme Court would 
assume dictatorial characteristics if it only sat in bank, losing its 
direct contact with the people. A compromise was effected which 
provided for intermediate district courts manned by one Supreme 
Court judge and two or three Common Pleas judges, any three of 
whom were a quorum. Soon after the District Courts were es- 
tablished, it was held in King v. Safford'* that a District Court 
composed of three Common Pleas judges, without the presence of 
a Supreme Court judge, was a lawful and constitutional District 
Court. Although this ruling was beneficial to the functions of the 
Supreme Court, it destroyed the remaining prestige of the District 
Courts. 


13 Art. 4. 
1419 Ohio St. 587 (1869). 



















1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 419 


No official reports of the District Courts were published; how- 
ever, their opinions appeared in a number of periodicals and were 
subsequently republished in reprints. 

The Ohio Decisions Reprint, in the first nine volumes, printed 
the opinions of the District Courts. A Laning publication, it con- 
sists of thirteen volumes. The Ohio Decisions Reprint was an at- 
tempt to compile from the various reports and periodicals all the 
case law of Ohio not found in the official reports for the period 
1840 to 1855. 

The following table lists the publications from which cases are 
republished and their location in the Reprint. 


Ohio Decisions 
Reprints Sets Reported 

Volume 1 Western Law Journal, ten volumes 

Volume 2 Western Law Monthly, five volumes 

Volume 3 Weekly Law Gazette, six volumes 
Daily Law and Bank Bulletin, three volumes 
American Law Register, thirty-four volumes 
Ohio Law Journal, five volumes 

Volume 4 Cleveland Law Record, one volume 
Cleveland Law Reporter, two volumes 

Volume 5 American Law Record, volumes 1-6 

Volume 6 American Law Record, volumes 7-15 


Volume 7 Weekly Law Bulletin, volumes 1-4 
Volume 8 Weekly Law Bulletin, volumes 5-9 
Volume 9 Weekly Law Bulletin, volumes 10-17 
Volume 10 Weekly Law Bulletin, volumes 18-23 
Volume 11 Weekly Law Bulletin, volumes 24-30 
Volume 12 Handy’s Reports, two volumes 
Disney’s Reports, volume 1 
Volume 13 Disney’s Reports, volume 2 
Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter, two volumes 


In reprinting these opinions, the Laning Company omitted 
opinions of federal and out-of-state courts and officially published 
Ohio Supreme Court cases. The Reprint is independently cited; 
however, it also includes the original pagination from the reprinted 
sets for reference or citation purposes. Periodical matter, of course, 
was omitted in the Reprint and many syllabi were added to the 
opinions. The reprinted sets are considered in detail in this article 
under their individual titles. 

The Western Law Journal, in volumes 8 through 10, printed 
opinions of the District Courts from 1851 to 1853.'5 

The Cleveland Law Register, in one volume, printed one Di- 
strict Court opinion, rendered in 1855. It primarily reported opinions 
of the Circuit, Common Pleas, and Probate Courts of the Cleveland 
area from 1899 to 1893. This publication, also called the Cleveland 


15 This periodical has already been described under the heading “The 
Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.” 














420 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


Law Register Reports, was a weekly supplement to the Daily Law 
Register of Cleveland. 

The Cleveland Law Record, in one volume, published opinions 
of the District and Common Pleas Courts from 1855 to 1856. These 
opinions, selected especially from the District Court of Cuyahoga 
County, were reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, volume 4. 

The Weekly Law and Bank Bulletin, in one volume, reported 
opinions of the District, Common Pleas, Probate, and Cincinnati 
Superior Courts from 1857 to 1858. This volume is a unit of a series 
of publications of R. B. and W. W. Warden of Cincinnati. The first 
opinions were printed in The Daily Court Bulletin of Cincinnati. 
The Wardens soon thereafter began compiling material from the 
Daily and issuing a weekly publication, called the Weekly Law and 
Bank Bulletin. This periodical is also known as Warden’s Law and 
Bank Bulletin, Warden’s Weekly Law Bulletin, and Law and Bank 
Bulletin. When one volume of the Bulletin was completed, its name 
was changed to The Weekly Law Gazette. The opinions of the 
Bulletin and the Gazette were reprinted in volume 3 of the Ohio 
Decisions Reprint. 

The Weekly Law Gazette, in four volumes, continued publish- 
ing the opinions of the same courts as did the Weekly Law and Bank 
Bulletin. No volume number one of this set was issued; the Bul- 
letin served as that volume. The series continued through volume 
5 and covered the period 1856 to 1860. 

The Western Law Monthly, in five volumes covering the period 
1858 to 1863, reported cases of the District, Common Pleas, Probate, 
Cincinnati Superior, Franklin County Superior, out-of-state, and 
federal courts. The Ohio decisions in this Monthly were reprinted 
in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, volume 2. This periodical was pub- 
lished by members of the faculty of the defunct Union Law College 
of Cleveland. 

The Cincinnati Municipal Decisions, a one volume publication, 
is devoted to cases involving municipal corporations decided by the 
Cincinnati Superior and Hamilton County District Courts from 1862 
to 1875. 

The American Law Record, in fifteen volumes, published 
opinions of the District, Common Pleas, Probate, and Cincinnati 
Superior Courts. These opinions were reprinted in volumes 6 and 
7 of the Ohio Decisions Reprint. The Record was published at 
Cincinnati and reported opinions for the period 1872 to 1886. 

The Weekly Law Bulletin contains District Courts decisions.'® 

The Cleveland Law Reporter, in two volumes covering the 
period from 1877 to 1879, reported opinions of the District, Common 
Pleas, Probate, and Cincinnati Superior Courts. These opinions were 
reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, volume 4. The Reporter 


16 Ibid. 























OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 421 





1950] 


was a weekly publication edited by J. G. Pomerene at Cleveland, 
Ohio. 

The Ohio Law Journal, in five volumes, printed opinions of the 
District, Common Pleas, and Probate Courts. These opinions dating 
from 1880 to 1884 were reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, 
volume 3. The Journal was a weekly pericdical published at Colum- 
bus, and, as noted previously, merged with the Weekly Law Bul- 
letin. 


The Circuit Courts 


The lack of success of the District Courts was fully felt by 1880. 
Their deficiencies were among the prime forces which influenced 
prominent attorneys to organize the Ohio State Bar Association in 
July, 1880. During the organizational meeting and succeeding special 
and annual meetings of the Association, various plans were offered 
and discussed to improve the judicial system in the state. As an 
initial program of the organized bar of Ohio, the study of the District 
Courts which resulted in their abolishment and the establishment 
of the Circuit Courts and the second Supreme Court Commission, 
proved very fruitful. The new Circuit Courts were created by an 
amendment to the Constitution of Ohio '’ and resulted in the first 
separate intermediate courts in the state. Thus, the judges of the 
Supreme and Common Pleas Courts were relieved of the responsi- 
bilities of serving on two courts and new judges were appointed and 
elected as provided by the general assembly. The assembly was 
authorized to fix and charige the number and boundaries of the 
circuits and to prescribe the jurisdiction of the new courts. The 
Circuit Courts began functioning in 1885 and soon gained the con- 
fidence of the bar and the people of Ohio. 

The opinions of the Circuit Courts were published in the 
various reports given below. 

The Cleveland Law Register includes Circuit Court decisions.'*® 

The Ohio Circuit Court Reports (Jahn), in twenty-two volumes, 
reported opinions of the Circuit Courts from 1885 to 1901. This set, 
a companion to the Weekly Law Bulletin, was merged with the Lan- 
ing publication, the Ohio Circuit Decisions, when the Jahn publica- 
tions were purchased by the Laning Company. 

The Ohio Circuit Decisions, in twelve volumes, covered the 
same cases and period as did the above Reports. The Decisions, 
published some time later, reprinted the opinions which had been 
published in the Reports, adding other cases which had been omitted 
from the Reports. 





17 Art. 4. 


18 A more complete discussion of this publication appears under the head- 
ing “The District Courts.” 








422 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


The Ohio Legal News also included Circuit Courts decisions.'° 

The Ohio Decisions, in three volumes, reported opinions of 
the Circuit, Common Pleas, Probate, and Cincinnati Superior 
Courts. This set was recalled by the publishers and the opinions 
were republished in the Ohio Circuit Decisions and the Ohio De- 
cisions. This set is differentiated from the republished Ohio De- 
cisions volumes by its citation, “Ohio Lower Dec.” The opinions 
reported were rendered from 1894 to 1896. 

Iddings’ Term Reports, in one volume, digested but did not 
print the complete opinions of the Circuit, Common Pleas and Pro- 
bate Courts of Montgomery County, and of other counties of the 
Second Judicial District. This volume was the work of Daniel W. 
Iddings, former Law Librarian of Montgomery County, and includ- 
ed cases from 1899 to 1900. 

The Ohio Circuit Court Decisions, in twenty-two volumes, was 
the successor to the Jahn publication, the Ohio Circuit Court Re- 
ports, and the Laning publication, the Ohio Circuit Decisions. The 
publishers of this set cited the first volume “13 — 23 O. C. C.” This 
unique method of citation did not gain favor, however, and the 
volumes were generally referred to by the title of one or the other 
of its predecessors. This accounts for such citations as 45 Ohio Cir- 
cuit Court Reports or 24 Ohio Circuit Decisions. The set covered 
cases from 1901 to 1918 and ended with volume “13 — 45.” The 
last twelve volumes of the Decisions also contain cases decided by 
the Courts of Appeals and earlier Circuit Courts opinions which 
had been omitted. Its publication was terminated at the instance of 
the Ohio State Bar Association and for competitive reasons, since 
two other sets of reports of the Courts of Appeals were then being 
published. The Bar obtained an agreement from these publishers 
- and the publishers of the Ohio Courts of Appeals Reports to with- 
draw their publications in favor of the one official set. 

The Ohio Circuit Court Reports (New Series) reported cases 
from 1903 to 1917, in twenty-six volumes. Volumes 17 through 26 
also include reports of the Courts of Appeals. A product of the Ohio 
Law Reporter Company, this set began publication shortly after the 
merger of the Jahn and Laning publications. This series was suc- 
ceeded by volumes 27 through 32 of the Ohio Court of Appeals Re- 
ports. 


The Court of Appeals 
By a constitutional amendment” in 1912, the Circuit Courts 
were replaced by Courts of Appeals. Significant changes were 
made in the judical system by the Constitutional Convention of 
1912. These modifications generally related to the jurisdiction of 





19 Ibid. 
20 Art. 4. 























OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 423 





1950] 


the various courts and the replacement of legislative determinations 
by self-executing constitutional provisions. Although many of the 
constitutional amendments were fundamental, the change to Courts 
of Appeals was essentially one of nomenclature, since they were 
but continuations of the Circuit Courts. 

The opinions of the Courts of Appeals are contained in the fol- 
lowing reports and periodicals: 

The Ohio Circuit Court Decisions and the Ohio Circuit Court 
Reports (New Series) include decisions of the Courts of Appeals.?! 

The Ohio Appellate Reports is the first and only official series 
of Ohio intermediate appellate court reports. The first volume was 
issued in 1913, and to date, eighty-five bound volumes have been 
published. 


The Ohio Courts of Appeals Reports was a continuation of 
the Ohio Circuit Court Reports. The first volume of this series was 
numbered 27 and the set reported cases from 1915 to 1922. This 
publication ended in 1922 with volume 32 by agreement between 
its publishers, the Ohio Law Reporter Company, the Laning Com- 
pany and the bar. The publication of the decisions as official re- 
ports of Ohio was continued under contract by the Ohio Law Re- 
porter Company. 

The Ohio Law Abstract, a current publication, reports cases 
of the Courts of Appeals, Common Pleas, Probate, Municipal, and 
Federal Courts. A product of The Law Abstract Company, a Lan- 
ing concern, the series began publication in 1923 with the printing 
of syllabi, digests, and “epitomized opinions” rather than the full 
texts. At present, fifty-six bound volumes have been published 
The early practice of summarizing the cases was discontinued, and 
the series now constitutes one of the three sources for locating the 
full texts of unofficially reported appellate and nisi prius decisions 
of Ohio. 

The Ohio Law Reporter, in volumes 21 through 40, reported 
opinions of. the Courts of Appeals from 1923 to 1934. It appears 
that these volumes were a continuation of the Ohio Court of Ap- 
peals Reports. In its later years, the Reporter concentrated more 
on the reporting of judicial decisions than on periodical articles. 

The Ohio Opinions, which is discussed more fully above under 
the Supreme Court, also includes cases of the Courts of Appeals. 

The North Eastern Reporter from volume 151 through 200 
and the North Eastern Reporter, Second Series, include the Courts 
of Appeals opinions.?? 





21 An account of these reports is included under the heading “The Circuit 
Courts.” 

22 A more complete statement concerning this publication is given under 
the heading “The Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.” 











424 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


The Ohio Bar, a publication of the Ohio State Bar Association, 
covers the advance opinions of the Courts of Appeals.” 

Typed copies of the Unreported Ohio Court of Appeals Opin- 
ions for the Eighth Judical District have been prepared by the 
Cleveland Law Library Association. To date, a total of twelve 
copies of the fifty-two volumes have been typed and made avail- 
able to libraries and the Bar of the state. 

The Bar Briefs, a publication of the Columbus Bar Association, 
and The Akron Bar Communications of the Akron Bar Association 
digest but do not print opinions of the Ohio Court of Appeals for 
their districts, the second and ninth, respectively. 


The Common Pleas and Probate Courts 

The Common Pleas Courts have remained relatively unchang- 
ed throughout the entire constitutional history of Ohio.?4 Origin- 
ally, these courts were composed of one presiding judge and two 
or three associate judges. There were no requirements or quali- 
fications attached to their offices and the practice generally was 
for the president of the court to be a lawyer and the associates to 
be laymen. The jurisdiction of the courts, always provided for by 
law, has been modified over the years; however, they have con- 
sistently been the nisi prius courts of general jurisdiction. Due to 
the additional work-load given the Common Pleas Courts by in- 
creasing their appellate jurisdiction, it was deemed expedient to 
withdraw from these courts jurisdiction over probate and testa- 
mentary matters. Accordingly, in 1851, when the new Constitution 
was adopted, it created the Probate Courts of Ohio.?5 The functions 
of these courts have remained relatively unchanged since that date. 

The Common Pleas and Probate Courts opinions are published 
in the following reports and periodicals: 

Tappan’s Reports, previously discussed for its one Supreme 
Court opinion, primarily reported opinions of Judge Tappan of the 
Common Pleas Court of the Fifth Circuit from 1816 to 1819. This 
publication is sometimes called the Ohio Decisions, Miscellaneous. 

The Western Law Journal, the American Law Register, the 
Weekly Law Bulletin, the Ohio Legal News, the Ohio Opinions, 
and the Ohio Bar include Common Pleas and Probate Courts de- 
cisions.?6 

23 Ibid. 

24The Common Pleas Courts in Ohio find their origin in the Northwest 
Territory. On August 23, 1788, the Governor and judges of the Northwest 
Territory, sitting as a legislative council, passed an act establishing “A Gen- 
eral Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace and County Courts of Common 
Pleas.” When Ohio became a state, the Common Pleas Courts became con- 
stitutional courts pursuant to Art. 3 of the Constitution of 1802. 

25 Art. 4. 

26 These publications are discussed in more detail under the heading “The 
Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.” 














1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 425 


The Ohio Decisions Reprint, the Cleveland Law Register, the 
Weekly Law and Bank Bulletin, the Weekly Law Gazette, the West- 
ern Law Monthly, the American Law Record, the Cleveland Law 
Reporter, and the Ohio Law Journal report opinions of the Com- 
mon Pleas and Probate Courts.?’ 

The Cincinnati Daily Court Bulletin, in one volume, reported 
cases from the Common Pleas, Probate, and Cincinnati Superior 
Courts for 1857. The series was the predecessor of the Weekly Law 
and Bank Bulletin which is more fully discussed under the District 
Courts. 

3 Ohio Miscellaneous Decisions, a one volume report, reported 
cases from the Common Pleas and Superior Courts of Montgomery 
County from 1865 to 1873. Another publication of the Laning Com- 
pany, it includes many of the opinions of Judge Haynes of the 
Superior Court which had been reported and preserved by O. M. 
Gottschall of the Dayton bar. The volume has been referred to by 
such names as the Dayton Reports and the Ohio Decisions, Dayton. 

Goebel’s Probate Reports, in one-volume, reported cases in the 
Hamilton County Probate Court from 1885 to 1890. These opinions 
were rendered by Judge Herman P. Goebel, and were edited and 
arranged by W. H. Whittaker of the Cincinnati Bar. 

The Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, in eight volumes, was a com- 
panion set to the Jahn publication, the Ohio Circuit Court Reports. 
In addition to opinions of the Common Pleas Courts, it reported 
cases from the Cincinnati Superior, Hamilton County Insolvency, 
and Municipal Courts from 1893 to 1901. The series was discon- 
tinued in favor of the Ohio Decisions when the Jahn publications 
were purchased by the Laning Company. 

The Ohio Decisions, Ohio Lower Decisions edition, and Iddings’ 
Term Reports contain Common Pleas and Probate Courts opinions.”® 

The Ohio Decisions, in thirty-one volumes, reported opinions 
of the Common Pleas and the Cincinnati Superior Courts, selected 
opinions from other lower Ohio courts and a few unofficially pub- 
lished opinions of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Com- 
mission. The set, which includes opinions from 1894 to 1920, is a 
companion set to the other Laning publications. While the series 
was to be unaffected by the purchase of the Jahn publications, from 
that date this set was cited by various means, i.e., “12 Ohio De- 
cisions,” “12 Ohio Decisions, Nisi Prius,” or “9 Ohio Nisi Prius Re- 
ports.” Competition with and eventual sale to the Ohio Law Re- 
porter Company lead to the discontinuance of the series. 





27A fuller account of these publications is given under the heading “The 
District Courts.” 

28 These publications are more completely discussed under the heading 
“The Circuit. Courts.” 





426 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


The Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New Series, in thirty-two 
volumes, is a companion set to the Ohio Law Reporter Company’s 
Ohio Circuit Court Reports, New Series. It reported 1902 to 1934 
opinions of the Common Pleas, Cincinnati Superior, Hamilton 
County Insolvency, and Municipal Courts. The series was succeed- 
ed by the Ohio Opinions. 

The Ohio Law Abstract, considered more fully under the 
Courts of Appeals, includes opinions of the Common Pleas and 
Probate Courts. 

The Ohio Supplement, in seventeen volumes, was bound with 
the various volumes of the North Eastern Reporter, Second Series, 
Ohio Edition, beginning with volume 30 and ending with volume 
66. The Supplement reported cases from the nisi prius courts of 
Ohio from 1932 to 1936. 

The North Eastern Reporter, Second Series, only volumes 67 
et seq., report Ohio nisi prius cases. This set from volume 67 con- 
tinues the Ohio Supplement series. 


The Cincinnati Superior Courts 


There have been two distinct Cincinnati Superior Courts in 
Ohio. The first of these was created in 183879 and continued until 
abolished by the Schedule to the Constitution of 1851. This court, 
as well as its successor, was given concurrent jurisdiction with the 
Hamilton County Common Pleas Court in essentially all civil mat- 
ters at law or in chancery. The second court was created in 1854? 
and functioned until it was abolished in 1921 by an act of the Gen- 
eral Assembly.*! A large number of the judges of the latter court 
subsequently made outstanding contributions in the national judi- 
cial and political realms.*? 

The decisions of the Cincinnati Superior Courts are published 
in the following publications: 

The Western Law Journal, the American Law Register, and 


2936 Ohio Laws 95. 

3052 Ohio Laws 34. 

31109 Ohio Laws 354. 

32 Included among these were Alphonso Taft (1864-72), who became Sec- 
retary of War, Attorney General of the United States, Minister to France, 
and Minister to Russia; Joseph B. Foraker (1879-82), who became Governor 
of Ohio and United States Senator; Smith Hickenlooper (1918-23), who be- 
came United States District Judge and later Judge of the United States Cir- 
cuit Court of Appeals; Stanley Matthews (1862-63), who became United States 
Senator and Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; Judson 
Harmon (1878-82), who became Governor of Ohio and Attorney General of 
the United States; William H. Taft (1887-90), who became Judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals, Governor of the Philippines, Secretary of War, Presi- 
dent of the United States, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States; and Edward F. Noyes (1889-90), who became Governor of 
Ohio and Minister to France. 




















1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 427 


the Weekly Law Bulletin include Cincinnati Superior Court cases.*’ 

The Ohio Decisions Reprint, the Weekly Law and Bank Bul- 
letin, the Weekly Law Gazette, the Western Law Monthly, the 
Cincinnati Municipal Decisions, the American Law Record, and 
the Cleveland Law Reporter contain Cincinnati Superior Court 
decisions.** 

Handy’s Reports, in two volumes, reported the opinions of the 
Cincinnati Superior Court from 1854 to 1856. The reporters of the 
volumes were R. D. and J. H. Handy of the Cincinnati bar. These 
opinions were reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, volume 12. 

Disney’s Reports, in two volumes, reported opinions of the 
Cincinnati Superior Court from 1854 to 1859. These opinions were 
reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, volumes 12 and 13. This 
set, with but a single exception, did not duplicate the opinions found 
in Handy’s Reports. The preparation of the publication was origin- 
ally undertaken by Judge Stanley Matthews, who subsequently 
became a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
was continued by William Disney of the Cincinnati bar. 

The Cincinnati Daily Court Bulletin, the Ohio Nisi Prius Re- 
ports, the Ohio Decisions, and the Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New 
Series, include Cincinnati Superior Court opinions.*5 

The Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter, in two volumes, 
printed opinions of that court from 1870 to 1873. Volume 1 was 
edited by Charles P. Taft and Bellamy Storer, Jr., sons of the con- 
temporary judges. The second volume was edited by Charles P. 
and Peter R. Taft. Both volumes, as were Handy’s and Disney’s 
Reports, were published by Robert Clarke & Co., of Cincinnati. 
These opinions were reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, 
volume 13. 

The Ohio Decisions, the Ohio Lower Decisions edition, also in- 
cluded Cincinnati Superior Court opinions.*® 

The Cincinnati Superior Court Decisions, in one volume, re- 
ported opinions of the court for the period 1903 to 1907. The De- 
cisions were reported by Judge Lewis M. Hosea of the Superior 
Court and published by The W. H. Anderson Company. The publi- 
cation is generally referred to as ‘“Hosea’s Reports.” 

The Ohio Law Reporter, in some of its early volumes, printed 
a number of otherwise unpublished Cincinnati Superior and other 





33 These journals are discussed in greater detail under the heading “The 
Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.” 

34For more complete references to these publications, see the discussion 
under the heading “The District Courts.” 

35 More complete discussions of these periodicals appear above under the 
heading “The Common Pleas and Probate Courts.” 

36A more complete statement on this publication was given under the 
heading “The Circuit Courts.” 








428 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


nisi prius court opinions. Most of the opinions published in the Re- 
porter, however, were included in the Ohio Nisi Prius, New Series. 


The Franklin County Superior Court 
Like the Cincinnati Court, the Franklin County Superior Court 
generally functioned as a substitute court of common pleas. This 
court was established in 185737 and functioned until it was abolish- 
ed in 1865.58 
The opinions of the Franklin County Superior Court were in- 
cluded in the Western Law Monthly and in the reprint of those 
cases in volume 2 of the Ohio Decisions Reprint.*? 


The Cleveland Superior Court 

This Superior Court, like that of Cincinnati, sat during two 
different periods. It was first created in 1848*° and then discon- 
tinued by the Schedule of the Constitution of 1851. The court, and 
that of Cincinnati and the Commercial Court of Cincinnati, could 
accept no new actions after February, 1852, but was permitted to 
operate until February, 1853. The second Cleveland Superior 
Court was established in 1873*! and was abolished two years later.* 

Its decisions are contained in the Western Law Journal and 
in the reprint of those cases in volume 1 of the Ohio Decisions Re- 
print.*’ 


The Montgomery County Superior Court 
This court was established in 18564 and functioned until 1885, 
when it was abolished by an act of the general assembly.‘ Its 
jurisdiction was the same as that of the other superior courts. 
The opinions of the Montgomery County Superior Court are 
included in the American Law Register and in their reprints in 
volume 3 of the Ohio Decisions Reprint.*® 


Three Ohio Miscellaneous Decisions also contains the Mont- 
gomery County Superior Court opinions.‘’ 





3754 Ohio Laws 37. 

38 62 Ohio Laws 58. 

39 For a more detailed statement regarding these publications, see the dis- 
cussion under the heading “The District Courts.” 

4046 Ohio Laws 21. 

4170 Ohio Laws 297. 

4272 Ohio Laws 105. 

43 A discussion of the Western Law Journal was given under the heading 
“The Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.” 

4453 Ohio Laws 38. 

45 82 Ohio Laws 85. 

46The American Law Register is discussed more completely under the 
heading “The Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.” 

47¥For a fuller account of this volume, see the discussion of it under the 
heading “The Common Pleas and Probate Courts.” 





1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 429 


The Commercial Court of Cincinnati 

Created in 1848** this court was given concurrent jurisdiction 
with the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court over all chancery 
matters and those civil actions which were based upon contract. 
The court was abolished in 1853 as a result of the Schedule of the 
1851 Constitution. 

Its opinions were included in the Western Law Journal and 
those cases were reprinted in volume 1 of the Ohio Decisions Re- 
print.*? 

The Hamilton County Insolvency Court 

This court, created in 1894,5° was one of a pair of insolvency 
courts established in Ohio which administered assignments for the 
benefit of creditors, receivers for insolvent corporations, and other 
commercial matters. This court was abolished in 1921,5! while the 
other court, the Cuyahoga County Insolvency Court, continued to 
function until 1934. 

The Weekly Law Bulletin included the opinions of the Hamil- 
ton County Insolvency Court.°? ; 

The Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, the Ohio Decisions, and the Ohio 
Nisi Prius Reports, New Series, contain decisions of this court. 

The Ohio Law Reporter, dealt with above in greater detail un- 
der the Federal Courts, also included the Hamilton County In- 
solvency Court decisions. 


The Municipal and Probate Courts 


No adequate historical summary of the Municipal and Police 
Courts of Ohio can be given in this article, in view of its limited 
scope. At best, only the more significant highlights of these courts 
can be presented. The Police Courts were first established in 185254 
and generally given authority similar to the Justices of the Peace 
and Mayor’s Courts. No pattern can be followed as to the various 
Municipal Courts either as to the dates of establishment or the 
jurisdiction; however, these courts now operate in most of the ma- 
jor cities in Ohio, the oldest being the Cleveland Municipal Court, 
created in 1910. 

The Municipal and Police Courts opinions are included in the 
Weekly Law Bulletin, the North Eastern Reporter, Second Series, 





48 46 Ohio Laws 17. 

49 See note 43 supra. 

5091 Ohio Laws 844. 

51108 Ohio Laws 357. 

52 The Bulletin is considered in greater detail under the heading “The 
Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.” 

53 For more detailed information regarding these publications, refer to 
the discussion under the heading “The Common Pleas and Probate Courts.” 

5450 Ohio Laws 223. 














430 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


and the Ohio Bar, publications which are outlined above under the 
Supreme Court. 

The Ohio Decisions Reprint, in volume 7 through 11, reprinted 
the opinions in the first thirty volumes of the Weekly Law Bulle- 
tin.55 

The Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, the Ohio Decisions, the Ohio Nisi 
Prius Reports, New Series, and the Ohio Supplement also covered 
the Municipal and Police Courts opinions.*® 


The Federal Courts 


The Ohio Law Reporter, more fully discussed under the Fed- 
eral Courts, contains decisions of the Municipal and Police Courts. 
The Ohio Law Abstract, which is treated in detail under the 
Courts of Appeals, also includes Municipal and Police Court opin- 
ions. 

A number of reports have selected and published certain fed- 
eral cases particularly applicable to Ohio law. These publications 
are outlined below. The general federal reports, however, are not 
included in this survey. 

The Ohio Federal Decisions, in sixteen volumes, printed se- 
lected opinions of Federal Courts arising out of Ohio disputes or 
construing Ohio statutes. This series, another Laning Company 
publication, included opinions from many sources covering the 
period 1809 to 1811. 

The Weekly Law Bulletin, the Ohio Legal News, and the Ohio 
Opinions contain selected decisions from the Federal Courts bear- 
ing on Ohio law.°*’ 

The Ohio Law Reporter, in forty-two volumes, included select- 
ed opinions of the Federal Courts. The Reporter, a competitor of 
the Weekly Law Bulletin, was an Ohio Law Reporter Company 
publication. For most of its life, it functioned as a periodical, rather 
than a report, printing only Federal opinions and reserving the 
other decisions for’ its companion sets, the Ohio Circuit Court Re- 
ports, New Series, the Ohio Court of Appeals Reports, and the Ohio 
Nisi Prius Reports, New Series. The Reporter was the victor in 
the struggle for publication supremacy but was voluntarily aban- 
doned at a later date in favor of the Ohio Opinions. Its title was 
then combined with that of the Ohio Opinions to formulate the 
caption for the advance sheets to the Ohio Opinions. 





55 A more complete discussion of the Reprint is given under the heading 
“The District Courts.” 

56 These reports are discussed further under the heading “The Common 
Pleas and Probate Courts.” 

57 These publications were more completely discussed under the heading 
“The Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.” 




















1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 431 


The Ohio Law Abstract also covers selected Federal Courts 
decisions.5® 


Miscellaneous Ohio Reprints 

A number of reprints of the various reports of the Ohio ju- 
dicial decisions has been published. These reprints, with the ex- 
ception of the Ohio Decisions Reprint, were not discussed in the 
preceeding sections of this article, since they are essentially dupli- 
cation of the original reports and are not independently cited. 
On the other hand, the Ohio Decisions Reprint was previously 
treated because of its significance and frequency of citation. 

Numerous reprints or republications of the Ohio Reports and 
the Ohio State Reports have been issued. These reprints were 
basically duplicate copies of the originals? and have not been 
independently cited by distinctive names. However, there are a 
few notable exceptions to this general rule. For example, in 1850, 
editions of volumes 2 and 3 of the Ohio Reports were published 
with notes by S. Shellabarger. Soon thereafter a new edition of 
volumes 4 through 7 was printed with notes by M. E. Curwen. A 
reprint of the first seven volumes of these reports, Wilcox’s Con- 
densed Reports, merits special mention. This is a condensed edition 
by P. B. Wilcox, a Reporter of the Ohio Reports, with the first 
four official volumes in one volume and volumes 6 and 7 in another. 
The Reports were condensed by omitting the arguments of counsel. 
In 1833, Reporter Hammond, the predecessor of Wilcox, published 
a condensed edition of the. first two volumes of the Reports in one 
volume. Neither of the latter editions found lasting favor. 

A reprint of Tappan’s Reports was published in 1875 and a 
revision in 1899. Both editions were typographical improvements 
over the original but otherwise did not alter the text. 

The R. D. and J. H. Handy’s Reports of Cases in the Superior 
Court of Cincinnati suspended publication while in the middle 
of the second volume. Thus, it includes only 288 pages, without 
title or index. In 1877, a new edition, two volumes in one, was 
published with notes by Lewis E. Mills. 

Wright’s Ohio Supreme Court Reports was republished in 
1884 as a second edition with annotations. 


Mr. Carl Jahn, while publishing the Weekly Law Bulletin 
and competing with the Laning Company, issued certain reprints 





583A more specific treatment of this publication is given under the head- 
ing “The Court of Appeals.” 

59 The original edition of volume 7 of the Ohio Reports was published in 
two parts which were inadvertently paged separately. It is therefore neces- 
sary to cite that edition by part as well as volume. The second edition of 
1852 has a dual pagination with both original and continuous page numbers; 
therefore, it and its reprints can be cited without reference to the parts. 








432 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


of cases found in the old Ohio legal periodicals. This group of re- 
prints, consisting of five volumes, competed with the Laning series, 
the Ohio Decisions Reprint. Although the Jahn reprints are not 
as comprehensive as the Ohio Decisions Reprint, they nevertheless 
include cases not found in the Reprint. These originally appeared 
in the Cleveland Law Register and the Cincinnati Daily Court 
Bulletin. The Jahn series is without a title but can be independently 
cited, since it has separate volume and page numbers. A list 
of the publications thus reprinted follows: 

American Law Record 

Cleveland Law Record 

Cleveland Law Reporter 

Cleveland Law Register 

Cincinnati Daily Court Bulletin 

Weekly Law and Bank Bulletin 

Weekly Law Gazette 

American Law Register 


Western Law Journal 
Western Law Monthly 


Table of Abbreviations of Ohio Court Reports 

Uniformity is not without its faults, yet its benefits become 
apparent when one examines the numerous unstandardized and 
conflicting abbreviations which have been used to identify the 
various Ohio court reports. While it is too late in the season of 
Ohio court reporting to give consistency to the citations of the 
past publications, we can partially relieve the confusion by listing 
the many varying abbreviations of the publications discussed in 
this article as culled from numerous sources and repositories. 


Abbreviation Publication 
A. L. Rec. American Law Record 
A. L. Reg. (N.S.) American Law Register, New Series 
A. L. Reg. (O. 5S.) American Law Register, Old Series 
Abs. Ohio Law Abstract 
Am. L. Rec. American Law Record 
Am. L. Reg. American Law Register 
Am. Law Rec. American Law Record 
Am. Law Reg. American Law Register 
App. Ohio Appellate Reports 
B. Weekly Law Bulletin 
Bull. Weekly Law Bulletin 
Burgess Ohio State Reports, volumes 46-51 
c.¢. Ohio Circuit Court Reports 
C. C. n.s. Ohio Circuit Court Reports, New Series 
C.D. Ohio Circuit Decisions 
C. L. Rec. Cleveland Law Record 
C. L. Reg. Cleveland Law Register 
C. L. Rep. Cleveland Law Reporter 
C.S.C.R. Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter 
Cin. Law Bul. Weekly Law Bulletin 











1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 433 


Cin. Mun. Dec. Cincinnati Municipal Decisions 

Cin. R. Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter 
Cin. S.C. R. Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter 
Cin. S. C. Rep. Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter 
Cin. Supr. Ct. R. Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter 
Cincinnati Law Bull. Weekly Law Bulletin 

Cir. Ct. Dec. Ohio Circuit Court Decisions 
Cleve. L. Rec. Cleveland Law Record 

Cleve. L. Reg. Cleveland Law Register 

Cleve. L. Rep. Cleveland Law Reporter 

Cleve. Law R. Cleveland Law Reporter 

Cleve. Law Rec. Cleveland Law Record 

Cleve. Law Reg. Cleveland Law Register 

Critch. Ohio State Reports, volumes 5-21 
D. Disney’s Reports 

D. Ohio Decisions 

D. Rep. Ohio Decisions Reprint 

D. Repr. Ohio Decisions Reprint 

Dayton 3 Ohio Miscellaneous Decisions 
Dayton T. R. Iddings’ Term Reports 

Dayton Term Rep. Iddings’ Term Reports 

Dec. Rep. Ohio Decisions Reprint 

Disn. Disney’s Reports 

Gaz. Weekly Law Gazette 

Goebel Goebel’s Probate Reports 
Gottschall 3 Ohio Miscellaneous Decisions 
Granger Ohio State Reports, volumes 22-23 
Griswold Ohio State Reports, volumes 14-19 
H. Handy’s Reports 

Ham. Ohio Reports, volumes 1-9 
Hammond Ohio Reports, volumes 1-9 

Han. Handy’s Reports 

Hand. Handy’s Reports 

Handy Handy’s Reports 

Hosea Cincinnati Superior Court Decisions 
Idd. T. R. Iddings’ Term Reports 

Idding Iddings’ Term Reports 

Iddings T. R. D. Iddings’ Term Reports 

L. & B. Bull. Weekly Law and Bank Bulletin 

L. C. D. Ohio Decisions (Ohio Lower Decisions) 
L. R. Ohio Law Reporter 

Law & Bk. Bull. Weekly Law and Bank Bulletin 
Lawrence Ohio Reports, volume 20 

Lower Ct. Dec. Ohio Decisions (Ohio Lower Decisions) 
Misc. Dec. 3 Ohio Miscellaneous Decisions 

N. E. North Eastern Reporter 

N. E. 2d North Eastern Reporter, Second Series 
N. P. Ohio Nisi Prius Reports 

N. P.n.s. Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New Series 
No. East. Rep North Eastern Reporter 

O. Ohio Reports 

O.A. Ohio Appellate Reports 

O. A. R. Ohio Appellate Reports 

O. App. Ohio Appellate Reports 





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Ohio Cir. Ct. R., N.S. 


Ohio Cir. Dec. 
Ohio Dec. 


Ohio Dec., N. P. 
Ohio Dec. Repr. 


Ohio F. Dec. 
Ohio Fed. Dec. 
Ohio L. Abs. 
Ohio L. B. 
Ohio L. J. 
Ohio L. R. 


Ohio Law Abst. 


Ohio Law Bull. 
Ohio Law J. 
Ohio Law R. 





OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


Ohio Courts of Appeals Reports 

Ohio Circuit Court Decisions 

Ohio Circuit Court Reports 

Ohio Circuit Court Reports, New Series 

Ohio Circuit Decisions 

Ohio Decisions 

Ohio Circuit Decisions 

Ohio Decisions 

Ohio Decisions Reprint 

Ohio Federal Decisions 

Ohio Law Abstract 

Ohio Law Abstract 

Weekly Law Bulletin 

Ohio Decisions (Ohio Lower Decisions) 

Ohio Law Journal 

Ohio Law Journal 

Ohio Legal News 

Ohio Law Reporter 

Ohio Law Reporter 

Ohio Legal News 

Ohio Decisions (Ohio Lower Decisions) 

Ohio Nisi Prius Reports 

Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New Series 

Ohio Opinions 

Ohio State Reports 

Ohio Supreme Court Decisions 
(Unreported Cases) 

Ohio Supreme Court Decisions 
(Unreported Cases) 

Ohio State Reports 

Ohio Supplement 

Ohio Reports 

Ohio Reports 

Ohio Appellate Reports 

Ohio Courts of Appeals Reports 

Ohio Circuit Court Reports 

Ohio Circuit Court Decisions 

Ohio Circuit Court Reports, New Series 

Ohio Circuit Court Reports 

Ohio Circuit Court Reports, New Series 

Ohio Circuit Decisions 

Ohio Decisions 

Ohio Decisions 

Ohio Decisions Reprint 

Ohio Federal Decisions 

Ohio Federal Decisions 

Ohio Law Abstract 

Weekly Law Bulletin 

Ohio Law Journal 

Ohio Law Reporter 

Ohio Law Abstract 

Weekly Law Bulletin 

Ohio Law Journal 

Ohio Law Reporter 











1950] 


Ohio Leg. N. 
Ohio Legal N. 
Ohio Lower Dec. 
Ohio Misc. Dec. 
Ohio N. P. 

Ohio N. P., N.S. 
Ohio, N.S. 

Ohio Op. 

Ohio Prob. 

Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 
Ohio S. U. 


Ohio St. 
Ohio St., N.S. 


Ohio Sup. & C. P. Dec. 


Ohio Supp. 
Ohio Unrept. Cas. 


Rand. 

S. &C. P. Dec. 
Stanton 

Sup. & C. P. Dec. 


Wkly. Law Bull. 
W.L.B. 


Warden & Smith 
Warden’s Law and 
Bk. Bull. 
Week. Cin. L. B. 
Week. L. Gaz. 
Week. Law Bull. 
Week. Law Gaz. 
West. L. J. 
West. L. M. 
West. L. Mo. 
West. Law J. 
West. Law M. 
Wilcox 
Wright 


OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 


Ohio Legal News 
Ohio Legal News 


435 


Ohio Decisions (Ohio Lower Decisions) 


3 Ohio Miscellaneous Decisions 
Ohio Nisi Prius Reports 


Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New Series 


Ohio Reports, Annotated 

Ohio Opinions 

Goebel’s Probate Reports 

Ohio Decisions 

Ohio Supreme Court Decisions 
(Unreported Cases) 

Ohio State Reports 

Ohio State Reports, Annotated 

Ohio Decisions 

Ohio Supplement 

Ohio Supreme Court Decisions 
(Unreported Cases) 

Ohio State Reports, volume 52-71 

Ohio Decisions 

Ohio Reports, volumes 11-13 

Ohio Decisions 

Tappan’s Reports 

Tappan’s Reports 

Tappan’s Reports 

Wright’s Reports 

Weekly Law Bulletin 

Weekly Law Bulletin 

Weekly Law Gazette 

Weekly Law Gazette 

Western Law Journal 

Western Law Journal 

Western Law Monthly 

Ohio State Reports, volumes 2, 4 

Ohio State Reports, volumes 2, 4 

Ohio State Reports, volume 3 

Weekly Law and Bank Bulletin 


Weekly Law Bulletin 
Weekly Law Gazette 
Weekly Law Bulletin 
Weekly Law Gazette 
Western Law Journal 
Western Law Monthly 
Western Law Monthly 
Western Law Journal 
Western Law Monthly 
Ohio Reports, volume 10 
Wright’s Reports 








The Ohio Legislative Reference Bureau 
And Its Place in The Legislative 
Process 


ArtTHuR A. SCHWARTz* 


In the American way of life which is based on the theory of 
representative government as the bulwark of a free people, the 
legislator becomes the cornerstone upon which rests the responsi- 
bility of encompassing through the vehicle of legislation the sum 
total of man’s relations with his fellow man. 

For generations the hackneyed phrase of mediocre legislative 
accomplishment has perpetuated itself in common parlance. The 
distrust of legislatures in general has in many instances resulted 
in state constitutions which are nothing more than compiled statutes 
with innumerable restrictions on the action of the legislator.' By 
the legislative reference bureau supplying the proper technical 
aid to the legislators, the legislative process can be lifted up by 
its own bootstraps. 


The legislator may be a newcomer to the field of legislation. 
From all walks of life, from every focus of endeavor, we see the 
farmer, the storekeeper, the country lawyer, the man of business, 
the housewife, all grappling entirely unprepared with the prob- 
lems of making laws that represent every phase of industrial, 
social, economic or governmental life. Suddenly thrown from the 
quiet of his native community, the legislator enters life on a new 
plane; he must acclimate himself to his new surroundings, new 
techniques must be acquired and new problems must be solved. 

The comparatively simple problems which perplexed our fore- 
fathers find no comparison when juxtaposed with the intricate 
questions of our day, which include taxation, public utilities, 
public finance, social security, insurance, elimination of crime 
and a host of other subjects covering every field of human en- 
deavor from the highly technical and professional to those of the 
ordinary layman. 

If the legislator is to represent properly his constituents he 
must introduce bills and must in some way by providing the proper 
impetus succeed in getting the bills passed. First, he must have 
his bills drafted, and as he probably has had little, if any, drafting 
experience and knows little of legal technique, he is greatly per- 
plexed. He is confronted with a host of bills on as many different 





* Director of The Legislative Reference Bureau, State of Ohio 
1 An excellent example is the constitution of the state of Louisiana. 


436 











1950] LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU 437 


questions and should be intellectually equipped to run the gamut 
of a multitude of complex subjects. Even the scientific problems 
that the chemist, the physicist or the other men of science find 
difficult, must be met and solved. 

The only answer is that if private business secures experts to 
look after its business, the public should do likewise. Every im- 
proved business method should be utilized in providing technical 
assistance to our legislators to the end that men who pass the laws 
may always have at their command knowledge worthy of being 
utilized in the making of good laws. 

And here the legislative reference bureau steps in as liaison 
officer to bridge the gap, as it were, and make it easier for the leg- 
islator to enter upon his new duties with a greater degree of pro- 
ficiency. Unless the bureau enters into this relationship with the 
spirit to win the legislator’s confidence and trust, unbiased and un- 
influenced by partisanship, and with unflinching devotion to truth, 
fact finding and scholarship, the bureau is not fulfilling its function. 


ORIGIN OF THE LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE MovEMENT 

The legislator groping for light, fumbling his way through the 
musty archives of a university library, laid the groundwork for 
a vision to a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin in 
1901, and out of that vision has evolved the legislative reference 
concept, which from its first inception in New York? and Wiscon- 
sin has grown until it now encompasses a large percentage of our 
states. 


With a background deeply vested in the fundamentals of eco- 
nomics, history, philosophy and political science, Charles McCarthy 
left the university imbued with an idea, a spirit of helpfulness 
which took concrete form in a new technique devised primarily to 
provide specific aid to members of a legislative body. It was Mc- 
Carthy of Wisconsin who envisioned a new order of things, in 
which the art of formulating legislation, aided by fundamental re- 
search into the concepts of the social sciences, could rise above the 
mediocre and stand out head and shoulders above the hodgepodge 
draftmanship of previous decades. 

Dr. Charles McCarthy lived to see a dream come true — he 
saw the art of legislative draftsmanship lifted to a place worthy of 
its importance.’ In 1912, he published “The Wisconsin Idea‘ in 





2 While the state of New York actually started a legislative reference 
bureau in 1890 as a section of the New York State Library, it was Wisconsin 
that first attracted national interest in the field. 

3 Dr. Charles McCarthy was chief of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference 
Library from its inception in 1901 until his death in 1921. 

4 McCartny, THE Wisconsin Inga, (New York, 1912). 








438 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


which he outlined for posterity the objects and purposes of a leg- 
islative reference bureau.‘ 


EVOLUTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BuREAU IN OHIO 

Ohio ranks among one of the earliest of the states in which ef- 
forts were made to focus attention on the needs of calling for 
technical assistance in drafting bills and in supplying legislative 
members with research data to aid the legislative process. , 

As early as 1908 two bills were introduced in the Ohio Gen- 
eral Assembly providing for the establishment of a legislative 
reference department in the Ohio State Library.® 

Reintroduced in the regular session of 1910, a bill was finally 
passed on May 10, 1910, as “An Act to provide for a legislative 
reference and information department in connection with the Ohio 
State Library.”? Under this law there was established in connec- 
tion with the state library a department to be known as the Legis- 
lative and Information Department for the use and information es- 
pecially of the general assembly, the officers of the several state 
departments and such other persons as may desire to consult the 
same. 

In 1913, an act entitled, “An Act to create a legislative refer- 
ence department, to provide for the maintenance and administration 
of the said department, for the appointment of a chief thereof, and 
to repeal sections 798-1 to 798-5 of the General Code of Ohio,” was 
passed by the assembly. This newly created department was still 
kept under the control of the board of library commissioners as 
was the old department. The duties of the chief prescribed by this 
act are the same as provided in Section 798-3, General Code.® 





5For a complete biography of Charles McCarthy, see: Frrzpatricx, Mc- 
CarTHy oF Wisconsin, (New York, 1944). 

6 House Bill No. 709, 77th General Assembly, was introduced January 7, 
1908, and was defeated in the house January 23, 1908. House Journal, Ohio 
General Assembly No. 99 (1908). 

House Bill No. 1043, 77th General Assembly, was introduced February 3, 
1908, and died in the committee on libraries. House Journal, Ohio General 
Assembly No. 99 (1908). 

7 House Bill No. 384, 78th General Assembly, passed April 30, 1910 (101 
Ohio Laws, 221). 

8103 Ohio Laws, 8. 

9“It shall be the duty of the director to collect and compare the laws 
of this and other states pertaining to any subject upon which he may be 
requested to report by the governor or any committee or member of the 
general assembly; to collect all available information relating to any matter 
which shall be the subject of proposed legislation by the general assembly; 
to prepare or advise in the preparation of any bill or resolution when re- 
quested to do so by the governor or by any member of the General Assem- 
bly; to preserve and collate all information obtained and carefully index and 
arrange the same so that it may be at all times easily accessible to the mem- 
bers of the general assembly, other state officials and to the general public 











1950] LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU 439 


In 1933 the control of the legislative reference bureau was 
transferred from the state library to a legislative reference board 
composed of the governor, clerk of the Senate and clerk of the 
House of Representatives, who appoint the director and the secre- 
tary of the bureau.’? 


FUNCTIONS OF THE BuREAU 
Bill Drafting 

“It shall be the duty of the director * * * to prepare or advise 
in the preparation of any bill or resolution when requested to do 
so by the governor or by any member of the general assembly ***”"! 

The most important function of the legislative reference bu- 
reau is the actual drafting of bills ready for introduction in the 
general assembly. Approximately 90 per cent of all bills and 
practically all resolutions introduced are prepared in the bureau. 
At the 1949 regular session of the general assembly, 1091 bills and 
resolutions were drafted in the bureau. 

The member either orally outlines the bill he desires drafted, 
or presents written notes which serve as a basis for the preparation 
of the bill by the drafter. Frequently drafts of bills which have 
been previously prepared outside the bureau are presented, which 
must be drawn over in order to meet the specifications of correctly 
drafted bills, including the standard component parts of title, en- 
acting clause, body and repeal clause.” 

The process by which.a bill is perfected through the facilities 
of the bureau, and made ready for introduction on the floor of the 
general assembly, makes an interesting story. 





for reference purposes; to collect such books, pamphlets, periodicals, docu- 
ments and other literature as may be of use to the general assembly or other 
state officials, and to keep the same on file in the quarters of the bureau, 
temporarily or permanently, according to the time for which such literature 
may be needed. It shall further be the duty of the director to collect, com- 
pile, classify and index the documents of the state, including Senate and 
House journals, executive and legislative documents and departmental reports 
of this and other states; to keep on file all bills and resolutions printed by 
order of either house of the general assembiy; to accumulate data and sta- 
tistics regarding the practical operation and effect of statutes of this and 
other states.” 

10 See: Onto Gen. Cope § 798-1. 

11 Onto Gen. Cope § 798-3. 

12 Sections of the Ohio General Code are either newly enacted, amended 
or repealed. A newly enacted section appears by reference to number, only, 
in the title and in section one of the bill, while the text of the section as 
enacted appears in the body of the bill. An amended section appears by refer- 
ence to number only in the title, in section one and in the repeal clause, and 
the text of the section amended appears in the body of the bill. A repealed 
section appears by reference to number only in the title and the repeal clause. 








440 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


The draftsman first makes a study of the General Code in or- 
der to determine if there is any statute now in force and effect, 
which covers the subject in any way, and determines whether any 
law relates either directly or indirectly to the content of the pro- 
posed bill. A like check is made of the session laws in order to as- 
certain whether any law, previously adopted by the General As- 
sembly, but not of a permanent or general nature has any bearing 
on the content of the bill.’ 

Through a complete set of the Journals of the general assembly, 
and through a like file of the final bulletins which index all bills 
and resolutions introduced, access can readily be had to the bills 
of any previous session of the general assembly, which may in any 
manner relate to the subject matter of the bill under consideration 
and which may be an important factor in determining the content 
of the new bill being prepared. Likewise the pamphlet acts of 
previous sessions are frequently utilized to great advantage, es- 
pecially where minor changes are made in a large number of sec- 
tions of previously enacted laws. (In this case, the bill is typed 
directly from the slip act.) 

The next step in the process is determining whether any com- 
parative legislation of other states would be helpful in the formu- 
lation of the content of the bill. Digests of legislation of other 
states on various subjects filed in the bureau library are used. Al- 
so the “State Law Index” of the Legislative Reference Service of 
the Library of Congress serves as an index to legislation in other 
states, citing acts which are available in the codes and session 
laws of the various states on file in the Supreme Court Law 
Library. 

Frequently the necessity of reading decisions of the supreme 
court and courts of appeals as well as Opinions of the Attorney 
General, construing certain sections of the code concerning which 
requests for amendments have been filed in the bureau, have im- 
portant bearing on the actual wording of the amendment sought. 
Then too, on numerous occasions amendments to statutes are re- 
quested for the express purpose of obviating previously rendered 
opinions of the attorney general and court decisions construing 
said statutes. 

On the face of it, the comparatively simple task of drafting 
a bill on any particular subject, may have far deeper implications. 
Is the bill within the encompassing sphere of constitutional limi- 
tations? Does the bill fulfill a legitimate function? Is there a 
philosophic background that justifies its existence? 

Whenever a bill is drafted by the bureau and questions of 





13 The reader should keep in mind the fact that only laws of a permanent 
or general nature are included in the Ohio General Code. 











1950] LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU 441 


constitutionality arise in the opinion of the staff of the bureau, 
a brief is presented to the author of the bill summarizing court 
decisions and attorney general’s opinions on the basis of which 
the bureau deems the bill constitutional or unconstitutional, as 
the case may be. 

But how are we to determine when the purpose of a law, which 
is unaffected by any express prohibition in the constitution, is 
legitimate? The answer may appear to be easy. Look first to the 
purpose of the constitution itself. Thus the central thought mani- 
fests itself as the very foundation upon which the whole is built. 
If the purpose of the proposed law is within this all encircling 
spirit then such law is legitimate, as anything fairly within that 
has always been, and must necessarily always be. 

Thus, far above the actual mechanics of lawmaking or law 
drafting lies a far more significant, a far deeper attribute. 

Another element of prime importance in legislative drafting 
is the confidential relationship which must of necessity be entered 
into between the legislator and the legislative reference bureau. 
Legislators being human, often take pride in being the first to 
initiate a brand-new idea on the floor of the legislative halls. 
Their thoughts and observations and suggested solutions of legis- 
lative problems must be guarded with utmost secrecy while the 
bill is in the process of preparation and until he, and he alone, 
cares to divulge it. 

The legislative reference bureau only fulfills its mission in 
prudent guidance. Never must it assert itself in matters of policy. 
That is the province of the legislator. Whenever the legislator has 
the slightest inkling that research or reference material has been 
assembled or put forward with the slightest flavor of bias, he 
will feel that the bureau is no longer serving on the high plane 
on which it was established. That is where the line must be closely 
drawn. The legislator must be the sole judge. Decisions must be 
based on facts. 

The actual bill drafting function loses its identity and merges 
itself into the finished product in the various steps a bill takes in 
its course through the general assembly. When the bill as finally 
enacted in the end finds its place in the Ohio General Code, it 
often bears no resemblance or perhaps only slight resemblance 
to the bill as initially introduced. This is often due to the ironing 
out of the wants and needs of conflicting interests to the best 
satisfaction of all concerned. 


The element of compromise enters into most successfully en- 
acted legislation. Unless a spirit of give and take plays its part 
in the process, very few laws would finally be enacted, and fre- 
quently compromises are successfully concluded through the 








442 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


intermediary relationship effected by the legislative reference bu- 
reau by which antagonistic minds are brought together and con- 
flicting ideas harmonized. 

These compromises are brought about on numerous occasions 
through the amending and reamending process in which the legis- 
lative reference bureau comes to the legislators’ assistance in 
the preparation of these amendments. 

It often happens that after introduction and reference to com- 
mittee and after committee hearings, and both sides of a question 
have been throughly discussed, a bill must be rewritten in its 
entirety. In that event the bureau is likely to be asked to draft 
a new bill. 

Usually amendments are offered to bills during their course 
through both houses of the general assembly, either in committee 
or on the floor of either house. Again it becomes the province of 
the legislative reference bureau to prepare these amendments. 

The conference table, whereat the discussion and digestion 
of crosscurrents of opinion frequently contribute an important 
element to the formulating of new legislation or the revamping 
of former laws, likewise plays its part in the legislative process. 
Here the facilities of the bureau are utilized to great advantage. 
In the preliminary discussion in which forthcoming legislation is 
outlined, in the threshing over and the rethreshing of ideas, the 
discussion around the conference table forms an invaluable aid. 

Often the draftsmen in the bureau are called to take part in 
these discussions, in preparation for the drafting of a bill and the 
director of the bureau frequently participates, upon request, in both 
the deliberations of interim commissions, pre-session conferences 
and in the multitude of instances where the counterplay of ideas 
precipitates a meeting of the minds on legislative issues. 


File of Bills, Resolutions and Acts 

“It shall further be the duty of the director *** to keep on file 
all bills and resolutions printed by order of either house of the 
general assembly; ***”!4 

Bills represent potential future legislation. They serve as a 
clearing house for embryonic ideas that will often crystalize in 
the future, but at the time of introduction they indicate matters 
that are stirring in the hearts and minds of the people, but are 
still without the backing of an organized public opinion. 

Bills introduced at previous sessions serve as stimuli to sub- 
sequent legislation. Often after repeated introductions into the 
General Assembly, these bills finally find their place in the statutes 
of the state. 





14 Onto Gen. Cone § 798-3. 











1950] LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU 443 


The bureau maintains a file of bills and joint resolutions in- 
troduced in the Ohio General Assembly since 1880;'5 and of acts 
passed since 1913. The copies of the acts on file are in the form 
of pamphlets or slip acts and are available for use of the bureau, 
the members of the general assembly, and for distribution in 
limited number to those parties having a special interest therein. 
This file of bills, joint resolutions and acts represents the only 
file kept in this state of proposed, as well as, of enacted legislation 
of previous sessions. 

All printed bills'® of each current session are bound into bill 
books and kept on file in the bureau. These include all printings 
of each bill, which may in some instances involve as many as two, 
three or four printings, as originally introduced, as amended bills, 
as substitute bills, and as amended substitute bills. 

Likewise separate copies of all bills printed including reprints 
are placed in file boxes according to bill number. These separate 
copies are utilized by the bureau for subsequent bill drafting, 
and copies are available to members of the general assembly as 
the basis for proposed legislation at later sessions, and a very 
limited number, if any, are available to the public for study by 
research or other agencies having a direct interest in the subject 
matter of the bill. A few copies of ail bills and acts are kept perm- 
anently on file. 

In some instances a bill is reported out to a standing committee 
with recommendations that it be not printed; it may however be 
rewritten by the standing committee which then reports the bill 
out with recommendations that it be printed as a substitute bill. 
Hence the bill is not available as originally introduced. 


Maintaining a Reference Library 

“Tt shall be the duty of the director *** to collect such books, 
pamphlets, periodicals, documents and other literature as may be 
of use to the general assembly or other state officials, and to keep 
the same on file in the quarters of the bureau, temporarily or 
permanently, according to the time for which such literature 
may be needed.”!” 

Another important duty of the bureau is the collection of 





15 See: Onto Gen. Cope § 798-6, which directs the clerk of both houses 
of the General Assembly to deliver, at the end of each session, copies of all 
bills and joint resolutions to the director of the legislative reference bureau. 

16 All bills are usually printed after introduction in the Senate, while in 
the House of Representatives bills undergo a general screening process by 
the reference committee. If the subject matter of the bill has been covered 
by a previously introduced bill, or if the bill can be handled as an amend- 
ment to another bill the reference committee so recommends and the bill is 
never printed. Bills of a frivolous nature are likewise not printed. 

17 Onto Gen. Cone § 798-3. 








444 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


a wide range of material that can be utilized in the preparation 
of legislation. 

The catalogued pamphlet library of the bureau covers sub- 
jects of legislative interest, especially in the field of the social 
sciences, including reports of legislative commissions of this and 
other states, and other special reports of studies and documents 
in the field of state government. It must be a working library, 
futuristic in intent and purpose. 

The library is indexed by author and subject and is constantly 
kept up to date by the addition of new material as published and 
through the elimination of obsolete or redundant material. 

In addition to the catalogued pamphlet library, there is also 
kept on file in the bureau one of the few extant complete sets 
of the journals of the Ohio Senate and the House of Representatives, 
containing a complete record of the proceedings of both houses 
of the general assembly since its inception in 1803. This is purely 
a procedural record as no stenographic transcripts of the debates 
on the floor of the general assembly or of committee hearings 
are made. 

The bureau also contains a complete set of the 123 volumes 
of the session laws of Ohio, a complete set of the Ohio Reports, 
Ohio State Reports and a set of Attorney General’s Opinions ren- 
dered since 1910. 


Digesting Legislation and Collecting Statistical Data 

“It shall be the duty of the director to collect and compare 
the laws of this and other states pertaining to any subject upon 
which he may be requested to report by the governor or any com- 
mittee or member of the general assembly; to collect all available 
information relating to any matter which shall be the subject of 
proposed legislation by the general assembly; ***’'!8 

Common sense tells us that we should secure all possible 
knowledge relating to a proposed statute for the use of our legis- 
lators. In this way legislation cannot avoid being improved; in 
this manner the best there is can be be culled from the statutes 
throughout the length and breadth of our land and the dearly 
bought experience in one state used for the betterment of condi- 
tions in another state. 

Especially during the interim beween sessions of the general 
assembly, digests of the laws of all states covering subjects within 
the scope of current interim commissions!’ or relating to subjects 





18 Jd. 

19The Ohio General Assembly is utilizing the interim commission more 
and more as an adjunct to the legislative process. These commissions serve 
as fact-finding agencies which make long range studies of legislative issues 
during the interim, and then prepare reports, embodying recommended bills 
carrying out the commissions’ recommendations. 











1950] LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU 445 


which are likely to come up for discussion at a forthcoming session 
of the general assembly, are prepared at the request of interim 
commissions or of individual members of the general assembly. All 
these digests are catalogued and placed on the library shelves for 
reference and are continually used in the drafting of bills or the 
supplying of research data for interim commissions, standing com- 
mittees of both houses of the general assembly, as well as indi- 
vidual members. 

The process of ascertaining statistical data or other factual 
information concerning any proposed legislation often involves 
the gleaning of information from federal and state documents and 
the necessary research work involved in checking material on 
file in various government agencies of the state of Ohio and its 
political subdivisions. 


THe Councit oF STATE GOVERNMENTS 


The Council of State Governments of Chicago, which is an 
outgrowth of the American Legislators’ Association established in 
1925, through the medium of its various publications, is an im- 
portant adjunct to the services offered by the reference bureau. 
This organization is committed to the improvement of state gov- 
ernment, especially on the legislative level. 

Among the numerous publications sponsored and published 
by the Council of State Governments and designed primarily to 
aid the legislative process and which have become leading tools 
of the legislative reference bureau, we may mention the following: 

“Recent Publications of Governmental Problems” (This is a 
self-explanatory weekly checklist.) 

“Legislative Research Checklist” (A monthly checklist based 
on information sent to the council by legislative and other govern- 
mental research agencies and prepared as an interstate reference 
service.) 

“State Government” (A monthly magazine on state affairs.) 

“The Book of the States” (This book is published biennially 
as an authoritative source of information on state activities, admin- 
istration, legislatures, services, problems and progress, together 
with current listings of state elective and administrative officials 
and members of the legislatures.) 

The Council of State Governments also acts in the capacity 
of secretariat for a number of conferences of officials on every 
level of governmental interest, national, state and local. 

Of chief interest to the legislative reference bureau is the 
Legislative Service Conference, organized in 1948. This confer- 
ence is composed of legislators who are officers of legislative 
service agencies, legislative librarians and reference officials, 








446 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


statutory and code revisors and legislative drafting officials of the 
states and territories. At the annual conference discussions of di- 
rect interest to all legislative service agencies are promoted. 


UTILizATION OF STUDENT SERVICES 

In the early nineteen twenties and continuously since that 
time the Ohio Legislative Reference Bureau has utilized the as- 
sistance of senior law students of the College of Law of The Ohio 
State University. These law students are chosen solely on the rec- 
ommendation of the dean of the law school and assist in the drafting 
of bills, resolutions and other requests for research work by mem- 
bers of the General Assembly. 

Under guidance the youth with a trained mind with its usual 
zest and vigor seizes upon the opportunity to serve the legislators. 
This zeal for intellectual companionship affords the senior law 
student a seminar in the solution of economic, political and social 
problems, which are being translated into the language of legis- 
lation. 

After a preliminary course in training in the principles of 
bill drafting, legislative research, parliamentary and constitu- 
tional law and Ohio government, during the months of November 
and December, prior to the opening of the legislative session in 
January, these senior law students are ready and available to 
enter upon their duties with ardor and zest. This stands out as a 
splendid example of how co-operation between the university and 
the reference bureau can work to the distinct advantage of the 
legislators. 


Our social order can never become stationary. As “new oc- 
casions teach new duties” we must advance and meet the problems 
of each new day and hour. The legislative reference bureau must 
envision the future, keep a step ahead of current events and 
foresee a particular need when the call to serve arrives. To 
accomplish this, the bureau must of necessity become a social 
inventor projecting plans far into the future and laid upon a defi- 
nite course. One must know where one is going, and we must 
insist on going forward, if only a step at a time. Thus our effort 
will accentuate itself in a better legislative process and a more 
finely delineated product. 

With courageous application to research and to the scholarly 
pursuit of information, with a keen insight into human nature 
and adaptability to the multitudinous demands of eight score and 
more legislators at any particular session of our General Assem- 
bly, the legislative reference bureau moves on with unflinching 
devotion to its goal: Service. 











Life History of a Bill in the Ohio Legislature 


GrorcEe B. MARSHALL* 


INTRODUCTION 


The 99th General Assembly of Ohio will convene in regular 
session on January 1, 1951. As usual a great many bills will be 
introduced seeking to make some amendments in our present 
laws, to repeal others, or to enact some new legislation. All acts of 
the legislature affect every citizen of the state in some measure, 
but, of course, individual acts affect certain interested groups 
more than others. Therefore there is much interest manifested 
both in favor of and against each bill which is presented and that 
interest continues until the bill is lost some place along the line 
or is finally enacted into law. Usually less than a third of the bills 
introduced are finally enacted into law. The purpose of this paper 
is to show the steps required to enact a law in our state legis- 
lature. This logically will deal first with the preparation of a bill 
and secondly with the steps necessary for its enactment into law. 


A. PREPARATION OF BILL 
Approximately 75% of all bills introduced in the general as- 
sembly are drafted by the Legislative Reference Bureau which is 
a bill-drafting service free to members. The balance of the bills 
introduced are prepared by private attorneys, organizations, or 
by the members themselves. 


Task of Bill Drafter 

A request by a member for the drafting of a bill may be a 
simple matter or a very complex one, depending in part on the 
subject-matter of the request and in part on the completeness of 
the idea to be incorporated into the bill. Some bills have been 
carefully worked over in advance by special groups, such as bar 
associations, organizations of county auditors, professional so- 
cieties, and the like. These bills ordinarily require only formal 
corrections. Administration measures are usually found in this 
same classification. The member introducing a bill may be pledged 
by campaign promises to introduce a measure on which he is an 
authority or on which he has definite and detailed ideas. It then 
becomes the duty of the bill-drafter to incorporate the given 
ideas into a workable bill, which sometimes requires considerable 
research and often an investigation into the constitutionality of 
the proposed bill. Some bills are introduced “by request” of a 





* State Senator from Franklin County, Ohio. 


447 








448 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


member’s constituents. Oftentimes these are difficult to draft be- 
cause of the vagueness of the idea and too often they do not get 
the sincere enthusiastic support of their authors. 


Essential Parts of a Bill 

All bills, whether long or short, simple or complicated, have 
certain essential parts prescribed by the constitution, by statute, 
or by rule. For example, every bill must carry a number, the num- 
ber of the assembly with the type of session, the name of the author 
or introducer, title, enacting clause, body of bill divided into 
sections, and a repealing clause if the purpose of the bill is to amend 
or repeal an existing law. The space for the number is left blank 
until the bill is introduced, at which time the clerk assigns it a 
consecutive number, depending on the order of its introduction. 
A bill introduced next year would have at the upper left-hand 
corner the words “99th General Assembly, Regular Session, 1951- 
1952.” Next would follow the name of the author or introducer. 
The State Constitution requires that “no bill shall contain more 
than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title.” It 
is also a constitutional requirement that a bill have an enacting 


clause, as follows: 
“Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio.” 


Example of Original Bill 

When the subject matter of the bill is new, and is not already 
contained in the General Code of Ohio, the title of such a bill 
might read, for example, as follows: 

“A bill to levy and collect taxes on the business of grey- 

hound racing in the State of Ohio; and to provide a penalty 

for violation thereof.” 

Example of a Simple Amendment 

When the purpose of the bill is to amend an existing law, al- 
ready included in the general code, the title of the bill might 
read thus: 

“A bill to amend Section 1398 of the General Code rela- 

tive to the open season on muskrat in the inland trap- 

ping district.” 

Example of Supplemental Bill 

If the purpose of a bill is to supplement an existing law its 
title might read: 

“A bill to supplement Section 5609 of the General Code 

by the enactment of supplemental Section 5609-1, rela- 

tive to the abolishment of taxes on over-valued or as- 

sessed real property.” 

Example of Simple Repeal 

If the bill is designed simply to repeal an existing law, its 

title might be: 











1950] LIFE HISTORY OF A BILL 449 


“A bill to repeal Section 13421-23 of the General Code rela- 
tive to the Criminal syndicalism law.” 


Body of the Bill 

The aforementioned requirements of a bill, while essential, 
are preliminary to the real purpose and body of the bill, which is 
next set forth. The body of a bill is the part which is finally 
printed into the code of the state and which declares and regis- 
ters the will of the assembly. A bill may be of any length provided 
it conforms to the constitutional rule that it shall not contain 
more than one subject. As a matter of convenience the body of 
the bill is divided into logical sections of convenient length. 


Who May Introduce Bills 

Bills may be introduced by any of the 33 State Senators or of 
the 135 members of the House of Representatives elected to the 
State Legislature. Even so-called administration measures must 
be introduced by a member of the assembly. This requirement 
is in contrast with the practice in Congress where committees may 
initiate bills. 

When Bills may be Introduced 

The introduction of bills is a regular order of business in 
the regular session from the time it first convenes at the beginning 
of each odd-numbered year until the fixed deadline which by 
rule is usually the second Monday in February. 

This deadline does not, however, apply to appropriation 
bills. Another exception is made by the Joint Rules which per- 
mit introduction of bills in either House when permission is given 
by a three-fifths vote of the elected members. Such permission 
is rarely asked for or given in the House but is frequently and 
usually given in the Senate as an act of “Senatorial Courtesy.” 


Number of Bills Introduced 
Some members do not introduce any bills. Others introduce 
as many as 50. The total number of bills introduced during the 
past eight years averages well over 900 at each regular session. 
852 bills were introduced three years ago, of which only 245 be- 
came law, and 1074 bills were introduced last year at the Regular 
Session, of which only 293 became law. 


Numbering of Sections 
If the subject-matter of a bill is new the sections are consec- 
utively numbered, and if the bill is of the general nature, the 
sections are later given code section numbers by the Bureau of 
Code Revision, so as to fit the new law into the code at the proper 
place. If the purpose is to add a supplemental section to an ex- 
isting section in the code, the introducer refers to the section to 








450 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


be supplemented and gives the new section a supplemental section 
number. If the bill simply repeals existing sections of the code, 
it mentions them specifically and these sections are eliminated 
from future printings of the code. If the purpose of the bill is to 
amend existing sections, all or any part of the section may be elim- 
inated or new matter may be added to any part of the section 
so long as the matter relates to the general subject contained 
in the section. 


Repealing Clause 
In case an existing law is either amended or repealed the last 
section of the bill is a repealing clause. 


Emergency Measure 

A bill which is intended to take effect immediately after its 
passage and approval by the governor must contain an emergency 
clause fully setting forth the reason for such emergency and the 
title of such a bill must declare that the bill is to be an emergency 
measure. An emergency measure requires a 2/3 majority vote 
and takes effect immediately following the approval of the gov- 
ernor, thereby eliminating the 90-day referendum period required 
for ordinary bills. 


B. ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION 

I have just shown in a summary fashion how bills are pre- 
pared and made ready for introduction. Let me now follow the 
course of such a bill from the time it is introduced in either house 
of the state legislature until it is enacted into law. While there are 
slight differences in the procedure in the House and Senate, the 
essential steps are the same, and I will outline the procedure in 
the House of Representatives. 


First Reading 

The 8th order of business in the House is the introduction 
of bills. The 88 counties are called in alphabetical order. If a mem- 
ber from Frankliri County, for example, desires to introduce a bill 
he waits until the Clerk calls the name of Franklin County then 
rises to his feet and offers the bill (6 copies required by rule). 
A page comes to the member and carries the bill to the desk of 
the clerk where it is numbered and given its first reading, which 
is by title only. 


Reference of Bill 
After its first reading the bill is sent to the Reference Com- 
mittee for its consideration and report. The Reference Committee 
must, within eight legislative days from the time it receives a bill, 
report the bill back to the House and recommend the proper stand- 
ing committee to consider the bill. In actual practice the House 











1950] LIFE HISTORY OF A BILL 451 


Reference Committee, or its chairman acting for the Committee 
has been more than a sorting committee. It has scrutinized bills as 
to both form and substance and on one pretext or another has on 
occasion held up certain bills until the Administration is ready to 
have them released. Furthermore, the committee wields great in- 
fluence in being able to steer bills into standing committees which 
may be known to favor or oppose the bills. The use of a Reference 
Committee as we have it in Ohio is somewhat unique in parlia- 
mentary practice. In the Ohio Senate the presiding officer, on 
motion of the author, refers all bills to standing committees. 


Second Reading 

The reading of the bill by title only, together with the report 
of the Reference Committee, constitutes the second reading of the 
bill, which is then ordered printed. Within several days there- 
after the printed bill is placed on the desk of the members and is 
available to the public. The chairman of the standing committee 
to which the bill is referred retains custody of the actual bill and 
amendments thereto. 


Hearings by Standing Committees 

There are at present twenty-two standing committees in the 
House of Representatives, having from five to twenty-five mem- 
bers each. The Senate has nineteen standing committees, the 
membership ranging from three in the Enrollment Committee to 
sixteen in the Military Affairs Committee. Certain committees, 
such as the Judiciary, Taxation and Finance Committees meet 
regularly each week and several times each week in rooms spe- 
cifically assigned for use of such committees. Other committees 
meet only on call of the Chairman in whatever committee room 
is available at the time. 


Work of Committees 

The real work of digesting and considering the bill is done in 
meetings of the standing committees after public hearings and dis- 
cussions on the merits of the bill. After the committee has made 
what it considers a sufficient study of the bill, its chairman calls 
for a vote. On a roll call a majority of the committee member- 
ship must vote in favor of a motion to refer the bill out of com- 
mittee with recommendation for passage. The committee might 
approve a motion to continue hearings on the bill, or to refer it to 
a subcommittee for further study. Another common motion is one 
to postpone indefinitely further consideration of the bill and such 
action must be reported to the House and entered upon its journal. 
The Secretary keeps a record of all amendments and motions of- 
fered and of the vote on such amendments and motions. He will 
also take custody of exhibits and briefs offered to the committee. 








452 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL {Vol. 11 


The rules require each committee to keep a record of committee 
attendance and the names of all persons who speak before the 
committee, with the names of the persons, firms, associations or 
corporations in whose behalf they appear. Before any committee 
reports a bill to the House, its chairman must submit it to the 
Reference Committee and obtain its suggestions as to its form and 
legal effect. After approval of the bill by the Reference Committee, 
the Chairman of the Standing Committee makes a report on the 
same from the floor of the House on the alphabetical call of the 
committees, either recommending the passage of the bill as origin- 
ally introduced or as amended by the committee. The bill is then 
ordered engrossed and is put on the calendar for its third reading, 
which is the second day following, unless otherwise ordered by a 
vote of the House. 


Joint Committee Meetings 


It is possible and often desirable for similar committees of the 
House and Senate to meet in joint committee meetings to hear ex- 
perts speak for and against important measures being considered 
simultaneously by both houses. This would save time for both 
the members and the public, since a bill must eventually have the 
approval of the committees of both houses. However, the holding 
of joint committee meetings is not common practice because of the 
difficulties of finding a time when substantially all the members 
can attend. Both chambers usually meet each Monday evening, 
Tuesday and Wednesday afternoons and Thursday morning, and 
no committees may hold meetings during such times. This leaves 
for regular committee meetings Tuesday morning and evening, and 
Wednesday morning and evening. Sometimes hearings are set for 
immediately after a session or for early Thursday morning. Thus 
it can be readily seen that with the members serving on from two 
to seven committees, and many of these committees meeting reg- 
ularly each week, it is difficult and often impossible to work out 
effective joint committee meetings. 


Discharge of Standing Committees 

A committee chairman has considerable discretion in the 
handling of bills. Sometimes he insists on many meetings cover- 
ing a long period of time, which makes other members impatient. 
The house rules provide that a standing committee may be dis- 
charged of a bill by a motion supported by four other members, 
and adopted by a roll call vote in which a majority of all elected 
members vote to support the motion. This gives control to the ma- 
jority party leadership. Since committee chairmen are appointed 
by the speaker and usually work in close cooperation with him and 
the majority party in control of the house, it is a rare event to dis- 











1950] LIFE HISTORY OF A BILL 453 


charge a committee of further consideration of a bill and such 
motions are seldom made. 


Calendar Committee 

About March ist a resolution is offered by the House leader- 
ship to designate the Rules Committee to serve as the Calendar 
Committee, giving it power to arrange the calendar from day to 
day and to select bills on the basis of their necessity or general in- 
terest. Usually the Rules Committee selects about six bills for 
consideration on the date of the calendar and a similar number for 
the succeeding legislative day. The Senate Rules provide that the 
standing committee on rules shall have the power to prescribe the 
order of business of the Senate and arrange the calendar from day 
to day. The majority party in each house selects and controls the 
Rules Committee and thus wields great power over the course of 
legislation. 


Third Reading 

Bills for third reading are taken up and read and disposed of 
in the order in which they appear on the calendar. The author of 
a bill is always recognized first to present his bill. If the bill origi- 
nated in the other house the member selected by the author to 
handle the bill is recognized and given the opportunity to present 
the bill. Opportunity is then given any member to speak for or 
against the bill and to offer amendments. Corrective amendments 
are usually accepted and adopted without extensive debate. 
Amendments making substantial changes in a bill are often fully 
debated before a vote is taken. The person who offers an amend- 
ment always makes the first argument in support of his amend- 
ment. The author, or sponsor, is then given an opportunity to de- 
bate the amendment. If he gives his consent, there is usually little 
further debate before the vote is taken, but if he opposes the sug- 
gested amendment there is often considerable floor discussion and 
debate. Oftentimes the chairman or a member of the committee 
which heard and recommended the bill is recognized and asked to 
comment on the amendment. 


Administration Bills 

There are always a certain number of bills which are called 
administration measures. These are either recommended by the 
Governor or introduced to carry out certain planks of the platform 
of the party in control of the House. Usually the majority party 
caucuses on such bills before they come up for third reading and 
there is an understanding as to what, if any, amendments will be 
allowed to be adopted on the floor. Surprise amendments pre- 
sented by the minority members usually have a difficult time to be 
adopted unless the majority leader is willing to accept the amend- 








454 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


ment and gives the signal for favorable action. Because final adop- 
tion is ordinarily assured in advance, the prolonged debate usually 
is made for the benefit of the gallery, press, and constituents of 
the various members. The members wish to make a record of the 
various votes on amendments, procedural motions and the final 
vote on the bill. There is also considerable maneuvering to de- 
mand or avoid a record roll call by getting a motion passed or 
tabled by a voice or standing vote. The minority is given the op- 
portunity to get its case before the House by submitting a list of 
opposition speakers to the presiding officer and he usually calls on 
definite proponents and opponents alternately before recognizing 
other members for general debate or amendments. 


Committee of the Whole 

The rules of both houses permit a bill to be referred to the 
committee of the whole House or Senate, and to fix a time when it 
shall be considered by the entire body acting as such committee of 
the whole. The speaker or president will designate a member to 
serve as Chairman, who will preside and vote as other members. 
Any amendments made or passed are noted by the clerk and when 
the matter is later submitted to the House or Senate for action, it 
will again consider the amendments before voting on the bill as 
amended. This procedure is not often used in the House but is 
common practice in the Senate. 


Vote on Third Reading 
After the presiding officer is satisfied that no one else desires 
the floor for debate or amendment, or when the previous question 
is properly asked for and adopted, the question is then put, “Shall 
the bill pass?” A roll call vote is taken by the clerk and if the bill 
receives a constitutional majority it is declared passed as an “act.” 


Necessity for passage by both Houses 

After a bill has passed the originating house, the next step is 
its transmission td the other house for introduction in that body. 
Approximately the same procedure is followed in the second house. 
If the bill is passed by the second house in exactly the same form 
as in the first house, it is signed by the speaker of the house and 
by the President of the Senate and sent to the Governor for his 
approval or disapproval. If the second house adopts amendments 
to the bill it is returned to the originating house with the amend- 
ments, which if agreed to by the first house, will be sent to the 
Governor for his approval. 


Conference Committee 


If the originating house does not see fit to concur in the amend- 
ments of the second house, a conference committee consisting of 3 











1950] LIFE HISTORY OF A BILL 455 


members from each house is appointed to consider the various 
amendments and to propose to both houses a bill which will be 
satisfactory to both. Each house then votes on the conference 
committee report, the members voting for or against the report. 
If both agree on the report the effect is the same as passage of a 
bill in identical form by the two houses and the bill is sent to the 
Governor. If either house refuses to approve the conference com- 
mittee report, the bill is dead unless such house requests the ap- 
pointment of a second conference committee and such request is 
agreed to by the other house. 


Effective Date of Act 

If the Governor approves a bill he signs it and has it filed with 
the Secretary of State. The bill becomes effective 90 days after 
such filing unless a referendum vote has been demanded by peti- 
tions circulated for that purpose. Emergency measures 4nd acts pro- 
viding tax levies and appropriations for the current expenses of 
state government become operative immediately after passage and 
approval by the Governor. 


Veto Power of Governor 

If the Governor does not approve a bill he returns it with his 
objections noted in a veto message to the house originating the bill. 
In its proper order the message of the Governor is read and the 
question is put: “Shall the bill pass notwithstanding the objections 
of the Governor?” If 3/5 of the members elected to that house vote 
to repass the bill, it is sent with the objections of the Governor to 
the other house, which may also reconsider the vote on its passage. 
If 3/5 of the members elected to that house vote to repass it, it be- 
comes a law notwithstanding the objections of the Governor. Of 
course if the vetoed bill is not approved by both houses as just in- 
dicated, it does not become a law. If a bill is not returned by the 
Governor within ten days, Sundays excepted, after being present- 
ed to him, it becomes a law in like manner, as if he had signed it. 
The Governor has the right to disapprove separate items in an ap- 
propriation bill, but the assembly may repass such items in the 
same manner as a vetoed bill. 








Judicial Interpretatica of Constitutional Limita- 
tions on Legislative Procedure in Ohio 
Howarp M. Metzensaum* 


Of prime importance in enacting a legislative bill into law is 
the question of whether or not the bill as enacted will stand up 
under judicial scrutiny when its validity is attacked in court. The 
validity of a statute is generally questioned on the ground of some 
constitutional defect under the federal or state constitution de- 
pending on the circumstances and may either be a matter of sub- 
stance or procedure. It is the purpose of this paper to examine 
the problems involved from a procedural point of view as they 
have arisen in the State of Ohio.! 

The fundamental questions are (1) the attitude of the courts 
when they are requested to look behind the enacted bill to discover 
defects in its passage, and (2) in any event, if defects are alleged 
to exist, whether such defects will be considered by the court in 
determining the validity of the measure. 

By way of introduction into the first above mentioned question 
it may be stated that the conflict is between the enrolled bill itself 
as precluding any further search of the records and the journal 
kept by the legislative body of its activities as the controlling in- 
strument. The words “enrolled bill” have accumulated many shades 
of meaning but in general they refer to a bill which has been passed 
by both houses of a legislature and signed by the presiding officers 
thereof. Such may also include the signature of the governor and 
the filing of the bill with the secretary of state.2 As to the journal 
in Ohio, it is a constitutional requirement and must be published.’ 

Throughout this country, the courts have adopted various 
theories in approaching the question of the validity of a statute.‘ 
One such view is that the enrolled bill is conclusive and no evidence 
will be admitted to show that required procedure was not followed 
in its passage or that the contents of the enrolled bill differ from 
the contents of the bill as passed by the legislative body. A second 
view holds that the enrolled bill is prima facie correct and only 
when the legislative journal affirmatively shows an omission of a 





* State Senator from The Twenty-Fifth District in Ohio. 

1The problems under discussion here are not peculiar to Ohio. For in- 
formative matter as to other jurisdictions see the following secondary sources: 
46 Mic. L. Rev. 989 (1948); 32 Iowa L. Rev. 147 (1946); [1941] Wisc. L. Rev. 
439, 15 Nes. L. But. 233 (1937); 21 Iowa L. Rev. 538 (1936); 3 Rocky Moun- 
TAIN L. Rev. 38 (1936). 

2 SuTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STaTuToRY ConstrucTION, § 1401 (3rd 1943). 

3 Onto Const. Art. II § 9. 

4Ritzman v. Campbell, 93 Ohio St. 246, 112 N.E. 591 (1915); SurHeranp, 
supra § 1402. 


456 











1950] CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 457 


constitutionally-required procedural step will the enrolled bill be 
invalidated. Still another theory holds the enrolled bill is prima 
facie correct but evidence from the journal or from any other re- 
liable source may be offered to show that the requisite procedure 
was not followed or that the enrolled bill differs in content from 
the bill as passed. A fourth and last view holds that the bill is 
valid only if the requisite steps are shown by the journal to have 
taken place. 

In Ohio, the leading case of Ritzman v. Campbell’ established 
the enrolled bill theory as to the contents of a measure and handed 
down a dictum that went almost that far as to procedural require- 
ments. In this case the court said®: 

Meanwhile an enrolled bill bearing the solemn attestation 

that it was signed by the presiding officers of each house 

while the same was in session and capable of doing busi- 
ness, and which thereafter was presented to and signed by 

the Governor and by him filed with the Secretary of State, 

must, if the legislative journal shows it to have received 

the necessary constitutional majority be considered to be 

what it purports to be, and not under any circumstances 

subject to impeachment as to its contents or the mode of 

its passage. 

It will be noted that the court provided an exception as to 
procedure, indicating that the journal must show the bill received 
the constitutional majority. Authority for this approach developed 
out of the earlier case of Fordyce v. Goodman’, which held that 
when the question of whether a bill has been passed by the requisite 
number of legislators is raised, the journals are proper evidence to 
determine the answer. While this represents an apparent deviation 
into another theory mentioned earlier, the court offered a very 
practical justification, pointing out that to hold otherwise would 
open the door for presiding officers to enact a bill without the 
proper vote. Further, until the journal itself is produced to show 
that the requisite number of votes was not received, the enrolled 
bill will be presumed to have received the required constitutional 
majority.’ 

Occasionally a question arises as to the authoritativeness of 
the certified copies of the enrolled bills published in the volumes 
of Ohio Laws under the authority of the secretary of state. Such 
copies are prima facie evidence of the law and may be controverted 
by reference to the enrolled bills!® but not to the journals of the 








5 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra. 

6 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra, at 263. 

7 Fordyce v. Goodman, 20 Ohio St. 1 (1870). 

8 Hilton v. State ex rel. Bell, 108 Ohio St. 233, 140 N.E. 681 (1923); Steam- 
boat Northern Indiana v. Milliken, 7 Ohio St. 384 (1857). 

9 State ex rel. Rogers v. Price, 8 Ohio C.C. 25, 4 Ohio C.D. 296 (1893). 

10 State v. Groves, 8 Ohio St. 351, 88 N.E. 1096 (1909). 








458 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


legislature.!! 

Turning now to the second question involved in this discussion, 
namely, what limitations the court will consider in testing the 
validity of a bill, the law of Ohio seems clear. The Constitution of 
the State of Ohio provides for the reading of a bill fully and dis- 
tinctly on three different days, unless this provision is properly 
waived.'?. As to this provision, the court will not travel behind 
the enacted bill to see if compliance therewith has been had, holding 
this provision to be merely directory in its nature and not manda- 
tory upon the legislature.'’ This last statement was made con- 
crete in the later case of Tim v. Nicholson'* which dealt with the 
constitutional provision that no bill shall contain more than one 
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.!5. This limini- 
tation was held to be intended only as a permanent rule for pro- 
ceedings in the legislature and therefore directory. The court said 
it would not be considered in determining the validity of the bill. 
The safeguard suggested by the court was the legislators’ regard 
for and their oath to support the constitution of the State. 

However, as to other provisions they have been labeled as 
mandatory,'® which in effect is saying that non-compliance will 
result in invalidating the bill. 

The Ohio Constitution provides that no law shall be passed 
in either house without the concurrence of a majority of each 
House’s members.'’ This is clearly a mandatory limitation on the 
legislature.'8 

Presentment of a bill to the governor for his approval and the 
subsequent filing of a bill which is subject to referendum with the 
secretary of state are of a similar import.!° 


In the case of State v. Kiesewetter?® the court held section 17 
of Article II of the Constitution of Ohio was mandatory and there- 





11 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra, note 4. Contrary expressions in early low- 
er court cases are, of course, without authority. See State ex rel. Rogers v. 
Price, supra, Burke v. Cincinnati, 10 Ohio Dec. 542 (1900). 

12 Onto Const. Art. II § 16. 

13 Miller and Gibson v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475 (1854). But see Bloom v. 
Xenia, 32 Ohio St. 461 (1877). 

14 Tim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 176 (1856); Ohio ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Cov- 
ington et al., 29 Ohio St. 102 (1876); Seeley v. Thomas, 31 Ohio St. 301 (1877); 
Weil v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450, 21 N.E. 643 (1889); Jones v. County Commis- 
sioners et al., 2 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 14, 15 Ohio C. D. 510 (1903). 

15 Onto Const. Art. II § 16. 

16 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra. 

17 Onto Const. Art. II § 9. 

18 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra; Fordyce v. Goodman, supra. 

19 Werde v. Richardson, 77 Ohio St. 182, 82 N.E. 1072 (1907) (As to presen- 
tation to governor). 

20 State v. Kiesewetter, 45 Ohio St. 254, 12 N.E. 807 (1887). 











1950] CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 459 


fore the presiding officers of each house must sign the bill publicly 
in the presence of the house and while it is in session and capable 
of doing business, or the bill is invalid and open to attack. As a 
practical matter, due to time limitations on the printing of bills, 
each House of the General Assembly oftentimes meets in skeleton 
session in order that this requirement may be met, without keep- 
ing the entire membership present for such purpose. Inasmuch as 
no roll call is taken on these days, the journal affirmatively fails 
to reflect the absence of a quorum, and it is problematical as to 
whether any court would question the procedure. 

Directly related to this problem and necessary to a more com- 
plete understanding is the theory of the court concerning impeach- 
ment of the journal, or what evidence the court will admit in order 
to establish the facts as they differ from those reported in the 
journal. 

In the interesting case of Wrede v. Richardson?', the court al- 
lowed reference to be made to (a) the “Minute Book” kept in the 
governor’s office, (b) to receipts given by the governor’s clerk, 
and (c) to a statement written on the enrolled bill itself to show 
that the bill in question has been presented to the governor and 
had become a law without his signature. The court, in this case, 
refused to admit the testimony of witnesses to the effect that the 
governor had not been presented with the bill and that he had 
been ill and had not been at his office at the time the bill was al- 
legedly presented to him. The court was of the opinion that the 
Minute Book was admissible because it was kept, like the legis- 
lative journal, in accordance with law. The protection of the 
governor’s daily record here is in line with the general rule apply- 
ing to the journal; namely, that it cannot in cases of legislative 
procedure be impeached.”? 

Outside the realm of legislative procedure, the journal has 
been the subject of two important cases. The first case, State ex rel. 
Loomis v. Moffitt?, decided in 1832, came up on a writ of quo 
warranto to test the authority by which one Moffitt undertook the 
duties of a judgeship. A direct attack was made on the legislative 
journal, and the court held that the journal could not be contra- 
dicted by the parol evidence of one individual member, the journal 
being the action of the whole body and not of a single member. 
The doctrine of the Moffitt case was departed from in Harbage v. 
Tracy**, decided in 1937. In this case, the journal indicated that 


21 Werde v. Richardson, supra. 

22 State ex rel. Rogers v. Price, supra; State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44 
Ohio St. 348, 7 N.E. 447 (1886). 

23 State ex rel. Loomis v. Moffitt, 5 Ohio 358 (1832). 

24 Harbage v. Tracy, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 553 (1937), aff'd. 64 Ohio App. 151 
(1939), app. diss’d. 136 Ohio St. 534 (1939). For a complete discussion of this 
case, see 5 Onto Sr. L. J. 213 (1939); 25 Minn. L. Rev. 528 (1941). 











460 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL {Vol. 11 


the legislature had been in session during a particular period, when 
in fact it had not. The court permitted the journal to be impeached 
by extrinsic evidence saying,”’: 

. .. we are of the opinion that such a manifest mis- 
statement of facts cannot be shielded from scrutiny which 
would develop the truth by the claim that the journals 
of the two houses may not be impeached. 

In the light of these decisions, it would seem to be a fair con- 


clusion that the general rule of not permitting the legislative 
journal to be impeached still exists, but an exception will be 
made if manifest fraud is made known to the court. 


SUMMARY 

One may well inquire as to the grounds upon which the Ohio 
Courts have accepted the enrolled bill theory in preference to the 
others. The court, in the Ritzman case*® stated that practical con- 
siderations made this the only wise rule. At the end of every legis- 
lative term literally hundreds of bills are passed and presented to 
the enrolling clerks who are compelled to work under exhausting 
pressure. Under these circumstances there are bound to be some 
discrepancies between the bills which are passed and the bills as 
they are actually enrolled. To look behind the enrolled bill would 
result in the invalidating of a great many statutes and it is doubt- 
ful if any useful public purpose would be served. 

As to the second view, holding the journal conclusive if it 
affirmatively shows the omission of a step, it appears to be an un- 
workable solution. The journal will seldom if ever affirmatively 
indicate an omission.?” 

The third approach permitting evidence from the journal and 
any other reliable source to impeach the enrolled bill, is the most 
liberal view and while not the law in Ohio, it is gaining favor.’*. 

To hold the journal conclusive, and the bill valid only if the 
requisite steps are shown to have been taken on its face is the 
most unworkable of all the theories. This fact was recognized by 
the court in the Miller case,?? in which the court said: 


If a strict, literal compliance with every constitutional 
requirement, however, minute, is necessary to the validity 
of a law, and the courts are bound to hold that nothing 
was done but what appears in the legislative journal, it is 
easy to demonstrate that not a single statute enacted since 
the constitution took effect can be upheld. 





25 Harbage v. Tracy, supra, at 162. 

26 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra. 

27 Ohio cases supra, will for the most part bear this out, except as to the 
requirement that the statute must have received the majority of votes set forth 
yxy the constitution. 

28 SUTHERLAND, supra, § 1402. 

29 Miller v. State, supra, at 481. 











1950] CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 461 


On final analysis, it seems that the Ohio courts have accepted 
the most workable solution available, admitting that human beings 
do err, and have made the theory flexible enough to permit ex- 
ceptions when sound reason demands. 

In dividing the constitutional limitations into directory and 
mandatory classifications, the courts have done so on their own 
authority, there being nothing in the constitution to indicate any 
difference. It appears that the courts have made directory those 
limitations which are not inherently essential to the validity of a 
bill, and have at the same time maintained the dignity of the con- 
stitution, by putting the legislators on their honor. To those who 
would argue that the constitution ought to be followed to the 
letter, it might be said that the realistic approach of the courts 
gives the words of the constitution a workable interpretation and 
is therefore preferable. 

Over all, the law of Ohio concerning these problems generally 
is comparatively clear and definite. The decisions have created 
a workable framework which permit legislator and practitioner 
alike to understand and cope with legislative procedure in Ohio. 








General Versus Special Statutes in Ohio 
W. T. Matuison, Jr.* 


Introduction 

Before the Civil War there was widespread recognition that 
the state legislatures were abusing their power to enact special and 
local legislation.! There was no doubt at all that power to enact 
statutes of this character existed under the accepted American 
theory that the power of state legislatures is plenary except as 
specifically restricted. It was equally certain that there were 
proper occasions for the use of a special statute. A law for the re- 
lief of a particular person under circumstances thought to create 
a moral obligation on the part of the state but where no remedy 
was otherwise provided is an example. However, the state leg- 
islatures, Ohio’s included,? abused special statutes by passing 
them in numbers out of all proportion to need and without any 
serious attempt by the whole memberships of the legislatures to 
examine the merits of proposed bills. Those members whose con- 
stituents were immediately affected usually sponsored the legis- 
lation and log-rolling tactics customarily resulted in its adoption. 
The abuse of special legislation became the normal state of affairs. 
Municipalities became the particular victims of irresponsible legis- 
lative majorities. There is no evidence to support the view that 
special statutes were used because they were considered more 
effective in the circumstances as a matter of policy. Rather, the 
view was that the legislature could more effectively maintain its 
own overriding control by the use of specialism. 

Constitutional provisions were supplied in order to prevent 
special legislation in those situations where general legislation 
could do the job more effectively or in situations where special 
legislation was believed to have been abused.‘ At the present time 





* Sterling Fellow, Yale Law School; Teaching and Research Assistant, the 
College of Law, The Ohio State University, 1949-1950. 

The writer desires to express his appreciation to Dean Jefferson B. Ford- 
ham for the use of notes prepared for the course in legislation in the College 
of Law of The Ohio State University. 

1 For a discussion of the background of legislative abuse of special laws, 
see Cloe and Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24 Ky. L. J. 351, 355-358 
(1936). 

2 For a discussion of legislative abuse of special laws in Ohio, see Walker, 
Municipal Government in Ohio Before 1912, 9 Onto State L. J. 1 (1948). 

3 Many state constitutions now contain express prohibitions against spe- 
cial legislation regulating municipalities as well as a general provision against 
special legislation. See, e.g., Munn. Const. Art. IV, § 33. 

4 See 2 SuTHERLAND, STaTuToRY ConsTRUCTION § 2101 (3rd ed., Horack, 1943). 


462 











1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 463 


there are several types of such state constitutional provisions. Mis- 
souri, for example, prohibits local and special laws in twenty-nine 
enumerated instances and in any instances where a general law 
can be made to apply.’ It is expressly provided that the problem 
of the applicability of a general law is a judicial question. A num- 
ber of states simply have the general provision that no special law 
can be enacted where a general law can be made applicable.’ Where 
the state constitutions do not speak to the point there is a division 
of opinion among the courts as to the ‘judiciality” of the provi- 
sion.’ A third group of states prohibit special laws when there is 
already a general law on the subject.’ This small group, in effect, 
permits legislative determination of generality or specialty but 
does not allow both general and special legislation to co-exist on 
the same subject. Ohio belongs to still another group. All of the 
states which prohibit or restrict special legislation stand in con- 
spicuous contrast to the federal government which has no such 
limitation in its basic law.'!° Some of the states have no constitu- 
tional provisions dealing with the subject. 

The most important of the various Ohio constitutional pro- 
visions concerned with special and general legislation is Article II, 
Section 26, which provides, in part, “All laws, of a general nature, 
shall have a uniform operation throughout the State. . .” A def- 
inition of “laws, of a general nature” is not provided. Perhaps the 
provision of a guide to the meaning of the phrase was regarded as 
superfluous by the members of the Constitutional Convention of 
1851 who were probably quite sure that the clause was aimed at 
the then plethora of special and local legislation and required no 
explanation beyond the facts which brought it into existence. In 
any event, a substantial body of case law has been applied to its 
interpretation. 

Article II, Section 26,'! is written in general language and has 
been held to apply to all subjects except those explicitly and ex- 





5 Mo. Constr. Art. III, § 40. Many of the enumerated items are applicable 
to local government units. 

6 Mo. Const. Art. III, § 40, sub. 30. 

7 See, e.g., Mtcn. Const. Art. 5, § 30. 

8 See 2 SuTHERLAND, Statutory Construction § 2103 (3rd ed., Horack, 1943). 

9 See, e.g,. Pa. Const. Art. III, § 7. 

10 The equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Federal Constitution is, however, relevant to the problem of classifica- 
tion. “Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is 
prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited 
in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all per- 
sons similarly situated, is not within the amendment.” Barbier v. Connolly, 
113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885). 

11 The Ohio constitutional provisions will be frequently referred to only 
by article and section numbers. 











464 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


clusively provided for by other sections of the constitution. Article 
IV, Section 1, for example, empowers the legislature “from time 
to time” to establish courts inferior to the courts of appeal and the 
general laws provision of the constitution is considered inappli- 
cable.!? In the same way, Article II, Section 30, requires special 
legislation for establishing new counties, changing county lines, or 
removing county seats.'3 The requirement is implicit but clear 
because general legislation would be inconsistent with the pro- 
cedure established in the constitutional provision. 


Section 32 of Article II expressly provides that the legislature 
“shall grant no divorce”, so it is unnecessary to consider what effect 
Article II, Section 26, standing alone, would have as to legislative 
divorces. Another express prohibition on special legislation is 
found in Article XIII, Section 1, which declares quite simply, “[t]he 
General Assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate 
powers.” This provision applies to municipal as well as private 
corporations. !* 


Complementary to the provision just quoted is Section 2 of 
Article XIII which requires general laws for the creation and 
regulation of private corporations. Section 6 of the same article 
requires the legislature to “provide for the organization of cities 
and incorporated villages, by general laws.” Both municipal and 
private corporations were justly regarded as important and partic- 
ularly dangerous subjects of special legislation, hence their specific 
prohibition in addition to the general one found in Article II, Sec- 
tion 26. 


In short, Article II, Section 26 (frequently referred to in this 
article as the general laws provision) is of general applicability 
except as limited by other parts of the constitution.'5 The common 
sense rule of constitutional interpretation that the particular pro- 
vision most closely related to the subject matter in question will 
be held applicable has been adhered to in Ohio. Curative statutes, 
not covered in Arti¢le II, Section 26, are permitted with certain 
restrictions in Section 28 of the same article. 





12 Neither the offocial syllabus nor the opinion in State ex rel. Fox v. 
Yeatman, 89 Ohio St. 44, 105 N.E. 74 (1913), wherein a special statute concern- 
ing a municipal court was upheld, mentioned Article II, Section 26. 


13 Article X, Section 1, requires general laws for the organization and 
government of counties. 


14 State ex rel. Knisely v. Jones, 66 Ohio St. 453, 64 N.E. 424 (1902); Cin- 
cinnati v. Trustees of Cincinnati Hospital, 66 Ohio St. 440, 64 N.E. 420 (1902). 


15In Ex Parte Falk, 42 Ohio St. 638 (1885) it was held that Article II, 
Section 26 was mandatory rather than merely directory. 











1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 465 


General Laws — Classification 


A. MunIcrpaL CoRPORATIONS 


As has been indicated already, the problem of specialism has 
been particularly acute in the field of municipal corporations.'® It 
is, therefore, the plan of this article to consider first the require- 
ments of generality as applied to municipal corporations both be- 
cause of the intrinsic importance of the subject and because it is 
believed that an analysis of the requirements as to municipalities 
will provide considerable informational background for the subjects 
to be considered at a later juncture. 


1. Historical development prior to 1851. 

It should be mentioned at once that the historical background 
of municipal government in Ohio has been carefully and fully 
analyzed in the pages of this Journal in an article by Professor 
Harvey Walker.'’? The treatment here will be confined to a brief 
survey of the use of special and general legislation in relation to 
municipalities prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1851. 

In territorial times the small number of municipal units were 
incorporated by occasional special legislation. There is no reason 
to believe that the method was not adequate to the situation pre- 
sented. Even if the use of general laws would have been preferable, 
the small amount of special legislation relating to municipalities 
did not burden the legislature. 

Under the first Ohio Constitution'® the legislature was left 
free to deal with municipalities as it saw fit. There was not even 
the possibility of gubernatorial veto to act as a brake. Beginning 
with Chillicothe’? in 1804, a series of special acts was passed. In 
1817 the first general law for the incorporation of municipalities 
was passed by the legislature.?° The incorporation procedure uti- 
lized is interesting today principally because of the use of the court 
of common pleas as a fact-finding agency. 

Following the passage of the general incorporation law of 
1817 there was, for a few years, a substantial lessening in the num- 
ber of special charters granted. Particular amendments to previ- 
ously-granted special charters continued in undiminished volume. 
The general act of 1817, however, appeared for a while to have 
substantially reduced the total amount of special legislation even 
though it only briefly stopped special chartering. By 1834 the 
situation had so deteriorated that the Thirty-third General Assem- 
bly passed fifty-eight pages of general laws in contrast to four 





16 See note 3 supra. 

17 Walker, supra note 2. 

18 Constitution of 1802 which became effective in 1803. 
19 Act of Feb. 18, 1804. 

20 Act of Jan. 7, 1817. 











466 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


hundred sixty-five pages of special and local laws. In 1838 the 
legislature came to its own rescue by passing another general in- 
corporation law.?! For a few years the special acts passed referred 
to the general law for provisions as to organization or powers, but 
by 1844 this practice was reversed and the tendency to do every- 
thing in the special statute reappeared. The Forty-eighth General 
Assembly demonstrated how well the old system was re-established 
by passing seven hundred sixty-seven pages of special and local 
laws and only one hundred twenty-nine pages of general ones. In 
May, 1850, when the Second Constitutional Convention of Ohio 
met, there was apparently widespread belief that something should 
be done to relieve the legislature of the crushing burden of special 
legislation and the municipalities themselves of the evils of legis- 
lative log-rolling. 


2. The Constitutional Convention of 1850-1851 

Delegate James W. Taylor of Erie County stated his view of 
the existing situation in the course of the debate on the floor of 
the convention which framed the Constitution of 1851: “[i]t has 
been frequently said that three-fourths of the laws of Ohio are 
special and local in their nature; and I believe that an effort will 
be made to confine the Legislature to general regulations exclu- 
sively.”?? The effort was made and succeeded even though the 
Convention appeared to spend more time, insofar as the debates 
are indicative, on the problem of general incorporation laws for 
private corporations. There is no record of debate on any of the 
provisions of Article XIII which was accepted by the Convention 
on March 10, 1851.75 The significant section, as far as municipalities 
were concerned, was the sixth which provides, in part: “The Gen- 
eral Assembly shall provide for the organization of cities, and 
incorporated villages, by general laws. . .” Probably no member 
of the Convention of 1850-1851 had any idea of the vagaries of 
judicial interpretation to which this section would be subjected. 
The first section, which also has importance for municipalities, 
provides: “The General Assembly shall pass no special act con- 
ferring corporate powers.” 

Two basic sections were placed in Article II, the portion of the 
constitution dealing with the legislature, which were to have far- 
reaching general influence. Section 26, the provision requiring 
general laws to have uniform operation, has already been men- 
tioned. Section 28 provides that “[t]he General Assembly shall 
have no power to pass retroactive laws, .. . but may, by general 
laws, authorize courts to carry into effect upon such terms as shall 





21 Act of Feb. 16, 1838. 
221 Ohio Convention Debates 285 (1851). 
232 Ohio Convention Debates 851 (1851). 











1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 467 


be just and equitable, the manifest intention of parties, and officers, 
by curing omissions, defects and errors, in instruments and pro- 
ceedings, arising out of their want of conformity with the laws of 
this State.” It is apparent at a glance that both of these sections are 
applicable to statutes dealing with local government in general as 
well as to municipal corporations. The language in Section 26 re- 
quiring “uniform operation” apparently calls for judicial interpre- 
tation, whereas the wording of Section 28 requiring curative stat- 
utes to be general ones seems to be more precise and meaningful 
standing alone. 

In Case v. Dillon** the court considered the validity of an act 
passed on March 24, 1851 (prior to the effective date of the Con- 
stitution of 1851) which authorized Muskingum County to subscribe 
to the capital stock of a specified railway corporation. Article VIII, 
Section 6, of the new constitution provided that the “General As- 
sembly shall never authorize any county, town, or township” to 
become a stockholder in any corporation. By a three-to-two vote 
the court upheld the statute, primarily on the ground that the new 
constitutional provision was only prospective in operation. The case 
is significant for our purposes because the court first undertook 
to interpret Article II, Section 26, in it. Judge Thurman, writing 
for the majority, appeared to assume at once that the statute was 
not of a general nature. He wrote, “[i]t is no more of a general na- 
ture than would be an act to authorize the construction of a bridge 
or the erection of a poorhouse.”’5 The corollary found by the court 
was that the act was necessarily, by its nature, a local one and so 
the constitutional provision dealing with laws of a general nature 
was inapplicable. There was no indication that the court considered 
the possibility that legislation authorizing local government invest- 
ment in private corporations might be a proper subject for a 
general law. By uncritically seizing upon the idea that certair 
subjects were local in nature, the court opened the door to wide- 
spread evasion of the constitutional mandate of uniformity of oper- 
ation. The vigorous dissent of Judge Ranney did not discuss Article 
II, Section 26.76 


3. The Period 1851-1912 

In 1852 it would have appeared to a careful observer that the 
new constitution had achieved its aims insofar as general legislation 
was concerned. Proof would have been found in that the special 
laws of 1852 comprised forty-seven pages while the general ones 
filled three hundred forty-eight pages. On May 3, 1852, existing 
laws relating to the organization and government of municipal 





242 Ohio St. 607 (1853). 
25 Id. at 617. 
26 Id. at 624-647 (dissenting opinion). 








ee eee 








468 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


corporations were repealed and, by the same general statute, means 
were provided for the organization of “cities and incorporated vil- 
lages”. Municipal corporations were divided into three broad 
classes: cities of the first class were all those of over 20,000 pop- 
ulation; cities of the second class were units below that figure with 
a population of at least 5,000; villages were of less than 5,000 pop- 
ulation. By an amendment of March 25, 1854, a local option pro- 
vision was inserted in the general law: a municipal corporation 
would not advance to the next higher population grouping without 
the approval of its council. The symmetry of the classification 
scheme could, thus, be impaired at the will of a municipal council. 

During the fifty-year period from 1852 to 1902 the legislature 
departed radically from the three-class arrangement it had followed 
immediately after the adoption of the new constitution. By 1880 
generality in form had become a cloak for specialty in fact. 

In one term of court, in just a few months, the entire classi- 
fication structure so painstakingly built up over a period of years 
was brought crashing down to earth.?”7 When the January, 1902 
Term of the Ohio Supreme Court commenced there was a plethora 
of classifications. Each of the eleven largest cities of the state was 
placed in a different grade of the hierarchy. Special legislation 
under the guise of classification had become sanctified by the pass- 
age of time and implicit judicial approval. The members of the 
legislative department had little reason to suspect that the judicial 
department would say nay to what had been done. 

In 1900 the legislature had passed a “general” law empowering 
Toledo to construct or repair a bridge across the Maumee River in 
which Toledo was described as “any city of the third grade of the 
first class” having a “navigable river or rivers, passing into or 
through any such city.”’8 In Platt v. Craig?® a taxpayer asked that 
defendant officials of the city be restrained from proceeding under 
the statute. At about the same time another taxpayer asked man- 
damus to compel the mayor of Toledo to submit to the voters the 
question of acting, under the permissive statute.*° The decision 
resolved both disputes. Judge Davis, speaking for a unamimous 
court, immediately stated that constitutional questions were pre- 
sented and disclaimed any intention to reconcile the previous 
decisions in the area, after pointing out that some of them were 
based on expediency. He then stated that the constitution, having 
emanated from the people, “must be construed as the people must 
have understood it’! and, with the aid of a dictionary, determined 





27 The January, 1902 Term. 

28 Act of April 14, 1900. 

2966 Ohio St. 75, 63 N.E. 594 (1902). 

30 Jones, Mayor of Toledo v. State ex rel. Walbridge, supra, note 29. 
3166 Ohio St. 75, 77, 63 N.E. 594, 595 (1902). 








1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 469 


that the words “general” and “special” were antonyms. The court 
concluded that the classification was “exceedingly artificial and a 
sham”>? and that the statute was unconstitutional as violative 
of Article XIII, Section 1, and, in the alternative, Article II, Section 
26. The reasoning as to the former was that the statute was special 
in that it applied only to Toledo and that it was a forbidden attempt 
to confer corporate powers. The latter section was violated be- 
cause, even if it was a law of a general nature, it was limited to 
one particular city. There was a dictum to the effect that Article 
II, Section 26, did not prohibit all special legislation and that an 
emergency could legalize some special legislations’ Judge Burket 
did not concur in this portion of the opinion or syllabus. The 
Platt case revealed the weakness of the structure of classification 
but its practical effect was limited to a vitiation of the one statute 
before the court. 


The Platt case was decided on March 18, 1902. On the following 
April 29th the legislature passed a special statute expressly appli- 
cable only to the Cincinnati Hospital which purported to confer 
certain additional powers on the trustees of the hospital. The 
hospital was a municipal institution and, at the request of a tax- 
payer, the corporation counsel sued to enjoin the issuance of bonds 
and the expenditure of money under the statute. The case came 
before the court in Cincinnati v. Trustees of Cincinnati Hospital’ 
and the defendants pleaded a local and temporary emergency in 
Cincinnati in reliance on the emergency language in the Platt case. 
The court about-faced and said, “[a] sufficient answer to this con- 
tention is that such doctrine is not decided in nor encouraged by 
the case cited.’”°5 It would have been more candid to admit what 
was said in Platt, including the statement of the emergency doc- 
trine in the official syllabus, and to reach the result in the Cin- 
cinnati Hospital case on the basis of new-found wisdom. Instead 
the court said that the second paragraph of the syllabus and the 
opinion related only to Article II, Section 26.5 While this state- 
ment was entirely accurate, it should not have been allowed to 
obscure the identity of the fact patterns in the two cases. Both 
were cases in which a municipal corporation was to receive cor- 
porate power from an abortive statute. The court went on to 
say that “[i]t was obvious not only to the member of the court 
who wrote the opinion in that case [the Platt case], but to all 








32 Jd. at 81, 63 N.E. at 596. 

33 See id. at 78, 63 N.E. at 596. 

34 66 Ohio St. 440, 64 N.E. 420 (1902). 

35 Id. at 447, 64 NE. at 422. 

36 The court did not think that the syllabus related to Article XIII, Sec- 
tion 1. 








A x ra 








470 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


of us, that the unconditional terms of the inhibition against spe- 
cial acts conferring corporate power would not admit of any ex- 
ception.”3? The syllabus of the Cincinnati Hospital case made no 
mention of Article II, Section 26, and the opinion does not decide 
whether it was violated. The decision was based on violation of 
Article XIII, Section 1, by the statute which purported to confer 
corporate powers on the hospital trustees. 


In State ex rel. Knisely v. Jones,3* decided two days after the 
Cincinnati Hospital case, an act of April 27, 1902, was held un- 
constitutional. The action was an original one in mandamus brought 
in the supreme court by the unfortunate petitioners, newly ap- 
pointed police commissioners of Toledo under the act of April 27, 
1902, to compel the defendants, incumbent commissioners, to sur- 
render commission property. The act provided for “the appoint- 
ment, regulation, and government of a police force in cities of the 
third grade of the first class.” That it affected no municipality but 
Toledo was admitted. The attorney general, for the petitioners, 
relied on the long line of decisions sustaining classification and 
pointed out that there was no law on the subject except the one 
under which petitioners claimed as it had expressly repealed all 
other laws on the subject. The defense relied on Article XIII, Sec- 
tion 1, which had been such a bulwark in the Cincinnati Hospital 
case. The unanimous opinion of the court was delivered by Judge 
Shauck, who brushed aside relators’ contention that there was no 
other law on the subject by pointing out that the repealing section 
of the act under attack would fall unless the rest were valid. Judge 
Shauck then proceeded to make a twofold argument: first, that 
the statute attempting to reorganize the board of police commis- 
sioners of Toledo was a special act granting corporate powers con- 
trary to the prohibition of Article XIII, Section 1; and, secondly, 
that the classification of cities of the third grade of the first class 
was a sham as it only included Toledo. The second branch of the 
argument received detailed consideration. The history of the classi- 
fication of municipalities was reviewed and it was pointed out that 
the existing absurd number of classifications was similar to the sit- 
uation existing prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1851. 
The court found further evidence of legislative intent to use classi- 
fication as a cloak for special legislation in Section 1546 of the Re- 
vised Statutes of Ohio which provided that “[c]ities of the second 
class which hereafter become cities of the first class, shall constitute 
the fourth grade of the latter class.” There were no cities of the 
fourth grade of the first class; it was just insurance against second 
class cities moving into the classification with Toledo. It was point- 





3766 Ohio St. 440, 447, 64 N.E. 420, 422 (1902). 
3866 Ohio St. 453, 64 N.E. 424 (1902). 








1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 471 


ed out that the population differences between the various grad- 
ations of municipalities were too narrow to be significant. The 
court concluded that those considerations which tended to take the 
statute out of Article XIII, Section 1, tended to place it within the 
prohibition of Article II, Section 26. In the Knisely case, in short, 
the court indicated that it would no longer sanction legislative 
evasion of the constitution and that the pretence that the classi- 
fications were meaningful would no longer be kept up. 


Ohio ex rel. Attorney General v. Beacom*® was the last case in 
the series and it demolished the structure on the same day that 
the Knisely case was decided. Petitioners brought an action in quo 
warranto against the defendants, certain key municipal officers of 
Cleveland, and alleged that the act of March 16, 1891 under which 
defendants claimed office was invalid. The act in question oper- 
ated on cities “of the second grade of the first class.” Cleveland 
was the only Ohio city in that class. Judge Shauck, again speaking 
for a unanimous court, invalidated the statute on the authority 
of the Knisely case. In answer to the argument that the de facto 
government of the city should not be disturbed after the passage 
of years during which legislation of this character had not been 
disapproved, the court replied that, “i]t is admitted that no limi- 
tation bars inquiry into the title of the defendants.’*° Judgment 
of ouster was granted and, because of the practical considerations 
of the maintainence of municipal government in Cleveland, exe- 
cution of the judgment was suspended until October 2, 1902. 


The governor called a special session of the General Assembly 
which met on August 25, 1902, and prepared a new municipal 
code.*! The Municipal Code of 19024? swung to the opposite pole 
from isolation of municipalities into separate classes under the 
guise of classification: all municipal units in the state were placed 
in two classes. Those municipalities with a population of 5,000 or 
more were made cities and all below 5,000 were designated villages. 
Each of the groups was furnished with one uniform governmental 
scheme. This was no hardship for the villages but it created a sit- 
uation for the cities which was as bad as, or worse than, that exist- 
ing before the judical ax fell. It was unworkable for a city such as 
Cleveland to have the same governmental structure and powers as 
a municipality of 5,500 or 6,000 population. The use of only two 
classes resulted in over-simplification of the problems of the most 
populous cities. However, it had one advantage. It placed the larg- 
er cities in such an impossible situation that their citizens became 





3966 Ohio St. 491, 64 N.E. 427 (1902). 

40 Id. at 507, 64 N.E. at 428 (1902). 

41 See Fairlie, The Municipal Crisis in Ohio, 1 Micu. L. Rev. 352 (1905). 
42 Act of Oct. 22, 1902. 














472 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


leaders in the municipal home rule movement. The results achieved 
by the Constitutional Convention of 1912 were in no small measure 
due to the felt necessities of the larger urban areas. 

The Municipal Code of 1902 was upheld as a general act, hav- 
ing a uniform operation throughout the state in Zumstein v. Mul- 
len.*s The attack was fundamentally based on the claim that the 
provision for a different number of councilmen in different cities 
in reality constituted special legislation in the form of isolated 
classes according to the old scheme. The different provision for 
councilmen was based on a sliding scale closely keyed to population 
and the court found no difficulty in upholding it. Chief Justice 
Burket’s opinion for the still unanimous court was notable for its 
analytical discussion and resolution of the claimed ambiguity in 
the method of computing the number of councilmen under the 
statute. 

4. The Present Constitutional Classification of Cities. 

(a) An exclusive population classification. 

The adoption of Article XVIII, the “home rule amendment”, 
transferred the dual classification of the Municipal Code of 1902 
into the organic law. Section 1 provided for classification of muni- 
cipalities as follows: 

Municipal corporations are hereby classified into cities 

and villages. All such corporations having a population of 

five thousand or over shall be cities; all others shall be 
villages. The method of transition from one class to the 
other shall be regulated by law. 

Section 2 of Article XVIII provided, in part, that, “[g]eneral 


laws shall be passed to provide for the incorporation and govern- 
ment of cities and villages.” The two provisions just quoted did 
not result in placing the larger municipalities in the kind of a 
strait-jacket that they existed in from 1902 to 1912. Substantive 
home rule powers were granted directly to municipalities by other 
sections of Article XVIII and were not contingent upon the adop- 
tion of a home rule charter. Thus, all municipalities were grant- 
ed power under Section 3 to adopt and enforce “such local police, 
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with 
general laws.” 

It should be emphasized that Article XVIII, Section 1, pro- 
vides an exclusive classification of municipalities as to population. 
There is nothing in the section which would or should exclude 
further classification on the basis of relevant factors unconnected 
with population. 

(b) Classification as charter and non-charter. 





43 67 Ohio St. 382, 66 N.E. 140 (1902). 
44See Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 
9 Onto Sr. L. J. 18 (1948). 








1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 473 


In Dillon v. Cleveland*S the court examined Ohio General 
Code Section 4227-12 which provided that certain foregoing sec- 
tions of the General Code relating to the initiative and referendum 
should be inapplicable to any municipality operating under a home 
rule charter containing provisions for the initiative and referendum. 
It was claimed that the classification of municipalities into charter 
and non-charter units was prohibited by Article II, Section 26. The 
ready answer to this objection, as the court indicated, is that the 
very classification in question is recognized by the constitution. 

(c) Geographical classification. 

Geographical classification was upheld in Board of Health v. 
Greenville.*® Section 1249 et seq., General Code, authorized the 
state board of health to take certain action in connection with 
sewage, including requiring the construction and operation of sew- 
age purification plants. It was further provided that no city or 
village which is discharging sewage*’ into any river which separates 
Ohio from another state (the court judically noticed that this applied 
only to the Ohio River) would be required to install sewage puri- 
fication plants as long as unpurified sewage of cities and villages 
of any other state is discharged into the river above the Ohio city 
or village. 

The geographical classification affected by this proviso was 
the basis of an asserted violation of Article II, Section 26. The court 
upheld the classification. It would have been quite futile to have 
compelled those located upon the Ohio side of the Ohio river to re- 
frain from pollution of the stream when it was being polluted by 
those on the other bank who were quite beyond the reach of the 
Ohio legislature. The sound basis for the decision was that the 
statute did operate as uniformly as the nature of the subject mat- 
ter permitted. The court also pointed out that the class was an 
open one. 

There is further authority to support the view that geographical 
classification is permissible in Ohio. In State ex rel. Squire v. 
Cleveland** the court had before it a statute relating to “[aJll 
municipal corporations within the corporate limits of which there is 
or may hereafter be included part of the shore of the waters of 
Lake Erie.’”*° Another section of the statute excepted Cleveland 
from the operation of its general provisions. The trial court be- 





45117 Ohio St. 258, 158 N.E. 606 (1927). 

4686 Ohio St. 1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912). 

47 The Onto Gen. Cone provision read “is discharging sewage” whereas the 
Act of April 7, 1908 read “is now discharging sewage.” 

48150 Ohio St. 303, 82 N.E. 2d 709 (1948). 

49 Onto Gen. Cove § 3699-1. 

50 Onto Gen. Cope § 3699-8. 








474 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


lieved that the excepting provision invalidated the entire act on 
the ground that this particular section could not be dropped and 
the act extended to cover Cleveland because the legislature did 
not intend to include Cleveland and the court had no power to do 
so. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court 
and held that the statute, aside from the excepting provision, was 
valid. This was determined on the basis that the provision ap- 
plicable only to Cleveland was merely a limitation on the territorial 
operation of the act and was, therefore, separable under the separ- 
ability clause. Judge Stewart, who wrote the opinion for the su- 
preme court, thought that the whole act was invalid under Article 
II, Section 26. Since, however, more than one of the members of 
the supreme court agreed on the theory propounded by the court 
of appeals that view prevailed.5°* The element of “naturalness” in- 
herent in a geographical classification is a strong basis for uphold- 
ing it. It is also readily apparent that a statute such as the one 
considered in the Squire case would have no applicability to other 
than littoral lands no matter how generally it was drafted. 

The court’s treatment of the provision excepting Cleveland 
from the operation of the statute is particularly interesting. It 
could have said that the excepting provision was invalid but to dis- 
regard it would result in applying the statute where the legislature 
had forbidden so the whole enactment must fall. Instead, the op- 
posite result was achieved with an appropriate show of deference 
to the legislature. 

In Greenville v. Board of Health,5' and in other cases, the court 
has been asked, in the event that an exception to a general statute 
shall be found to be unconstitutional, to disregard the exception 
and to apply the statute uniformly throughout the state. The court 
has consistently refused to accede on the ground that such action 
would invade the province of the general assembly in extending 
the operation of the statute in a manner expressly forbidden by 
the general assembly. The result of this view has been that where 
the exception is held invalid the whole statute falls with it. There 
is no disposition to underestimate the drastic effect of a holding of 
unconstitutionality. There must be, however, certain self-imposed 
judical restraints when a statute is subjected to review and the 
one which refuses to extend a statute where the legislature has for- 
bidden is based upon the most sound considerations of deference 
due a coordinate branch of the government. 


B. Counties 
In Andrews v. State ex rel. Henry** a statute providing for 





58a Onto Const. Art. IV, Sec. 2. 
5186 Ohio St. 1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912). 
52104 Ohio St. 384, 135 N.E. 655 (1922). 











1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 475 


bonds in criminal cases, in fact limited only to Cuyahoga County, 
was invalidated under Article II, Section 26. Judge Wanamaker, 
speaking for a unanimous court, strongly intimated that a classi- 
fication of Cuyahoga County along with the other larger counties 
would be a reasonable one. It appears to the writer that there are 
no sound reasons which require county population classification 
to be more suspect than similar classification applied to munici- 
palities. The fire prevention problem, for example, of counties con- 
taining organized areas would be roughly similar to one another 
and substantially different from predominantly rural counties. 

County libraries are the subject of general legislation in Ohio. 
A statute concerning the establishment of libraries in general terms 
but actually applicable only to Hamilton County has been in- 
validated as contrary to Article II, Section 26.55 The court thought 
that it was obvious that libraries could only be the proper subjects 
of general laws because knowledge was not more necessary or de- 
sirable in one part of the state than in another. 

The problems arising under the general laws provision of the 
constitution have been far less acute in relation to counties than 
to municipalities. The Ohio Supreme Court has not treated counties 
in a significantly different manner from cities. Of course, there is 
no constitutional classification of counties. 


C. ScHoots 

By Article I, Section 7, of the constitution the legislature is 
exhorted to encourage schools. The cases reveal that the encour- 
agement must be by general laws. 

In Minshall v. State ex rel. Merritt’* the court examined that 
provision of Ohio General Code Section 7749-1 which required a 
district board of education to furnish transportation for high school 
students when the county board of education so determined. There 
was no difficulty in upholding the statute in view of the express 
exception in Article II, Section 26, which allows statutes relating 
to the public schools to take effect upon the approval of an au- 
thority other than the General Assembly. 

On April 2, 1902 the legislature passed an act establishing a 
special school district in parts of two counties. Quo warranto was 
brought to test its validity and, in State ex rel. v. Spellmire,*> the 
court discussed the relevant cases in the course of holding the act 
invalid under Article II, Section 26. The court overruled the 
Shearer case,5° which had stated the rule that special legislation 


53 Brown v. State ex rel. Merland, 120 Ohio St. 297, 166 N.E. 214 (1929). 

54124 Ohio St. 61, 176 N.E. 888 (1931). 

5567 Ohio St. 77, 65 N.E. 619 (1902). 

5646 Ohio St. 275, 21 N.E. 354 (1889). This resulted in reinstating State 
v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54 (1882) which had previously been overruled by the 
Shearer case. 











476 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


was not prohibited as applied to subject matter local in nature such 
as schools. It was the view of Chief Justice Burket, speaking for 
a unanimous court, that there was no constitutional justification 
for the Shearer doctrine “of carving a special or local subject-mat- 
ter out of one of a general nature.’’? The reversal was based on the 
purely logical grounds that no exception is expressed in Section 
26. It had been argued for the defendants that an adverse decision 
might well jeopardize other school districts. Judgment of ouster 
was granted and the court emphasized that the judgment could be 
drawn so as to “protect the public interests.”5* 

In Cline v. Martin’® the court upheld the validity of a statute 
which conferred authority on county boards of education to change 
school district lines in order to facilitate accessibility for all stu- 
dents served by the school. The charge of specialism deserved no 
more from the court than the statement that this was “undoubted- 
ly” a law of a general nature which operated uniformly through- 
out the state. 


D. TAaxaTION 

In the taxation field we find, as we have in other areas, that 
the law as to the requirements of generality was well-established 
and then, after the lapse of years, the earlier decisions were re- 
jected. It was once settled that a tax collector could be appointed 
for certain designated counties. The rationale was that tax col- 
lection was clearly a matter of a local nature. The present rule is 
that the subject is of a general nature and that statutes concerning 
it must be of uniform operation throughout the state.®! 

In Davis v. Wiemeyer® the court was confronted with the prob- 
lem of the constitutionality of a statute which authorized, as to 
some property owners only, the assessment of real estate accord- 
ing to benefit received in the construction of a state highway.®? The 
legislature attempted to authorize the county commissioners of 
counties having a tax duplicate of at least a certain amount to 
assess part of the cost against specially-benefited property owners. 
No such authorization was made as to those counties having a 
lesser tax duplicate. Judge Robinson, speaking for a unanimous 
court, said that the law was of a general nature and, therefore, was 
required to operate uniformly throughout the state. The court then 
proceeded to determine that the classification of property owners 


57 67 Ohio St. 77, 89, 65 N.E. 619, 623 (1902). 

58 Id. at 90, 65 N.E. at 623. 

5994 Ohio St. 420, 115 N.E. 37 (1916). 

60 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Crites, 48 Ohio St. 142, 26 N.E. 1052 (1891); 
State ex rel. Ogelvee v. Capeller, 39 Ohio St 207 (1883). 

61 State ex rel. Wilson v. Lewis, 74 Ohio St. 403, 78 N.E. 523 (1906). 

62 124 Ohio St. 103, 177 N.E. 37 (1931). 

63 Onto Gen. Core § 1193. 














1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 477 


for purposes of assessment was unreasonable because the value of 
the tax duplicate of a county has no necessary relation to special 
benefit to a property owner. The opinion did not indicate that a 
classification of counties as to the value of tax duplicate would be 
banned by Article II, Section 26, for other purposes. The writer 
suggests that the court is to be commended for frankly examining 
the relationship between the classification utilized and the benefit 
conferred by the construction of the highway. In many instances 
the validity of the classification can be properly appraised only by 
examining its relation to the rest of the statute. 


Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution provides that 
the legislature “shall make,” by taxation or otherwise, provision 
which “will secure a thorough and efficient system of common 
schools throughout the state.” Section 7575, General Code, pur- 
suant to the mandate, provided for a property tax levy equally 
throughout the state and for distribution of the proceeds to school 
districts according to need. In Miller v. Korns® the statute was at- 
tacked as contrary to both Article II, Seciion 26, and Article XII, 
Section 2, which provides for ad valorem taxation by uniform rule. 
The court said that the latter requirement was met by the tax be- 
ing imposed equally on all property throughout the state and that 
unequal distribution of the proceeds was necessary to meet the 
constitutional requirement of an efficient school system. Of course, 
the argument of violation of Article II, Section 26, received short 
shrift in view of the provision relating to the establishment of an 
efficient school system throughout the state. There is no doubt that 
the court reached the correct result. 


In State ex rel. Brunenkant v. Wallace,®5 Ohio General Code 
Sections 6290, and 6291, were attacked on the ground that uni- 
formity was lacking because trackless trolleys were excluded 
from the definition of motor vehicle for the purposes of the annual 
license tax on motor vehicles. The court held that Article II, Sec- 
tion 26, was not violated by this statute as it operated uniformly on 
a territorial basis and applied equally to all persons and property 
intended to be brought within its operation. It appears to the writ- 
er that a different decision would have resulted in depriving the 
legislature of its discretion and policy-making power in the field of 
taxation. This would be an improper result in view of the well- 
settled power of the legislature to select the subjects and persons, 
within broad limits, to which a given tax will be made to apply. 
The statute under consideration amounted merely to a legislative 
determination that trackless trolleys would not be classified with 
motor vehicles in general for purposes of taxation. 





64107 Ohio St. 287, 140 N.E. 773 (1923). 
65137 Ohio St. 379, 30 N.E. 2d 696 (1940). 











478 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


There is reason to believe that classification in taxation statutes 
will be upheld so long as fundamental tenets of fair play are not 
violated. In other words, where there is only a difference of op- 
inion as to the propriety of the classification under consideration 
the court is not likely to invalidate the statute. This is but another 
example of the due regard which most courts have today for the 
exigencies of a sound tax-gathering system. The flow of revenue 
will not be hampered except when there are clear violations of 
constitutional mandates. 


E. Pusiic Works 


The judicial treatment of the requirement of generality in 
statutes concerning public works has been variant. The initial 
Ohio view was set forth in a case where mandamus was asked to 
compel the commissioners of a particular county to act under a 
statute directing them to improve a particular road within the 
county.” The writ was allowed and the court brushed aside the 
argument that the statute violated the general laws provision by 
saying, “this provision does not affect the power of the legislature 
to pass local laws where the acts are in their nature local.”®* The 
other possible mode of treating the problem, that is, denominating 
roads a subject of general legislation and so one requiring uniform 
treatment throughout the state, did not initially win the court’s 
support. 

In Hixson v. Burson’ the court had before it a statute which 
authorized any county having a population between 35,190 and 
35,200 to construct roads within the county under certain con- 
ditions. The act applied actually only to Athens County. The court 
said that the statute was clearly a local one and the problem pre- 
sented was whether the subject of roads was general in nature. 
After an elaborate discussion the court concluded that, “[i]t seems 
so clear that the subject of roads is of a general nature, that we 
would be doing violence to our oaths to hold otherwise’’”® and pro- 
ceeded to overrule the inconsistent holding in the earlier case. 

The rule as to highways enunciated by Hixson v. Burson was 
soon extended to bridges.’”! In the face of a general law concerning 





66 This view was recently demonstrated in Angell v. City of Toledo, 153 
Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E. 2d 250 (1950) where the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought 
the invalidation of the Toledo municipal income tax on constitutional grounds. 
The court was not impressed by dicta in an earlier case which supported 
plaintiff's position. 

67 State ex rel. Hibbs v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 35 Ohio St. 
458 (1880). 

68 Id. at 467. 

6954 Ohio St. 470, 43 N.E. 1000 (1896). 

70 Id. at 485, 43 NE. at 1003. 

71 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Davis, 55 Ohio St. 15, 44 N.E. 511 (1895). 











1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 479 


the construction of bridges the legislature passed an abortive spe- 
cial statute dealing with bridges in Mahoning County. The ex- 
istence of the general statute on bridges appeared to be a sub- 
stantial factor in the holding that bridges were only appropriate 
subjects for general legislation. Where there is an operative gen- 
eral statute dealing with a subject, it should certainly receive 
judical consideration in the determination of the generality of the 
subject matter. 

In Thorniley v. State ex rel. Dickey,’? the court approved and 
followed the Hixson case and State ex rel. Attorney General v. 
Davis” in the course of holding Section 4903 of the Revised Statutes 
unconstitutional. The statute was deemed to be repugnant to the 
generality requirement of the constitution in that it was an es- 
sential part of a statute making different provision for the manage- 
ment of highways in different counties of the state. No rational 
basis was discovered for the differentiation in treatment and it was 
noted that the counties to which the special legislation applied were 
the most, as well as the least, populous in the state. The invalidated 
section itself only related to the compensation of county commis- 
sioners for services rendered as highway directors and the same 
result could have been reached by holding that it was repealed by 
a later inconsistent statute which specified the salaries of county 
commissioners and limited their salaries to such amount.” 

The Hixson case substantially represents the Ohio rule today. 
It appears that the rule is sound in two important respects: (1) It 
closes a loophole in the constitutional requirement of general leg- 
islation. The loophole amounted to saying that a bridge or a road 
was localized in a particular area of the state and could, therefore, 
be dealt with by special or local legislation. It is believed that 
this was nothing more than a play on words. (2) As a practical 
matter it has been shown that general laws are most efficacious in 
the public works field. It would be difficult to show any defects 
of the present system comparable to the log-rolling which was pre- 
valent under the old system of special legislation. 

It appears that logic alone has not proven an unerring guide 
in this area. The modern Ohio law has come into existence after 
the court has had full opportunity to appraise the working results 
of both special and general legislation in the field. The courts’ 
resolution of the problem purports to have discovered the key to 
what the constitution really means. The writer suggests, however, 
that what the court has really done is to resolve a question of leg- 
islative policy in much the same manner that the legislature would 





7281 Ohio St. 108, 90 N.E. 144 (1909). 
7355 Ohio St. 15, 44 N.E. 511 (1896). 
74 Act of April 21, 1904. 











480 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


do if it had the power. The court has decided that general statutes 
are probably better in the public works area. In other words, the 
court originally determined that the legislative decision to use 
special laws was reasonable and now only general laws on this 
subject are so held. 


F. ELEcTIONS. 

Statutes providing for and regulating primary elections have 
been unsuccessfully attacked as contrary to the general laws pro- 
vision.’?5 The permissive primary election applied only to those 
parties which cast at least ten per centum of the vote at the last 
general election but this was not held to be an unreasonable classi- 
fication. In the same case it was determined that the existence of 
special primary election statutes in three counties of the state did 
not prevent the general statute from operating uniformly through- 
out the state as no geographical restrictions were imposed upon it.’® 

In State ex rel. Wilmot v. Buckley’’ the court passed on a 
statute concerning election boards which specifically exempted 
Mansfield and cities of the fourth grade of the first class from its 
operation. There was no difficulty in finding that the act was vio- 
lative of the uniformity requirement of Article II, Seection 26. In 
answer to the argument that the exceptions should be disregarded 
and the legislation applied uniformly, the court replied that there 
was a difference between an exception and a limitation and that 
this was an exception and the court had no power to extend the act 
where the legislature had forbidden. The case is also noteworthy 
for an interesting dictum to the effect that the old election statute 
contained a valid classification as far as cities went but that there 
was no authority to classify counties as to elections.”? There was 
little indication as to why counties should be treated differently in 
this respect. 

In Gentsch v. State ex rel. McGorray”? the court upheld Re- 
vised Statutes Section 29260 which provided that in all cities of a 
population of 300,000 or more or which later attained such a popu- 
lation the polls should be open on election day from five-thirty 
o’clock in the morning until four o’clock in the afternoon. Section 
2926a provided that the polls should close at 5:30 in the afternoon 
in all other cities where registration was required. Only Cincinnati 
and Cleveland would be required to close their polls at four o’clock 
at the time of the decision but the court was impressed by the 
open-end character of the classification. The reasonableness of the 





75 State ex rel. Webber v. Felton, 77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N.E. 85 (1908). 
76 Id. at 579, 84 N.E. at 90. 

7760 Ohio St. 273, 54 N.E. 272 (1899). 

78 Id. at 297, 54 NE. at 276. 

7971 Ohio St. 151, 72 N.E. 900 (1904). 











1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 481 


classification was approved on the ground that fraud was more 
likely to occur in large cities under cover of darkness. The court 
concluded that the statute was general and operated uniformly 
within the requirements of Article II, Section 26. There appears 
to be no doubt but that the classification was as wide as the evil 
to be corrected and this should be enough. 

State ex rel. Weinberger v. Miller®® upheld an act passed by 
the legislature to provide for the election of judges by separate 
non-partisan ballot. The decision was by a three-to-two vote and 
was characterized by sharp dissenting opinions based on the stated 
improper treatment of illiterate voters. Judge Donahue, writing 
for the majority gave only brief attention to the claim of invalidity 
under Article II, Section 26, and disposed of it on the grounds that 
the legislature had power to treat elections for different types of 
offices differently. The result was buttressed by an extended dis- 
cussion of the requirements for judicial office in contrast to those 
for legislative and executive positions. The majority opinion also 
pointed out that separate ballots were not previously unknown in 
Ohio. At this writing there is nothing surprising about the de- 
cision because of the contemporary widespread use of the separate 
non-political judical ballot.®! 


G. MISCELLANEOUS 


1. Crime 


Laws defining crimes and prescribing punishment therefor 

must comply with the general laws provision.** 
2. Jury Trial 

A statute imposing certain restrictions on the right to trial by 
jury in “all counties which now contain, or which may contain a 
city of the second grade of the first class” was invalidated in Silber- 
man v. Hay*® as contrary to the general laws provision. The “classi- 
fication” was applicable only to Cuyahoga County and the court 
stated that no subject was more clearly of a general nature than 
the basic right to trial by jury. Judge Minshall carefully dis- 
tinguished the facts under consideration from those in an earlier 





80 87 Ohio St. 12, 99 N.E. 1078 (1912). 

81 It is noteworthy that at the time of the decision in the Miller case the 
provision of Article IV, Section 2 requiring more than a majority vote in the 
supreme court to hold a law unconstitutional had been adopted but was not 
yet effective. Judge Donahue said, “The fact that it has been adopted shows 
that the people of this state are of the opinion that courts have been too ready 
to find constitutional objection to legislation.” Id. at 30, 99 NE. at 1080. 

82In Ex Parte Falk, 42 Ohio St. 638 (1885) it was held that a statute 
purporting to make it a crime to be found in or near a certain city with 
burglar’s tools was invalid as contrary to the general laws provision. 

83 59 Ohio St. 582, 53 NE. 258 (1899). 











482 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


case which upheld a mode of selecting jurors in Cuyahoga County 
differently from the provision made under the general law.** It is 
doubtful whether such a statute would be upheld today. 


3. Personal Property. 

Statutes which classified beer bottles and similar containers 
separately from other personal property have been held to be gen- 
eral statutes with the requisite uniform operation throughout the 
state.25 In reaching this result the court was careful to point out 
that containers of the type under consideration were different from 
other personal property in that their normal use required them to 
be temporarily in the possession of the purchaser of their contents. 
The owner of the container customarily had his trade name or 
mark blown into the bottle. 


4. Relief 

In State ex rel. De Woody v. Bixler®® the court examined a 
statute which permitted county commissioners, by a two-thirds 
vote, to establish a poor relief distributing fund and which re- 
quired them to take such action when requested by resolution of 
a taxing authority administering relief within the county.8’7 The 
statute was upheld against an attack under that provision of Article 
II, Section 26, which declares that no act, except those relating to 
public schools, shall be passed “to take effect upon the approval of 
any other authority than the General Assembly .. .” Judge 
Williams, writing for a unanimous court, said that the county com- 
missioners were, at most, required to make a factual determination. 
The decision is in accord with the modern view that the legislature 
may delegate the power to make determinations of fact. 


5. Trust Companies 
Legislation purporting to authorize probate courts in some 
counties only to appoint trust companies to act as administrators 
of decedents’ estates has been invalidated as contrary to the gen- 
eral laws provision.** It is not believed that the decision would 
preclude general legislation in the field. 


H. EvaLuaTIon 
The crucial test of the workability of population classifications 
is usually found in their application to municipalities. As has al- 
ready been indicated, the Ohio pattern of two population groupings 
for all municipalities would result in severe hardship were it not 





84 McGill v State, 34 Ohio St. 228 (1878). 

85 Renner Brewing Co. v. Rolland, 96 Ohio St. 432, 118 NE. 118 (1917). 
86136 Ohio St. 263, 25 N.E. 2d 341 (1940). 

87 Onto Gen. Conve § 6309-2. 

88 Schumacher v. McCallip, 69 Ohio St. 500, 69 N.E. 986 (1904). 











1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 483 


for the existence of substantive home rule powers for municipal- 
ities.®° 

Classification of municipalities into broad and substantial 
population groups is widely upheld even though there may be 
many more groups than are permitted under the Ohio Constitution. 
Such classification finds ready judical acceptance even though 
there may be wide factual divergences within cities of the same 
general size.°° The reason for the popularity of population group- 
ings is probably that such classification involves general similarity 
within the class in respect to population which, in turn, is thought 
to have at least some relevance to the character and scope of many 
municipal problems. It is true that large metropolitan areas have 
serious problems in connection with crime prevention, for example, 
which are not found in rural areas. It is very doubtful, however, 
that there is as complete similarity as might be expected in regard 
to particular types of municipal activities, such as the need for 
fire or police protection, within cities of the same population 
group.”! It is thought that these considerations do not tend to de- 
stroy the validity of population classification. After all, the pur- 
pose of the constitutional provisions is to prevent the abuses of spe- 
cial legislation for each municipality. Even though population 
groupings are rather rough and ready, they are sufficiently remov- 
ed from specialism to justify validation. Of course, the judiciary 
should not approve merely sham classification. 

While population groupings provide only a general guide to 
municipal similarities, practical considerations are strongly in their 
favor. It would be well-nigh an impossible task to draft a statute 
with base classifications which take account of almost every point 
of difference and which, at the same time, do not constitute spe- 
cialism in fact under the guise of classification. 

Germaneness of the population classification to the purpose of 
the law should be a factor which receives careful judical consider- 
ation. The population classification should have some real bearing 
on the problem at hand.®? An established population classification 
should be used where appropriate, but it should not be utilized to 
prevent geographical classification, for example, when only such 





89 See note 44 supra. 

90 See the cases cited in 2 SuTHERLAND, Statutory CoNsTRUCTION § 2109 
(3rd ed., Horack, 1943). 

91For a study of the lack of relation between population and area and 
various other factors see Horack and Welsh, Special Legislation: Another 
Twilight Zone, 12 Inn. L. J. 109, 183, 184-186 (1936). 

92 See, e.g., State ex rel. Fire District of Lemay v. Smith, 353 Mo. 807, 
184 S.W. 2d 593 (1945) which upheld a population classification related to fire 
protection purposes even though St. Louis County was the only one in the 
c 








484 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


classification can give coherence to a law. It is believed that the 
Ohio court has been wise to uphold geographical classification as 
in accord with realities even though it finds no express sanction in 
the constitution. 

The courts frequently test population classification by de- 
termining whether it is “open-end” so that the subjects of the law 
can move from one class to another as populations change. Stated 
negatively, frozen population classifications (which are frequently 
limited to a particular census) are invalid. This writer believes 
that it is entirely proper to require classifications to be fluid. Other- 
wise, the degree of artificiality present in the classification is likely 
to increase proportionately to the time the classes have been frozen. 
It should at least be required of population classes that they 
accurately reflect population as of the present time. 

The Ohio cases have generally stated uniformity of operation 
to be a separate requirement. Frequently the subject matter of the 
statute will be determined to be of a general nature and then the 
statute will be invalidated on the ground that it fails to have a 
uniform operation throughout the state. It is believed that this 
is merely a roundabout method of saying that the statute is special 
and the constitution requires it to be general, so it must fall. If a 
statute particularizes within a possible and practical general class- 
ification it is special law. A statute is a general one if it applies 
equally to all those within the classification it establishes. If the 
classification is unreasonable the statute can either be invalidated 
on due process grounds or because the classification is not suf- 
ficiently related to the subject matter of the legislation. The Ohio 
court’s frequent reference to “uniform operation throughout the 
State” is understandable because, after all, the language does 
appear in the constitution. It is far, however, from constituting 
a solving concept.% 

Curative Statutes 

The problem of generality as opposed to specialism also arises 

in connection with’ curative and retroactive legislation. The partic- 





93 Some cases illustrate a realistic use of the uniformity provision: 

In State ex rel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E. 2d 219 (1941) 
the court upheld the validity of a statute requiring city fire departments to 
meet certain minimum standards. The opinion briefly considered the claim 
that the statute lacked uniform operation in that it applied only to cities and 
dismissed it on the grounds that the constitution recognized reasonable classi- 
fications including the classifications of cities and villages. 

In State ex rel. Outcalt v. Guckenberger, 134 Ohio St. 457, 17 N.E. 2d 743 
(1938), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Whittemore Acts which, 
in the period of the depression, remitted penalties and interest on taxes as 
an inducement to payment. The court specifically stated that the uniformity 
provision of Article II, Section 26 was not violated as the questioned statutes 
operated equally upon persons and property similarly situated. 











1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 485 


ular problems raised under the Ohio constitutional provision are, 
however, sufficiently different from the problems thus far covered 
in this paper to justify separate treatment. It may be helpful at 
the outset to suggest definitions of the kind of legislation under 
consideration. A curative (or validating) statute, most simply 
viewed, is one designed to cure legal defects in either prior acts 
or prior legislation or in both. Such a statute is usually a retro- 
active one. A retroactive (or retrospective) statute is one which 
affects acts or legal relations existing before the statute came into 
operation. 

In addition to the provision forbidding the impairment of 
contracts, which is beyond the scope of this article, Article II, 
Section 28, of the Ohio Constitution contains both a flat prohibition 
and a limited authorization. The first clause in the section states 
that “[t]he General Assembly shall have no power to pass retro- 
active laws.” This has been held to constitute a flat prohibition 
of such laws. The third portion of the section, the significant one 
for purposes of this discussion, provides that the legislature may, 
“by general laws” authorize courts to effectuate on equitable terms 
“the manifest intention of parties, and officers, by curing omissions, 
defects and errors, in instruments and proceedings, arising out of 
their want of conformity with the laws of this State.” 

Curative statutes are usually plainly retroactive in effect, so 
the provision just quoted may be treated as an exception to the 
broad prohibition against retroactive laws found in the same article 
of the constitution. Is there anything which requires curative legis- 
lation to be only retroactive in operation? The constitutional pro- 
vision itself, of course, contemplates the effectuation of prior acts. 
However, this is not to specify the method by which such acts 
are to be effectuated. A careful reading of the provision fails to 
reveal an express interdiction of prospective or open-end curative 
statutes. There is no reason why a statute drafted to effectuate 
acts, insufficient or defective in themselves, occuring in the future 
would not meet the literal language of the constitution. The re- 
quirement that the effectuation be by means of general laws seems 
to add considerable strength to the conclusion that “open-end” 
legislation is desirable. Indeed, as we have already seen, there 
is much authority which indicates that such prospective character 
is essential to the validity of a general law. 

What arguments can be mustered to oppose general and pros- 
pective curative legislation? Such a question requires analysis of 
the practical and common-sense reasons behind a constitutional 





94 Safford v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 119 Ohio St. 332, 164 N.E. 351 
(1928). The prohibition against retroactive laws does not include those of 
a procedural or remedial nature. State ex rel. Slaughter v. Industrial Com- 
mission of Ohio, 132 Ohio St. 537, 9 N.E. 2d 505 (1937). 








486 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


authorization of curative legislation. One substantial policy basis 
is the recognition that a substantial portion of state and local bus- 
iness is conducted by laymen unfamiliar with legal intricacies. 
It is believed that the logic behind the constitutional provision is 
that where there are policy reasons to effectuate otherwise legally 
unmeaningful acts that the legislature should have specific au- 
thorization in the constitution to carry such acts into effect. The 
legislature will determine whether the conditions which exist and 
the acts which have been done are entitled to validation. Whether 
the legislature bases its policy determination on the good faith 
and substantial compliance with the law by the parties or officials 
or on the necessity of avoiding undesirable consequences or un- 
certainty where the legally inadequate action has been relied upon 
is unimportant so long as the legislative effectuation is on such 
terms, according to the constitutional wording, “as shall be just 
and equitable.” 


Would the fundamental policy enunciated be undermined by 
a general law operating prospectively which undertook to validate 
future deficient acts which were based upon a prescribed degree 
of compliance with other existing law or upon the presence of good 
faith on the part of some or all of the parties? This question would 
be almost instantly met by the objection that such a law would 
encourage disregard of the law generally on the assumption that 
all, or at least many, defects would be automatically cured by 
the suggested general and prospective curative statute. To state 
such an objection is to acknowledge its merit. Such a course of 
conduct would perhaps be unwise for a legislature to follow. Even 
so, it is doubtful whether unwisdom alone would answer the ques- 
tion of the constitutionality of such a measure. As a matter of law 
such a statute would amount to nothing more than a legislative 
declaration that the law shall not be so strict in reference to those 
matters capable of validation under the prospective curative statute. 
It should not be forgotten that we are interpreting a constitutional 
requirement that cuirative laws be general ones. Whatever might be 
a court’s view as to the wisdom of an “open-end” curative statute, 
it is submitted that there would be no proper occasion for the use 
of the drastic step of a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality. 


It has not been the purpose of the foregoing discussion to 
suggest that “closed” curative statutes are invalid. The purpose 
has been, rather, to explore fully the considerations relevent to 
“open-end” curative statutes. In view of the plain requirement 
that curative laws must be general laws, a fundamental question 
in connection with the validity of “closed” curative statutes is 
whether such a statute with a “frozen” classification can qualify 
as a general law. As applied to municipalities such classification 











1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 487 


based on population would clearly be invalid under Article XVIII, 
Section 1, which requires “transition” from the one class to the 
other. Different considerations, however, may be relevant when a 
“closed” basis of operation is employed in curative legislation. The 
problem here is whether past acts can constitute a reasonable basis 
for the operation of curative legislation. Suppose, for example, 
that a statute passed in 1949 ordains that all persons who were the 
victims of torts committed by the state between 1943 and 1947 
should be awarded damages in a prescribed manner. Is the stated 
period of time a reasonable basis for the operation of the legis- 
lation? Stated differently, is the basis so unreasonable as to warrant 
invalidation? Probably the statute is inadequate if there is no 
other provision made for those similarly situated who were vic- 
timized before 1943 and after 1947. But this is a far cry from 
deeming it unreasonable. Standards of reasonableness lack precision 
and in this situation, where the time period is assumed to have 
some relation to the injuries suffered, it seems proper to uphold 
the legislative determination. Further support for this view can be 
found in the legislature’s acknowledged policy power in respect 
to curative statutes. The legislature determines initially whether 
a particular subject matter can be appropriately dealt with by a 
curative statute and, within certain broad limits, it should have 
the power to prescribe the operative time, including the beginning 
and terminal dates, of curative legislation enacted. As a practical 
matter in Ohio there should be no question as to the validity of 
“frozen” curative legislation because the Ohio Supreme Court 
has actually gone so far as to uphold special curative legislation 
which is applicable only to a past event and to one named indi- 
vidual.®5 

In Spitzig v. State ex rel. Hile®’ a special statute based on a 
personal injury fact background was presented to the court. One 
Spitzig was summoned as a juror and while so acting and in the 
absence of negligence on his part was injured due to the falling 
of a courthouse elevator. The legislature passed a special statute 
authorizing the county commissioners of Cuyahoga to pay the 
victim a sum not exceeding $15,000. A taxpayer sued to enjoin the 
payment of $12,500, which sum had been set pursuant to the 
terms of the statute. The court emphasized that it had only the 
constitutional question to decide. 

Judge Kinkade, who wrote for the unanimous court which 
upheld the validity of the statute, appeared to reason in the follow- 
ing manner: (1) The facts were undisputed. (2) The legislature 
found that the injury to Spitzig imposed a moral obligation on the 





95 See note 96 infra. 
96119 Ohio St. 117, 162 N.E. 394 (1928). 








ee EN 
2 


MAS 








488 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


state. (3) The payment of $12,500 was only compensation and was 
in no sense a gratuity extended by the county to Spitzig.”” (4) 
The special statute did not violate the state constitution because 
where the state acknowledges a moral obligation the prohibition 
of retroactive laws found in Article II, Section 28, is inapplicable. 
(5) Although the moral obligation does not amount to a legal 
one, it is “unthinkable” that the state be powerless to act in the 
premises. ’ 

Implicit in the holding that Article II, Section 26, also was in- 
applicable was the determination that the statute in question was a 
law of a special nature. Aside from the implication just mentioned, 
the court repeatedly referred to the statute as a special one. How 
then did it overcome the obstacle presented by the general law re- 
quirement of Article II, Section 28? The writer is unable to answer 
this question other than to say it appears that the court simply 
ignored the requirement. The conclusion that the payment to Spit- 
zig was compensation rather than gratuity may be questionable in 
view of the legislative finding of only a moral obligation resting 
upon the state. In any event, the legislature did formulate the 
policy that Spitzig should be paid. It is quite clear that the court’s 
view that the statute was special was correct because it applied 
only to Spitzig. Certainly it was retroactive in operation and basing 
it upon a moral obligation, without more, does not render the 
general law requirement inapplicable. It is submitted that there 
is no sound reason for the court’s validation of special legislation, 
once the legislature has found a moral obligation, in the face of 
the contrary unequivocal constitutional mandate. It will not do to 
rationalize the result in terms of some inarticulate judicial feeling 
that general legislation would not be applicable to the fact situ- 
ation; such an argument does not apply to the Ohio Constitution. 
Even though one rebels against the conception of public irrespon- 
sibility present in the concept of sovereign immunity from tort 
liability, it is well to recognize that the constitution provides a means 
to accomplish the laudable objective which the legislature had in 
providing for Spitzig’s relief. A general statute passed for the relief 
of all those now or later situated similarly to Spitzig would comply 
with the requirements of Article II, Section 28. 

It is frequently said that a legislature cannot do by a validating 
act that which was originally beyond its power. The Ohio general 
assembly once attempted to provide that special school districts 
previously invalidated would become valid special school districts 
under the provisions of a validating act.9® The court struck down 
the supposed validating act without hesitation and said that the 





97 Id. at 120, 162 N.E. at 395. 
%8 Bartlett v. State, 73 Ohio St. 54, 75 N.E. 939 (1905). 








1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 489 


legislature’s power “to validate any void or ineffectual act is lim- 
ited to such acts as it might have originally performed or author- 
ized. 

It is essential that the curative statute be worded sufficiently 
broadly to remedy the defect which the legislature intends to 
reach. In one case failure to advertise for bids pursuant to the 
requirement of an existing statute was not validated by a later 
statute which purported to cure the defect because the later statute 
was carelessly drawn too narrowly.!© 

In Kumler v. Silsbee! the court had before it a statute which 
provided that where any municipal corporation previously had 
granted by ordinance the right to lay pipes and drains below the 
surface of its streets that such ordinance should be held valid and 
binding as if the municipality had had express authority so to 
grant. The claims were made that the statute was unconstitutional 
because it was retroactive and so violated Article II, Section 28, 
and because it was a special grant of corporate power and so vio- 
lated Article 13, Section 1. The court held that the act, as a curative 
one, was within that exception to the prohibition against retroactive 
laws. Without extended discussion the court held the statute to 
be general. It is implicit in the opinion that curative acts must 
be general. 


Curative acts are a valuable legislative tool to help smooth 
the administration of government and to prevent wrongs from going 
without effective legal remedies. The requirement of the Ohio 
Constitution that such acts must be general is entirely workable 
and the courts should see that purported curative legislation meets 
the constitutional test. 


Express Prohibitions on Special Legislation 
Article II, Section 32, put an end to legislative divorces in 
Ohio.!° 


The leading case for our purposes on Article XIII, Section 1, 
which as we have seen forbids special acts conferring corporate 
power, is the Cincinnati Hospital case which was discussed earlier 
in this article.'!°° In this case the court held void a statute which 
attempted to confer corporate power on a named muunicipally- 
owned hospital. The case shows that even though this constitutional 
provision is frequently thought of in connection with private cor- 





99 Id. at 57, 75 N.E. at 940. 

100 Cowen v. State ex rel. Donovan, 101 Ohio St. 387, 129 N.E. 719 (1920). 

101 38 Ohio St. 445 (1882). 

102 For the background of legislative divorces in Ohio see Woodbridge, 
A History of Separation of Powers in Ohio: A Study in Administrative Law, 
13 U. or Crnn. L.R. 191, 251-255 (1939). 

103 See note 34 supra. 








490 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


porations, it can also apply to municipal corporations.'* 


Requirements or Authorizations of Special Legislation 

The implicit requirement of specialism for the creation of new 
counties and for certain other purposes has already been men- 
tioned. !95 

Article IV, Section 1, of the Ohio Constitution provides that 
the judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts 
of appeals, courts of common pleas, courts of probate, and such 
other courts inferior to the courts of appeals as may from time to 
time be established by law. 

In Kelley v. State!’ the court considered a statute of April 9, 
1856 which conferred certain criminal jurisdiction on some of the 
common pleas courts of the state and not on others. By a three- 
to-two decision the court determined that the courts of common 
pleas in Ohio were an organization of a general nature and that 
the laws dealing with them must, therefore, be of a general nature. 
It was also stated that these laws “are imperatively required to 
have a uniform operation throughout the state.”!°’ The reasoning 
of the court was mechanical but the decision effectively prevented 
special legislation applicable to the lower courts. 

In Wallace v. Leiter’ a statute which provided that there 
should be an appeal in certain counties from the probate court to 
the circuit court in specified cases was invalidated as a general 
law not having uniform operation. In a brief opinion the court 
stated its reliance on the well settled rule of the Kelley case. 

In two interesting cases the court examined legislation dealing 
with probate courts. In the first case, Squire, Superintendent of 
Banks, v. Bates,'!©? the court invalidated Ohio General Code Sec- 
tion 10501-62, which provided for divergent methods of appeal 
from probate courts. The statutory method provided that in in- 
stances where the probate judge had the qualifications prescribed 
by law for common pleas judges, appeal was taken directiy to the 
court of appeals. In other instances the appeal was to the common 
pleas court. Judge Zimmerman, speaking for a unanimous court, 
stressed that the result of the method was to make appeals de- 
pendent upon the qualifications of the particular probate judge. 
The opinion stated that because the statute concerned the appellate 





104In a leading case the trial court thought that if the questioned statutes 
were not invalid as contrary to the general laws provision that they should 
fall under Article XIII, Section 1. State ex rel. Squire v. Cleveland, 150 Ohio 
St. 303, 82 N.E. 2d 709 (1948). 

105 See page 464 supra. 

1066 Ohio St. 269 (1856). 

107 Id. at 272. 

108 76 Ohio St. 185, 81 N.E. 187 (1907). 

109 132 Ohio St. 161, 5 N.E. 2d 690 (1936). 











1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 491 


jurisdiction of two constitutional courts that it was a law of a 
general nature and failed to have the requisite uniform operation. 


In re Estate of Bates'!© presented a situation readily distin- 
guishable from the foregoing one. Section 10501-56, General Code, 
provided that when a record was not made at the hearing of a 
matter before the probate court, an appeal on law and fact may 
be taken to the common pleas court. Judge Matthias, writing for 
the unanimous court, emphasized that the legislation merely 
provided an optional method of procedure. The argument that 
the statute was invalid as not having uniform operation was based 
on the fact that some probate courts were combined with common 
pleas courts and that therefore the statute only applied to probate 
courts as such. The court readily conceded that this was the situ- 
ation but apparently thought that the classification of probate 
courts which were not combined with common pleas courts was 
a reasonable one. The statute applied only to appeal proceedings 
and applied uniformly to separate probate courts throughout the 
state. It is clear that so long as some probate courts are combined 
with common pleas courts and are known as “common pleas courts” 
and the others are separate and are known as “probate courts” that 
it is entirely proper to treat the latter as a separate class for such 
purposes as appeal to the common pleas courts. It would, of course, 
be ridiculous to allow such an appeal for the former class as it 
would result in an appeal taken from a court to the same court. 

The reader will have noted that all the cases dealing with 
courts which have been -discussed thus far have been concerned 
with the constitutional courts enumerated in Article IV, Section 1. 
This provision of the constitution also refers to “such other courts 
inferior to the courts of appeals as may from time to time be es- 
tablished by law.” This is interpreted to refer to laws passed by 
the legislature; the power to establish courts is held to be beyond 
the home rule powers of municipalities.!'' The uniformity re- 
quirement of Article II, Section 26, is regarded as inapplicable to 
the creation of inferior courts and the general assembly has com- 
monly created particular municipal courts by special laws.'!? In an 
important case where the problem could have been raised, the 
requirement of the general laws provision was not even men- 
tioned.'!3 It is believed fair to assert that Ohio has, in this area 
done violence to the policy favoring general legislation. It would 
seem that this area would be an ideal one in which to use general 





110142 Ohio St. 622, 53 N.E. 2d 787 (1944). 

111 State ex rel. Cherrington v. Hutsinpiller, 112 Ohio St. 468, 147 NE. 
647 (1925). 

112 Onto Gen. Cope § 1558-1 et. seq. 

113 State ex rel. Fox v. Yeatman, 98 Ohio St. 44, 105 N.E. 74 (1913). 








492 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


legislation which varied the number of judges in relation to the 
population of the communities served. The judiciary has the power 
to determine the meaning of the constitutional requirement of 
general laws in this field. The constitution is not crystal clear on 
the point and the judges, therefore, should not be adverse to con- 
sidering factors of policy and practicality. In many instances the 
feasibility of a general statute is a policy determination rather 
than an inevitable decision deduced from fixed principles. 


Express Requirements of General Legislation 

Article XIII, Section 6, which requires general laws for the 
organization of municipalities may be regarded as a specific im- 
plementation of Article II, Section 26, which, of course, applies 
to municipalities also. Where a special statute attempts to regulate 
municipal organization the court could point to either Article XIII, 
Section 6, or to the general laws provision. In the same way, 
Article X, Section 1, which requires general laws for the organi- 
zation and government of counties, could be used as an alterna- 
tive to the general laws provision. 

Section 2 of Article XIII requires general incorporation acts 
for private corporations. It has been held that this provision grants 
wide authority to form new corporations and to effect changes in 
existing ones so long as general laws are utilized.''* 


Some Policy Factors 

The plethora of interpretive problems arising under the con- 
stitutional provisions examined in this article could lead one to 
the conclusion that judicial determination of requirements of gen- 
erality in legislation has not been altogether successful. Very few 
subjects of legislation, however, are “naturally” the subject for 
either a general or a special law. The very simplicity of the language 
“Ta]ll laws, of a general nature” may tend to lull one into a sense of 
complacency as to the character of interpretive problems. Ex- 
perience has shown that the problems under the general laws 
provision are as formidable as those arising under the equally 
simple phrase “all powers of local self-government” found in the 
home rule amendment. Therefore, there must be one authoritative 
interpreter. 

Would the situation be improved by making the legislature 
the sole judge of the applicability of a general law? There are 
several arguments which can be mustered on the negative side. 
Prior to the Beacom''5 case the legislature pretty much had the 
final say and the record was one of evasion and disregard of the 
constitutional mandate. An important argument is that legislative 


114 Belden v. Union Central Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E. 2d 629 (1944). 
115 See note 39 supra. 


























1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 493 


solutions frequently must be based on compromise and expediency. 
The legislative process does not lend itself to that detached con- 
sideration which is necessary for constitutional interpretation. 
Another objection would be that legislative interpretation would 
probably result in a patchwork of particular solutions rather than 
an integrated pattern. Finally, it would be out of harmony with 
the existing method of constitutional interpretation to entrust 
this part of the constitution to the legislature. 

On the other side of the argument is that a purely logical 
analysis of the constitutional requirements is not enough. The judi- 
cial process, so the argument would run, is not well fitted to make a 
broad gauged inquiry into the considerations dictating the use of 
a particular type of statute. The legislature could acquire the fac- 
tual information on which a sound policy decision could be based. 
If the legislative solution were deemed inappropriate, the law 
could be repealed and a more workable one enacted. Other pro- 
visions of the constitution could be relied upon to prevent legislative 
abuse in this area. “The question, ‘could a general law be made 
applicable?’ does not really call for interpretation and application 
of existing law but requires a policy determination as to whether 
the subject is one which could be effectually dealt with by general 
law.”116 


We are committed to judicial review and it is at least doubtful 
as to whether the Ohio Supreme Court should be displaced as the 
arbiter of general as opposed to special legislation. Would it not 
be more profitable to press for an affirmative vote on the question 
of a constitutional convention at the general election in November, 
1952 so that the whole question of the present constitutional re- 
quirements of general and special laws could be opened? If this 
were done, the court could be presented with a much more coherent 
pattern than now obtains. It is incongruous to permit special laws 
for the creation of inferior courts when there is no reason to be- 
lieve that the subject is not readily susceptible to general legislation. 
By the same reasoning, the special laws subject to local referendum 
authorized in Article II, Section 30, are undesirable.!”’ 


It cannot be overemphasized that the court’s function in passing 
on an initial legislative determination of the type of statute to 
be employed is one calling for the exercise of judicial talents of 
the highest order. The judges must steer a middle course between 
credulity where only form supports the legislative determination 
and over-zealousness for precision where the legislative determi- 
nation appears rough but is nonetheless supportable. They should 





116 ForpHaM, Loca, GOVERNMENT Law 60 (1949). 
117See Fordham, Some Aspects of Constitutional Revision in Ohio, 23 
Onto Bar 181, 186 (1950). 








494 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


recognize, for example, that in some circumstances a general law 
may operate on a very limited number of persons and still be valid. 
In the words of Judge Cardozo, “Time with its tides brings new 
conditions which must be cared for by new laws, Sometimes the 
new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting 
statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the new conditions affect 
one only or a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow 
as the mischief.”!!8 





118 Williams v. Mayor and Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933). 











The Initiative and Referendum in Ohio 


JEFFERSON B. ForpHAM* AND J. Russet, LEAcH** 


This paper is designed as an expository treatment of the process 
of popular legislation at the state level in Ohio. The primary con- 
cern is with the “how” of the subject without critical re-exami- 
nation of the “why.” The policy aspects are intriguing; they chal- 
lenge separate discussion in relation to possible constitutional re- 
vision in Ohio.! 

The initiative is a device by which any person or group of per- 
sons may draft a statute and, by securing to a petition the signatures 
of a minimum number of qualified voters, require the appropriate 
state officials (with or without action upon it by the legislature) 
to submit the measure to the electorate at a general or special elec- 
tion.? If an initiated measure is approved by the required major- 
ity, it becomes a law. In some states the device may be employed 
to amend the constitution. The true initiative has two forms. The 
direct initiative gets a measure to the voters without the necessity 
for first submitting it to the legislature in order to permit consider- 
ation there before referral to the voters may be required.’ 

The referendum is a device whereby a measure, already 
adopted by a representative legislative body or constitutional con- 
vention, is held in suspense until it shall have been submitted to 
the voters at a general or special election, there to be ratified or 
rejected by majority vote. There are compulsory, voluntary and 
optional types of referenda. In the case of the compulsory refer- 





* Dean of the College of Law, The Ohio State University. 

** Reference Librarian, College of Law, The Ohio State University. 

1 At the general election in November 1952 the voters of Ohio are sched- 
uled to vote, under Section 3 of Article XVI of the constitution, on the ques- 
tion “Shall there be a convention to revise, alter or amend the constitution?” 
For a general discussion of this subject, see Fordham, Some Aspects of Con- 
stitutional Revision in Ohio, 23 Onto Bar 181 (1950). 

21 Bulletins for the Constitutional Convention, Massachusetts 1917-18, 
p. 183. Mr. Luce would confine “initiative” literally to initiating the making 
of law: “. . . taking the terms as we find them, we shall approach clear think- 
ing if we try to restrict ‘initiative’ to that independent process whereby an 
electorate begins the making of a law; ‘referendum’ to that process whereby 
an electorate completes or prevents the making of a law; and ‘direct legis- 
lation’ to that process of law-making wherein a representative body plays 
either a subordinate part or no part at all.” Luce, LecisLaTive PRINCIPLES 565 
(1930). 

31 Bulletins for the Constitutional Convention, Massachusetts 1917-18, 
p. 183. 

4 Ibid. 


495 








496 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


endum a measure must go to the electors and receive a majority 
vote before it may become operative. This type is used to a great 
extent in the amending of state constitutions. The voluntary type 
is referral to the voters by the legislature at its own instance. 
Under the optional form a referendum is had responsive to a 
petition of a percentage of the electors. It is the optional type 
which is usually embraced in the combination of the initiative 
and referendum. 

Although these devices did not gain a foothold in the United 
States, as applied to ordinary legislation, until the end of the 
nineteenth century, popular legislation is a governmental process 
of great antiquity.’ The initiative, in its modern form, was born 
in Switzerland about about a century ago.° 

It was in 1898 that popular legislation secured constitutional 
recognition in American state government. In that year South 
Dakota amended her constitution to permit the use of the initia- 
tive and referendum at the statutory level.’ In the years from 
1900 to 1909 six states followed the example of South Dakota.* 
Four of these states extended the initiative provisions to amend- 
ments to their state constitutions.’ In the so-called “progressive 
era,” 1910 to 1915, twelve states adopted provisions permitting 
both the initiative and the referendum.'° Ten of those states, includ- 
ing Ohio, made the initiative available as to constitutional amend- 
ments.!!' New Mexico and Maryland have provided for the 
referendum alone.'? There has been scant development since 1915; 
only Massachusetts has been added to the list of initiative and 





5 Losincier, THE Peopte’s Law 1 (1909). 


6 Rappard, The Initiative, Referendum and Recall in Switzerland, 63 Tue 
ANNALS 110, 131 (1912). 


7S. Dax. Const. Art. III, § 1. 


8 The states, with dates of original adoption noted, are: Utah, Art. VI, 
§ 1(2) (1900); Oregon, Art. IV, §§ 1, la, Art. IX, §§ 1, la, Art. XI, § 10, Art. 
XVII, § 1 (1902); Montana, Art. V, § 1 (1906); Oklahoma, Art. V, §§ 1-4, 6-8, 
Art. XVIII, § 4(a) to 4(e) (1907); Maine, Art. IV, Pt. I, § 1, Art. XXXI (1908); 
Missouri, Art. III, §§ 49-53, Art. XII, § 2B (1908). 

9 Utah, Oregon, Oklahoma and Missouri. 

10 The states with dates of original adoption noted, are: Arkansas, Art. V, 
§ 1 (1910); Colorado, Art. V, § 1 (1910); Arizona, Art. IV, § 1, Art. XXI, § 1, 
Art. XXII, § 14 (1911); California, Art. IV, §§ 1, 1b (1911); Nebraska, Art. III, 
§§ 1-4 (1912); Washington, Art. II, § 1, Art. XI, §§ 2, 4, 10 (1912); Idaho, Art. 
III, § 1 (1912); Ohio, Art. II, §§ 1-1g (1912); Nevada, Art. XIX, §§ 1-3 (1912); 
Michigan, Art. V, §§ 1, 30, 38, Art. XVII, §§ 1-3 (1913); North Dakota, Art. 
II, § 25, Art. XV, § 202; Mississippi (1914 — held invalid in Power v. Robert- 
son, 130 Miss. 188, 93 So. 769 (1918) ). 

11 The exceptions were in Idaho and Washington. 

12 The states, with dates of original adoption noted are: New Mexico, Art. 
IV, § 1 (1911) and Maryland, Art. XVI (1915). 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 497 


referendum states.'’ On the other hand, no state has abandoned 
the initiative and referendum, once provision has been made for 
them in its constitutional scheme. 


There is no federal bar to state use of direct legislation. An 
effort was once made to persuade the United States Supreme 
Court that the device violated the republican form of government 
clause of the Constitution, but the court categorized the contention 
as a political question not for judicial determination.’ 


Ohio adopted the initiative and referendum in 1912. Popular 
legislation was one of the liveliest topics of discussion to engage 
the attention of the constitutional convention of that year. Among 
those who spoke in favor of the innovation was Theodore Roose- 
velt, who appeared by invitation. It is of interest, as an historical 
aside, that the Colonel even spoke out for the recall of judicial 
decisions.'5 One of the objections which seemed to cause the 
most concern was the suggestion that the then still active move- 
ment for the single tax would stand a better chance of success in 
Ohio through direct legislation than through action of the general 
assembly. An accommodation was achieved by so amending the 
proposal as to ban resort to direct legislation to embrace Henry 
George’s darling. 


The record of direct legislation in Ohio discloses the interest- 
ing fact that the device has been employed more freely at the con- 
stitutional than the statutory level. Between 1912 and 1950 twenty- 
nine constitutional amendments were proposed by the initiative. 
Nine were ratified. During the same period fifteen of twenty-nine 
amendments proposed by the general assembly were approved. 
Seventeen legislative measures have been proposed by the initiative. 
Of these, three were enacted by the general assembly. Three of 
those not so enacted were carried to the voters by supplemental 
petition; one was adopted. As for the referendum, we find that ten 
measures have been referred and, of them, all save one were dis- 
approved at the polls.'¢ 





13 Mass. Const. Art. of AmMenp. LXXIV (1918). 


14 Pacific State Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Oregon, 223 US. 
118 (1911). 


151 Onto CoNsTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1912, ProceEpINGs AND DepatTes 378. 
Also of interest is Art. IV, § 7 of the constitution as amended in 1912. The 
movement for popular legislation led to this amendment whereby through 
a petition and an election, the voters of smaller counties could cause a uni- 
fication of the probate and common pleas courts. 


16 Legislative Reference Division, Ohio State Library, Operation of the 
Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 1931; Onto Execrion Sraristics. 








498 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


INITIATIVE 


1. Matters or Areas to which the Initiative Applies 
a. Constitutional Amendments 

Sections 1 and 1a of Article II of the Ohio Constitution reserve 
to the “people” the power, through the initiative, to amend the 
constitution. There are no express substantive limitations upon 
that power. It has been suggested, however, that there is an im- 
plied limitation which precludes amendment, in this wise, of the 
initiative or referendum sections of the constitution. Were this 
not so, it is said, all the procedural protections insisted upon by the 
conservative element in the 1912 Convention could be eliminated. 
To eliminate “dangers” of this nature; Mr. James P. Richardson 
introduced two resolutions in the Massachusetts Convention of 
1918, which were designed to place their provisions beyond the 
reach of the initiative.'? In Ohio there have been two unsuccess- 
ful attempts to amend the initiative and referendum provisions.'* 
We are unable to find a rational basis for the asserted limitations. 
If certain provisions are considered so important that they should 
not be subject to change in this way an express limitation is called 
for. Thus, Arizona has provided by an initiated constitutional 
amendment that the legislature may not repeal or amend initiated 
or referred measures approved by the people.'® and this provision 
has been given effect by the courts.”° While the limitation related 
to measures of statutory, and not constitutional dignity, the point 
is the same. 





172 DEBATES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Massachusetts 639, 950. 
The resolutions read: “No part of the Constitution which provides for the 
establishment of the initiative and referendum shall be the subject of an 
initiative petition.” These amendments were rejected by votes of 106 to 129 
and 137 to 140. This gentleman, with others, was successful, however, in 
adding the following clause to a provision relating to excluded matter: “No 
part of the constitution specifically excluding any matter from the operation 
of the popular initiative and referendum shall be the subject of an initiative 
petition; nor shall this section be the subject of such a petition.” (Italics ours). 

18 The first attempt was in 1915 when the people defeated a proposed 
amendment to limit elections on twice defeated constitutional proposals and 
to prevent the abuse of the initiative. The second attempt, while being ap- 
proved at the polls, was short-lived; this was the amendment to Article II, 
Section 1, which reserved to the people the legislative power of the referen- 
dum on the action of the assembly ratifying a proposed amendment to the 
Federal Constitution. This amendment was declared unconstitutional in Hawke 
v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920), on the basis of the Federal Constitution. No- 
where in the opinions there or in the Supreme Court of Ohio, is found any 
argument that the section was invalid as not dealing with a proper subject 
of amendment by the initiative. 

19 Artz. Const. Art. IV, pt. 1, § 6. 

20 State ex rel. Conway v. Superior Court, 60 Ariz. 69, 131 P. 2d 983 (1942); 
Williard v. Hubbs, 30 Ariz. 417, 248 Pac. 32 (1926). 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 499 


b. Legislation 


Certain limitations are imposed on the people’s power to adopt 
initiated laws. Some of these are expressly written into the con- 
stitution while others have been worked out in the process of 
judicial decision. Article II, Section le, prohibits the use of the 
initiative process to enact “a law authorizing any classification of 
property for the purpose of levying different rates of taxation 
thereon or of authorizing the levy of any single tax on land or 
land values or land sites at a higher rate or by a different rule 
than is or may be applied to improvements thereon or to person- 
al property.” While, as we have seen, the single tax movement 
was still vigorous in 1912, at this day the fear of the ghost of 
Henry George seems very unreal. In view of the relative ease 
of amending the constitution, this limitation is pretty weak, in 
any event. 

The constitutional limitations on the power of the general as- 
sembly to enact laws are made applicable in broad terms to popular 
legislation. This is generally taken to refer only to substantive 
limitations. Constitutional limitations on legislative procedure are 
not appropriate to the processes of popular or direct legislation. 


The question whether constitutional provisions as to form and 
style of bills and laws apply to initiated measures is more trouble- 
some. Are they limitations on legislative power? It should be 
noted at once that Section 1g of Article II prescribes a form of 
enacting clause for initiated measures. That section also refers to 
the title of such a measuré but is silent as to form and content of 
both title and body. It will be remembered that Section 16 of 
Article II requires that a bill originating in the general assembly 
be confined to a single subject clearly expressed in its title. The 
supreme court considers these requirements merely directory,”' 
but the legislature, to its lasting credit, conscientiously abides by 
them anyway. Even if they were, by interpretation, carried over to 
the initiative it is not evident that they would harden into some- 
thing of a mandatory character. On the same footing is the second 
part of the companion requirement that an amendatory law con- 
tains the entire section or sections amended and repeal the section 
or sections amended (as they theretofore stood).?* The first part, 





21 Weil v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450, 21 N.E. 643 (1889); Pim v. Nicholson, 6 
Ohio St. 176 (1856). 

22 This is shown by the approval of the Ohio courts of the doctrine of 
repeal by implication. See, e.g., Kinsey v. Bower, 147 Ohio St. 66, 68 N.E. 2d 
217 (1947); Goff v. Gates, 87 Ohio St. 142, 100 N.E. 329 (1912); State v. Board 
of Commissioners of Wyandot County, 9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 90 (1897), affirmed 
Board of Commissioners v. State ex rel. Cuneo, 57 Ohio St. 661, 50 N.E. 1127 
(1897). 








500 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


as to setting the amended sections out at length, is, however, deem- 
ed mandatory.” In the absence of an authoritative ruling on the 
question, the sensible course is to adhere to the rule in drafting 
an initiated measure of an amendatory character. 

The courts have recognized an implicit limitation on the 
municipal initiative. The initiative and referendum are reserved to 
the “people” of a municipality as to any subject of municipal leg- 
islative action.“ It appeared in State ex rel. Smith v. City of Fre- 
mont,2® that the state health authorities had ordered the city to 
change its water supply source or install purification facilities. The 
day before a water filtration plant bond ordinance of the city was 
adopted by council on third reading an inconsistent measure, which 
called for a change from a river to deep wells as the source of sup- 
ply, was put forward by initiative petition. At the next general 
election the initiated measure was approved by the voters. 
Mandamus to compel action under the initiated ordinance was de- 
nied by the supreme court in a brief per curiam opinion on the 
theory that the initiative may not be used as a substitute for the 
referendum. Council’s ordinance was adopted as an emergency 
measure and as such was not subject to referendum. Since the 
Ohio courts refrain from reviewing legislative declarations of 
emergency,”* the effect of the decision is to enable a municipal 
governing body to put its measures beyond the reach of either the 
initiative or the referendum. This is made the more clear by the 
critical statement in the opinion that the initiated measure was an 
attempt to repeal legislative action. The attorney general has so 
construed the court’s language in ruling that the initiative could 
not be used to repeal a non-emergency ordinance on which the 
ninety-day referendum period had run.”? The municipal initiative 
and referendum may be regulated by the exercise of home rule 
charter-making power.”* On this basis the Court of Appeals for 
Cuyahoga County has decided that a charter provision permitting 
repeal of an ordinance by an initiated measure is valid.”® 

We are not aware of any instance in which this implicit limi- 
tation has been invoked at the state level. Nor have we, on the 
other hand, found any logical basis for denying its application to 
statutes. It is true that under the general statute an initiated ordi- 





23 State ex rel. Godfrey v. O’Brien, 95 Ohio St. 166, 115 N.E. 25 (1917). 

24 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1f. 

25116 Ohio St. 469, 157 N.E. 318 (1927). 

26 State ex rel. Schorr v. Kennedy, 132 Ohio St. 510, 9 N.E. 2d 278 (1937). 

27 1948 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 4252. 

28 Onto Gen. Cope § 4227-12. Applied in: State ex rel. Daniels v. Council 
of City of Portsmouth, 136 Ohio St. 15, 22 N.E. 2d 913 (1939); Dillon v City 
of Cleveland, 117 Ohio St. 258, 158 N.E. 806 (1927). 

29 Ferguson v. Wiegand, 34 Ohio Law Rep. 257 (1931). 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 501 


nance is not channeled through council, whereas an initiated statute 
must be subjected to consideration by the general assembly. This 
provides some procedural basis for a distinction but it is not com- 
pelling because, even under the state pattern, the last word is with 
the electors. The difficulty is with the proposition per se. As indi- 
cated by the dissenters in the Fremont case, the design of the con- 
stitutional reservation of powers to the electors was to enable them 
to enact legislation as a part of the legislative power of the state on 
at least an equal footing with the representative legislative body, 
but the decision of the court left them far short of that.°° The leg- 
islative body can repeal popular legislation®*®* and it can, as we 
have seen, by an emergency clause, put a measure beyond reach 
of the referendum. Yet, we are told, the electors cannot, by initi- 
ative, repeal a legislative enactment. 

Initiative and referendum provisions have, in other states, been 
declared inapplicable to municipal legislation administrative in 
character.*! Considerable confusion has resulted from this rule 
due to the difficulty of determining just what action is legislative. 
Most of the few Ohio cases involving this problem relate to the 
referendum and will be discussed under that head.3? In Goodman 
v. Hamilton,** the court held that an initiated ordinance, authoriz- 
ing and directing a city official to enter into a contract with a public 
utility company to obtain artificial gas for the city, was legislative 
in nature and a valid act. Whatever may be the position taken as 
to municipal measures, there is no sound basis that one can readily 
perceive for engrafting an exception onto the state initiative and 
referendum with respect to measures deemed administrative. Apart 
from express limitations, the power reserved to the electors is as 
broad as that vested in the general assembly. As a practical matter, 
moreover, a local governing body is likely to deal much more di- 
rectly with administrative matters than is a state legislature. 

Particular note may be made of the fact that the initiative may 
be used to levy a state tax or make an appropriation of state funds. 
Theoretically, this could have absurd effects upon the state budget. 
In practice, the power has not been so employed. The most the 
voters have done is repeal the tax on colored oleomargarine by 
initiative in 1949. 

2. Preliminary Steps 

Section 1g of Article II, ordains that the provisions of that sec- 

tion (presumably Section 1 and all its subsections) shall be self- 





30116 Ohio St. 469, 472, 157 N.E. 318 (1927). 

30a State ex rel. Singer v. Cartledge, 129 Ohio St. 279, 195 N.E. 237 (1935). 
31 Keigley v. Bench, 97 Utah 69, 89 P. 2d 480 (1939); Note: 122 A.L.R. 769. 
32 Page 523, infra. 

33 21 Ohio App. 465, 153 N.E. 217 (1926). 








502 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


executing, except as otherwise provided, and that laws may be 
passed to facilitate their operation, “but in no way limiting or re- 
stricting either such provisions or the powers herein reserved.” 
The legislature has enacted implementing sections,** among which 
is one requiring proponents to give notice of their intention to 
circulate petitions.** This is done by filing a petition, signed by 
one hundred qualified electors, and a summary of the proposal 
with the attorney general for examination.** If the summary is, in 
the opinion of that officer, a fair and truthful statement, he must 
so certify.*7 A verified copy of the proposal, together with the sum- 
mary and the certificate, is then filed with the secretary of state 
whose duty it is, in turn, to designate the size, color and weight of 
the paper to be used and the general arrangement of the petition. 
There are other provisions governing printing, control, and disposal 
of blank petitions by the secretary of state, and payment to that of- 
ficer by the petitioning committee for the costs of printing.** 

The question whether these are all true implementing pro- 
visions or constitute restrictions on the powers reserved to the 
voters by the constitution has not been adjudicated. It is hardly 
cause for serious concern. The requirement of one hundred sig- 
natures is not onerous; those signers would be but a tiny fraction 
of the immensely larger total needed to get a measure to the legis- 
lature and they would serve as some indication to the attorney gen- 
eral that the petition was being put forward on a serious basis. It is 
required that the summary be reproduced on the printed petition. 
The apparent purpose is to help the persons, whose signatures are 
sought, to get with facility an understanding of what the proposal 
is about. The attorney general doubtless could be required by 
mandamus to certify an adequate summary but the supreme court 
has denied the writ in an instance where the “summary” was longer 
than the text. That, observed the Chief Justice, simply was not a 
summary.*® 

3. Form of Petition 

The constitution expressly permits the presentation of petitions 

in separate parts, but each part must contain all the elements of a 





34 Onto Gen. Cope §§ 4785-175 to 4785-183. 

35 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-175. 

36 The attorney general will not certify unless the summary is accom- 
panied by a petition of one hundred signatures. 1930 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) 
No. 1854. 

37 Under a former statute calling for a fair and impartial synopsis the 
attorney general ruled that arguments may not be included in a synopsis. 
1930 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1854. It is doubted that the statutory change 
to “fair and truthful” would affect this ruling. 

38 Onto Gen. Cope §§ 4785-175, 4785-176a, 4785-177c (Supp. 1949). 

39 State ex rel. Hubbell v. Bettman, 124 Ohio St. 24, 27, 176 N.E. 664 (1931). 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 503 


complete petition.*’ This is a practical necessity. The constitution 
requires that a petition bear “across the top” a prescribed caption*’ 
and that there be set out in the petition the full text of the proposed 
law or proposed constitutional amendment with the prescribed 
enacting clause or resolving clause, as the case might be. 

The implementing statute’? goes much further; it not only 
prescribes the form of petition but requires that there be elements 
not exacted by the constitution. The statute requires that the words 
“initiative petition” be placed at the top of the petition. This is to 
be followed by a place for numbering each part of the petition. 
Next there is a place for inserting the name of the solicitor to whom 
the part is issued. Below this is a place for inserting the date of is- 
suance. After these items comes the caption required by the con- 
stitution. It may be doubted that this departure from the literal 
language of the constitution is serious, since the matters set ahead 
of the caption are simply useful mechanics for administrative pur- 
poses. 


The statute requires that, following the constitutional caption, 
there be set forth the summary and then the certification of the at- 
torney general as to the summary, under proper date. Then must 
follow the names and addresses of a committee of from three to 
five members to represent the petitioners in all matters relating to 
the petition or its circulation.** The next item is a notice, printed 
in red, that one who signs more than once or signs a name other 
than his own or signs when not a qualified voter is subject to 
prosecution. Then follows-a place for a statement of the amount 
the solicitor has received or expects to receive for his services and 
from whom. The address of the person paying for the services must 
be given. (The solicitor must fill in his part before any elector 
signs. Of course, he can fill in “nothing,” if he is not working for 
pay.) The next item is the following legend before the signatures: 
“Sign with ink or indelible pencil. Your name, residence, and date 
of signing must be given.” The text of the proposal must be set out 
immediately following the place for signatures and it must begin 
with the prescribed resolving or enacting clause, as the case may 





40 On10 Const. Art. II, § lg. 

41 For constitutional proposals, the caption reads: “Amendment to the Con- 
stitution Proposed by Initiative Petition to be Submitted Directly to the Elec- 
tors.” Art. II, § la. For legislative changes the caption reads: “Law Proposed 
by Initiative Petition First to be Submitted to the General Assembly.” The 
capitalization of both captions is slightly changed in Onto Gen. Cope § 4785- 
176. 

42 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-176. 

43 The requirement of a committee is ordained by Oun1to Gen. Cope § 4785- 
180. This requirement of a committee of not less than three purports to deny 
to the “lone wolf” the rights of the initiative or referendum processes. 








504 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


be. The final item is an affidavit of the solicitor. The precise form 
is fixed by the statute. 

It should be observed that the statute in requiring a fixed form 
of petition uses the qualifying word “substantially”, which is de- 
signed to obviate any questions based on minor deviations.** 


4. Obtaining Copies of Petition for Circulation 

As already mentioned, the secretary of state orders the print- 
ing of all petitions and retains their possession until certain formal- 
ities are complied with. In order for the committee of petitioners 
to obtain blank part-petitions, they must file a list of the names 
and addresses of the circulators and the number of part-petitions 
to be issued to each.*® The secretary of state then places the circu- 
lator’s name on the particular part-petition and keeps a record of 
the serial number and date of issuance of each such petition issued. 
Petitions circulated by anyone other than the listed solicitor will 
not be accepted by the secretary of state. 


5. Signatures to Petitions 

The constitution requires that petitions proposing constitutional 
amendments bear the signatures of ten per centum of the electors*® 
and those proposing legislation, three per centum.*7 Upon these 
petitions as well as supplementary initiative petitions, it is neces- 
sary that there be the signatures of not less than one-half of the 
designated percentage of electors for each of one-half of the counties 
of the state.4® The basis upon which the required number of pe- 
titioners in any case is determined is the total number of votes cast 
for the office of governor at the last preceding election therefor.*® 
The clause “last preceding election” has been taken to refer to 
that election next preceding the filing of the petition despite the 
fact that the petition filed lacked sufficient signatures and a guber- 
natorial election occurred before the additional signatures were 
filed.° The effect of this ruling has been limited by a legislative 
directive that the secretary of state shall not accept for filing a 
petition which does not purport to contain at least the minimum 
number of signatures required.™! 

Each signer of a petition must be “an elector of the state.”*? 
The constitution elsewhere provides that every citizen of the Unit- 





44 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-175. 

45 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-176a. 

46 Onto Const. Art. II, § la. 

47 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b. 

48 Onto.Const. Art. II, § lg. 

49 Ibid;.Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-182. 

50 State ex rel. Ilg v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 171, 187 N.E. 301 (1933). 
51 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-177d. 

52 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g. 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 505 


ed States, of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been a 
resident of the state one year next preceding the election, and of 
the county, township, or ward, in which he resides, such time as 
may be provided by law, shall have the qualifications of an elector, 
and be entitled to vote at all elections.** Voting privileges may, 
however, be limited by registration statutes so long as they are 
reasonable in their requirements.®* In enacting legislation to im- 
plement the initiative and referendum provisions, the general as- 
sembly saw fit to employ the registration device and required that 
each signer be a qualified elector of the county, and a registered 
voter, if he resided in a registration city or precinct."> Although a 
person may be a qualified elector when he signs a petition his name 
will not be counted if he is not a voter at the time the petition is 
examined by the county board of elections.5® A change of residence 
within a precinct or a correct entry on the petition of the street 
address coupled with a mistaken entry of the ward and precinct 
will not invalidate a signature.*’ 

The constitution prescribes that the names of all signers to a 
petition shall be written in ink, each signer for himself, and that 
each signer shall place on the petition, after his name, the date of 
signing and his place of residence.*® Residents of municipalities 
must note their municipality, street and number (if any), ward 
and precinct. Any other signer must state the township and coun- 
ty in which he resides. The implementing legislation requires, in 
addition, that the rural route or other post office address of non- 
municipal residents be shown." 

In one particular, legislation lessens the strictness of the proc- 
ess; the constitution specifies signing in ink, the statute calls for 
ink or indelible pencil. This has passed muster in the courts on 
the theory of substantial compliance.* But it has been held that 
the requirements as to the date of signing, the residence of the 
signer and his ward or precinct are mandatory and failure to place 





53 On10 Const. Art. V, § 1; Sections 5 and 6 of this article deny residency 
to the military under certain conditions, and deny the privileges of electors 
to idiots and insane persons. 

54 State ex rel. Klein v. Hillenbrand, 101 Ohio St. 370, 130 N.E. 29 (1920); 
Daggett v. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548, 3 N.E. 538 (1885). 

55 Onto Gen. Cope §§ 4785-34 (1945) and 4785-177 (Supp. 1949). 

56 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-178. 

57 In the Matter of Initiative Petitions, 3 Ohio Supp. 260 (C.P. 1939). 

58 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g. 

59 Onto Gen. Cove § 4785-177 (Supp. 1949). 

60 Om10 Gen. Cone § 4785-176. 

61 Thrailkill v. Smith, 106 Ohio St. 1, 138 N-E. 532 (1922), In re Referendum 
Petition, 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 140 (1915). A ruling by the attorney general, 
however, holds that signatures in black or colored pencil are invalid. 1939 
Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1203. 








506 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


that material on the petition is fatal to the validity of the signa- 
ture.** This information may, however, be written on the petition 
by another, at the direction and with the authority of the elector, 
since the mandate as to signing, “each signer for himself,” is deem- 
ed to refer to the signature alone.* 

One further limitation relating to signers of petitions is pre- 
scribed by statute. Each part-petition which is filed must contain 
signatures of electors of only one county. The attorney general 
has ruled that this provision tends to facilitate the operation of the 
initiative and referendum and that any part-petition which bears 
signatures of electors of two or more counties is invalid.“* This 
holding could be exploited to advantage by opponents of a petition 
by getting signatures of out-of-county electors on the petition; ap- 
parently there would be no criminal liability although the elector 
signed only to defeat the petition. 

May one who has signed, later withdraw his signature from 
the petition?®’ Without the benefit of statute the supreme court 
held signers to have this privilege on referendum petitions if the 
withdrawal was made before official action was taken on the pe- 
tition.** Any doubt was resolved by the enactment of a provision 
which now permits an elector to withdraw his name at any time 
prior to the time the part-petition bearing his signature is returned 
by the county board of elections to the secretary of state.** This 
must be done by written request to the board of elections. Further 
complications might be caused should an elector first withdraw 
his signature, then change his mind and seek to reinstate it. In a 
somewhat similar situation dealing with remonstrances to school 
district changes, the attorney general ruled that this could be 
done. 


6. Circulation and Verification of Petitions 
Solicitors must retain possession of incomplete petitions or 
part-petitions and may not leave them at any place for signing out 





62 In re Referendum Petition, 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 140 (1915); 1932 Ops. 
Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 4272. 

63 State ex rel. Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872 (1933). 

64 Onto Gren. Cone § 4785-177 (Supp. 1949). 

651949 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 783; Informal Opinion of the Attorney 
General (Ohio) No. 464, January 4, 1949. 

66 Note: 85 A.L.R. 1373 (1933). 

67 State ex rel. Kahle v. Rupert, 99 Ohio St. 17, 122 N.E. 39 (1918); but 
see State ex rel. v. Lemon, 26 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 151 (1925). 

68 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-177a (Supp. 1949). 

6° 1933 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 984. This opinion can, however, be 
distinguished as the attorney general ruled that signatures could be added 
on remonstrances until the final possible filing date, even if actually filed 
earlier. 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 507 


of their presence.” It is required that any petition or part-petition 
left in violation of this provision be seized on behalf of the county 
board of elections and forwarded, with an affidavit explaining the 
seizure, to the secretary of state. Notice and hearing must be given 
the solicitor and each member of the committee for the petitioners. 
The statute puts the burden of proof on the solicitor and if he does 
not sustain it the secretary of state must destroy the petitions or 
part-petitions in question.” 

The constitution requires that each part-petition must be veri- 
fied by affidavit of the solicitor, which shall set forth (1) the “num- 
ber of signers” of the part-petition; (2) that each signature was 
attached to the part-petition in the presence of the affiant; (3) that 
the signatures were attached with knowledge of the contents of 
the petition; (4) that each signature was entered on the date placed 
after it; (5) that “to the best of his knowledge and belief” each 
signature is genuine; and that “he believes” the signers to be 
electors.’2 This section also prescribes that “no other affidavit 
thereto shall be required.” The form of affidavit prescribed by 
statute demands more of the affiant. It requires the circulator to 
swear positively that the signers were electors and that the signa- 
tures are of the persons whose names they purport to be.™* This 
places a burden on the solicitor to determine as a fact the identity 
of a signer and his qualifications as an elector. 

Defects in the affidavit will invalidate a part-petition even 
though all of the signatures are genuine signatures of electors. By 
statute a part-petition is not properly verified if the statutory form 
of affidavit is not properly filled out and signed; is altered by erasure 
or interlineation; or is false in any respect.74 There is a like pro- 
vision as to the case of a person signing more than once. This is 
rather harsh. Accidents do happen in circulating petitions and, 
should the circulator have two petitions on separate subjects and 
a signer inadvertently signed one twice, it would seem folly to in- 
validate the whole petition; especially if the circulator caught the 
error and in his affidavit reported the signatures as but one. 

The courts, likewise, seem very strict in cases concerning the 
verification of petitions. They deem the provisions mandatory and 
hesitate to rely upon the doctrine of substantial compliance. Thus, 
in a case relating to a municipal referendum, it was held that the 
omission to state that the electors signed with knowledge of the 
contents was fatal to the validity of the petition.7*> And, in the days 


70 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-176b. 

71 Ibid. 

72 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g. 

73 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-176. 

74 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-176c. 

75The Ohio Valley Electric Railway Co. v. Hagerty, 14 Ohio App. 398 
(1921); motion to certify overruled, 19 Ohio Law Rep. 172. 











508 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


when the secretary of state, rather than boards of elections, ruled 
upon petitions, the supreme court sustained his action in rejecting 
the whole document when the affidavit was false or not in part 
sworn to.”* The attorney general has ruled that the secretary of 
state should reject the entire part-petition when the affidavit is un- 
signed by the circulator or notary.77 He did not, however, consider 
an incorrect date on the affidavit as an invalidating irregularity.” 


7. Filing of Petitions; Review; Protest; Additional Signatures 

All initiative and referendum petitions are filed in the office 
of the secretary of state.”® Part-petitions must be filed at one time 
and all outstanding part-petitions must be invalidated and may not 
thereafter be accepted for filing.8° A part-petition becomes void 
unless filed within eighteen months after the date of its issuance.*’ 
The secretary of state may not accept for filing any petition which 
does not purport to contain at least the minimum number of sig- 
natures required.®? 

In the case of a proposed constitutional amendment the secre- 
tary of state must make the submission to the voters at the next 
succeeding regular or general election “in any year occurring 
subsequent to ninety days after the filing” of the petition.** To 
calculate the ninety-day period referred to, the day of filing is in- 
cluded and the election day excluded.™ It will be observed that 
this is the reverse of the rule followed in determining whether an 
act has been done within a period limited by law. In that situation 
the first day is excluded and the last counted.** The limitation is 
mandatory; the decision of the secretary of state is not conclusive, 
but subject to review by the courts.8* While the constitutional sec- 
tion undoubtedly precludes the secretary of state from submitting 
an amendment at an election unless ninety days have elapsed since 
the filing, the attorney general has ruled that the section requires 
that the petition be submitted in the same year as the election 
and, thus, that the secretary of state may not hold the petition un- 


76 State ex rel. Gongwer v. Graves, 90 Ohio St. 311, 107 N.E. 1018 (1914). 

771939 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1203. In a case dealing with municipal 
matters, it has been held that an affidavit is not defective because the notary 
was the attorney for the affiant and did not stamp, type or print his name 
under his signature. City of Gallipolis v. State ex rel. Houck, 36 Ohio App. 
258, 173 N.E. 36 (1930). 

78 1939 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1203. 

79 Onto Const. Art. II, §§ 1a, 1b. 

80 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-177c (Supp. 1949). 

81 Om1o Gen. Cope §4785-177b. 

82 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-1774. 

83 Onto Const. Art. II, § la. 

% Thrailkill v. Smith, 106 Ohio St. 1, 138 N.E. 532 (1922). 

85 Heuck v. State ex rel. Mack, 127 Ohio St. 247, 187 N.E. 869 (1933). 

86 Spahr v. Brown, 19 Ohio App. 107 (1925). 














1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 509 


til the next year’s general election.*7 He thought this interpretation 
necessary to give effect to the words “in any year”. There was, 
however, another choice. The words “occurring subsequent”, and 
so on, would, according to ordinary rules of grammar, be taken to 
refer to the words which immediately precede them in the sentence. 
The next preceding words are “in any year”. Thus, we might say 
that the indicated election is the first regular or general election 
in a year which shall have begun over ninety days after the petition 
shall have been filed. Under this construction the process is ad- 
mittedly slow but the petitioners are assured that their proposal 
will eventually get to the voters. The attorney general’s view, on 
the other hand, puts the quietus on a petition if filed too late in a 
given year.*®* 

An initiated legislative proposal filed not less than ten days 
prior to the commencement of any session of the general assembly, 
must be submitted to the assembly when it convenes.®® It seems 
clear enough that the secretary of state must hold over this type 
of petition, if submitted less than ten days before a session, in 
order to submit it to the succeeding assembly.” 

Once a petition has been filed, the secretary of state must 
separate the part-petitions by counties and transmit them to the 
county boards of elections of the respective counties to determine 
their sufficiency.®! It has been determined that this requirement 
is not restrictive of the constitutional scheme.®? In the event that 
part-petitions are defective, a question arises as to who shall be 
judge of their sufficiency. In a case involving a now-repealed sec- 
tion of the General Code, it was held that the secretary of state 
should judge the sufficiency and his decision was final so long as 
he did not act fraudulently or abuse his discretion.°* The next 
assembly changed this to vest the authority in the county boards 
of elections, including the power “to scrutinize for the omission 
of any of the formal or other requirements set forth in the con- 





871949 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 753. 

88 This difficulty may be overcome by the proponents of a petition by 
withholding the petition from filing until the first of the following year. Sig- 
natures for petitions seeking constitutional amendments may be obtained in 
the year proceding the year in which the petition is filed. 1913 Ops. Att’y 
Gen. (Ohio) No. 83. It must be noted, however, that the life span of each 
part-petition is only eighteen months from the date of issuance to the date 
of filing. Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-177b. 

89 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b. 

90 Art. II, § 1b reads in part: “When at any time, not less than ten days 
prior to the commencement of any session of the general assembly, . . .” 
(Italics ours). 

91 Onto Gen. Cove § 4785-178. 

92 State ex rel. Herbert v. Mitchell, 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 N.E. 2d 907 (1939). 

93 State ex rel. Gongwer v. Graves, 90 Ohio St. 311, 107 N.E. 1018 (1914). 








510 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


stitution.°* Under this state of facts the supreme court held that 
the secretary of state was under a duty to transmit immediately 
the part-petitions to the county boards and would be precluded 
by a writ of prohibition from proceeding to hear and determine 
the sufficiency of petitions on file.°5 This has since given way to 
a provision that the boards shall determine “the omission of any 
necessary details provided by law.”°* The changes in the statutes 
were enough to cause a modification in but not the overthrow of 
the previous ruling. Thus, in late 1939, the supreme court held that 
the secretary of state could reject petitions not verified as directed 
by the constitution. If the signatures lost from this means de- 
creased the total so as to be under the number required the 
secretary then need not transmit them to the local boards.®’ This 
decision was effective in overruling an opinion of the attorney 
general, given a few days earlier, which ruled that the secretary 
of state could invalidate all part-petitions or signatures void on 
their face.°* 

Should the secretary of state refuse to proceed after invali- 
dating petitions ineffectively verified, the petitioners would ap- 
parently have to start over. While the constitution grants ten 
additional days to file “additional signatures” to petitions verified 
as provided for but proved to be not in all respects sufficient, the 
doctrine of the last cited case®® would limit this grant to cases 
where the petitions were properly verified but the petition or cer- 
tain signatures were voided for other reasons. 

Should the part-petitions contain sufficient signatures even 
after the secretary has refused those on unverified part-petitions, 
the secretary must transmit them to the county boards. The boards 
then proceed to determine the validity of the part-petitions and 
signatures. The boards must ascertain whether each part-petition 
is properly verified.‘ Undoubtedly this includes the power to 
reject part-petitions outright, if they are, on their face, unverified 
because of the omission of the signature of the notary or circula- 
tor.'°! But the power to reject part-petitions goes further than this. 








94113 Ohio Laws 307. 

°S State ex rel. McCrehen v. Brown, 108 Ohio St. 454, 141 N.E. 69 (1923). 

96 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-178. 

97 State ex rel. Herbert v. Mitchell, 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 N.E. 2d 907 (1939); 
but see Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-7 (Supp. 1949) which says it shall be the duty 
of the secretary of state “to determine the sufficiency of all initiative and 
referendum petitions on state questions . . . as hereafter provided.” 

981939 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1203. 

99 State ex rel. Herbert v. Mitchell, 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 N.E. 2d 907 (1939). 

100 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-178. 

101 This would be occasioned only if the petition slipped through the sec- 
retary of state as he also has such authority by reason of the Mitchell Case. 
See note 95, supra. 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 511 


The boards may reject them for falsified affidavits, signatures of 
electors from more than one county, or omissions of any necessary 
details required by law. The boards have authority to administer 
oaths, issue subpoenas, summon witnesses and compel the pro- 
duction of documents in conducting investigations. '°? A board 
likewise may reject certain signatures on otherwise valid part- 
petitions if those signatures are not of persons on the registration 
lists of a registration city, or on the polling lists of the county, 
or eligible to vote in the county or are not electors at the time of 
the board’s examination.'°3 It may further reject illegal signatures; 
signatures written other than in ink or indelible pencil; and sig- 
natures followed by no date or an incorrect date. It must determine 
any repetition or duplication of signatures. 

After investigating a board must make notes opposite each 
rejected signature and make a report to the secretary of state in- 
dicating the sufficiency or insufficiency of the signatures and 
indicating whether or not each part-petition is properly verified.'! 

Any circulator of a particular part-petition, any signature on 
which or the verification of which has been declared insufficient 
or which is held to be not verified by a county board, may protest 
the board’s findings.'!°° The protest may be filed by the interested 
committee or any elector, as well. There is no expressed grant of 
the right of protest against action invalidating petitions or parts 
thereof for other causes. Should such a protest as is permitted be 
filed, the board must proceed to test its findings by bringing an 
action in the common pleas court of the county within three days 
after the filing of the protest. A judge of the court hears the action 
and certifies his decision to the board. The latter returns only the 
verified signatures and part-petitions to the secretary of state, 
including therewith the report of the board. These materials must 
be returned not less than fifty days before the election except that 
for petitions initiating legislation, the board shall “promptly check 
and return” the petitions and report. 

The chronology relating to protests seems somewhat confused. 
The constitution provides that petitions and signatures upon such 
petitions, verified as provided in the constitution, shall be presumed 
to be in all respects sufficient, unless not later than forty days 
before the election, they shall be otherwise proved, and in such 
an event, ten additional days shall be allowed for the filing of ad- 
ditional signatures.'!°° The framers, however, failed to some extent 





102 Oxuto Gen. Cove § 4785-179b (Supp. 1949). 

103 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-178. 

104 Ibid. 

105 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949). 

106 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g. This forty-day provision was applied in 
State ex rel. Vail v. Fulton, 97 Ohio St. 325, 120 N.E. 140 (1917). 








512 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


in making these provisions self-executing by not providing a method 
whereby the petitions or signatures could be proved insufficient. 
This section would, however, stop an opponent of a petition from 
protesting a signature immediately before an election and thus 
throwing a monkey wrench into the whole proceedings. It relates 
simply to proving matters insufficient and it could not, therefore, 
preclude a protest by a circulator objecting to a board’s ruling a 
signature insufficient. Moreover, under the definition of “so veri- 
fied” used in the Mitchell case,!°’ it would not even stop an out- 
sider protesting the day before the election on the ground that the 
part-petitions were improperly verified. 

The statutes set no express time limits within which protests 
must be filed. One may, however, be implied from the general 
arrangement of the section dealing with protests. This section! 
provides, in the following order, for (1) the right of protest, (2) a 
court action, (3) submission to the secretary of state and his an- 
nouncement of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the whole petition, 
and (4) an extension of ten days in which to file valid signatures. 
It could be implied therefrom that all rights of protest cease upon 
the notification by the secretary of state. 

On the other hand, the statutes calls for no notice to the com- 
mittee, circulator, or general public until the notification men- 
tioned above is given. Without notification of the board’s findings, 
how may we properly expect anyone to be able to take advantage 
of the right to protest? 

One further possible interpretation, with respect to consti- 
tutional amendment, supplemental, or referendum petitions lies 
in the fact that the “properly verified part-petition” (certified so 
by the court) shall be returned to the secretary of state not less 
than fifty days before the election. This might be construed to de- 
feat any protest submitted later than the aggregate period needed 
for the board to commence an action in the court, and for the 
court’s decision and, certification plus a span of fifty days. 

If the petition should be found insufficient because of an in- 
sufficient number of valid signatures, the committee must be 
notified and is allowed ten additional days after notification for 
the filing of additional signatures.!°? This ten-day provision does 
not relate to petitions which on their face do not purport to contain 





107 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 N.E. 2d 907 (1939). See note 95, supra. 

108 On10 Gen. Cope § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949). 

109 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g; Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949). 
This provision does not apply when a defect in a part-petition operates to 
reduce the number of counties represented on the petition to a number less 
than that required by Section 1g of Art. II. 1950 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 
1419. 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 513 


sufficient signatures, for these are not even accepted for filing.!!° 
Apparently in such a case the committee would not be limited, 
except indirectly, in obtaining additional signatures. Where, how- 
ever, a petition purports to contain sufficient signatures, but does 
not because of rejections by the county boards of elections, or 
the courts, the ten-day extension provision applies. 


The requirements as to the filing of additional signatures fol- 
low the pattern of the original petition. The secretary of state, 
upon request of the committee, issues new part-petitions for the 
obtaining of new signatures.'!! No signature on a “supplemental 
part-petition,”!!? which is the same as a signature on an original 
part-petition, may be counted. The properly-verified original part- 
petitions and the new supplemental petitions which appear to the 
secretary of state to be properly verified are forwarded to the 
county boards of elections for determination of the validity and 
sufficiency of the new part-petitions. These must be returned to 
the secretary of state within five days. No provision authorizes 
review of the board’s findings either by the secretary of state or 
the courts. Upon receipt of the county board’s reports, the secre- 
tary of state must determine the total number of signatures to the 
petition which he shall record and announce. Should they be 
sufficient, then such amendment, proposed law, or law, shall be 
placed on the ballot as required by law.'!3 Should the petition 
be found insufficient, the committee must be so notified and their 
only apparent recourse would be to start all over again. 


8. Submission to the General Assembly 
As mentioned earlier, initiated legislation in Ohio must first 
be submitted to the general assembly. The direct initiative does 
apply at the constitutional level; proposed amendments are placed 
directly on the ballot. 


If a sufficient petition is filed with the secretary of state not 
less than ten days prior to the commencement of any session of 
the general assembly, the secretary of state must transmit it to 





110 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-177d. 

111 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-177c (Supp. 1949). 

112 So called in Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949), but this should 
not be confused with petitions to submit laws to the people after the general 
assembly has refused to enact an initiated proposal. As to this limitation, a 
question might arise should an elector sign the original petition and then the 
“supplemental” petition after his original signature was rejected for lack of 
proper verification, for example. 

113 On10 Gen. Cope § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949). The failure of the section 
to mention submission of a proposed law to the general assembly was appar- 
ently an inadvertence. 








514 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


the general assembly as soon as it convenes.''* The initiated mea- 
sure is certified as being sufficient to the assembly and is there 
formally introduced by one of the members; usually by the speaker 
as a house bill. Neither the constitution nor statutes deal speci- 
fically with legislative procedure on initiated proposals, but the 
assembly generally treats them as if introduced by an individual 
member. Once the bill is submitted, the committee favoring the 
adoption of the proposal loses its semi-official status and has no 
more right to lobby for the bill or explain its merits than does 
any ordinary citizen. 

Should the bill receive favorable attention of the assembly 
and pass either as petitioned for or in amended form, it is subject 
to veto by the governor''5 and to independent referendum by the 
electors.!!6 

If the bill is not passed, or if no action is taken thereon within 
four months from the time of receipt by the general assembly, or 
if passed in amended form, the original proposal may be placed 
on the ballot if sufficient supplemental petitions are properly 
filed.'17 But the attorney general has ruled that the assembly is 
not precluded from considering an initiated bill because more 
than four months have elapsed since it was received.''8 

In order to demand the submission of the proposal to the 
voters supplementary petitions verified as were the original part- 
petitions and signed by not less than three per centum of the elec-- 
tors, in addition to those signing the original petition, must be filed 
with the secretary of state.'"9 The supplementary petition may 
propose the law either as first petitioned for or with any amend- 
ment or amendments which may have been added by either or 
both branches of the general assembly.!?° There seems to be no 





114 Om1o Const. Art. II, § 1b. The use of the word “any” would seem to 
support the holding over of such petitions from one session until the next. 
One serious limitation on the word “any” might exist with respect to special 
sessions. OHIO Const. Art. Ill, § 8 provides that special sessions shall be 
called by the governor and no business shall be transacted at such session 
except that named in the governor’s proclamation or subsequent proclama- 
tion or message or provision for the expenses of the session or other matters 
incidental thereto. 

115 Omro Const. Art. II, § 16 provides in part: “Every bill passed by the 
general assembly shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the governor 
for his approval.” In the initiative sense a bill vetoed by the governor would 
hardly have been finally passed. 

116Qxnto Const. Art. II, § 1b. This provision, as distinguished from a 
carry-through election on an initiated measure, would, no doubt, be defeated 
should the assembly amend the proposal by adding an emergency clause. 

117 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b. 

118 1933 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 903. 

119 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b. 

120 Ibid. 

















1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 515 


provision limiting the supplementary petition procedure to the 
original sponsors. Should they decide to step out any other group 
could, apparently, carry on from that point. However, should the 
second group succeed in its task, controversy might arise as to 
which group would be entitled to prepare the arguments in sup- 
port of the measure.!?! 


If the assembly should pass the proposal in amended form, 
the filing of a supplementary petition would prevent the enacted 
bill from becoming effective until the version proposed in the 
supplementary petition was rejected at the polls.'?? In that situ- 
ation, the supplementary petition would have the features both of 
the initiative and of the referendum. Should the bill as enacted 
in amended form contain an emergency clause, it is doubtful that 
it would be subject to the referendum as such,'”3 but the same 
would hardly be true as to the referendum features of a supple- 
mentary petition, else the basic design of ultimate electoral action 
on an initiated measure could be defeated. 


Most of the formalities and procedures relating to an original 
petition govern supplementary petitions. In some respects, how- 
ever, such procedures are not fitted to the supplementary petition, 
and in others, express contrary provisions govern. It might be 
questioned whether those invoking the supplementary petition 
procedure need always file with the attorney general a synopsis 
and one-hundred signature petition. The section requiring those 
relates only to “initiative” or “referendum” petitions.'*4 It is doubt- 
ful if these words are to be strictly construed, however, since 
most of the sections!?5 use this language, or the even looser word, 
“petition.” In one situation, however, such a requirement seems 
superfluous; that is, where the measure to be submitted is the 
same as proposed to the general assembly and the committee wishes 
to use a synopsis, already certified as fair and truthful by the 
attorney general. In an opinion concerned with a similar statute 
the attorney general ruled that a previously-certified synopsis 
might be used on a supplementary petition without a new certifi- 
cation when the supplementary petition proposed the same, and 
not an amended measure.!*6 In other instances this requirement 
has as much merit as when applied to the original petitions; for 





121 See page 517, infra. 

122 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b. 

123 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1d. 

124 Onto Gen. Cove § 4785-175. 

125 Onto Gen. Cope §§ 4785-175 through 4785-182. 

1261927 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 235. The statute then provided that 
petitioners “may submit” to the attorney general a synopsis of a proposed 
law. 














516 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


example, when the proposal to be submitted is an amended version 
of the original. 

The requirements as to printing, forms, circulators, signatures 
and circulation and determination of sufficiency are generally the 
same as with the original petitions. The form is varied to a slight 
extent by inserting the word “supplementary” before the word 
“initiative” in the title of the petition or part-petition.!2”7 Once 
again ten days are given to file additional signatures should a 
supplementary petition be found insufficient because of rejections 
of signatures or part-petitions.!78 

The times of filing prescribed for supplementary petitions 
are, of course, different from those for the original petition. To be 
effective a supplementary petition must be filed with the sec- 
retary of state within ninety days after the proposed law shall 
have been rejected by the general assembly or after the expiration 
of a term of four months during which no action was taken on 
the proposal or after the law as passed by the assembly has been 
filed with the secretary of state by the governor.!9 It has been held 
that a motion to postpone a bill indefinitely amounts to action on 
and a rejection of a bill for present purposes.'5° Where the assembly 
has adjourned without taking definite action on a bill the ad- 
journment will be treated as a rejection and the ninety-day period 
will commence at that date.'3! The secretary of state initially de- 
cides if a petition was timely filed, but the ninety-day time limit 
is mandatory, of course, and an error in computation is subject 
to judicial correction.'*? 


9. Information to the Electors 
The constitution comtemplates that the electors be “briefed”, 
as it were, on initiated proposals which are to appear on the ballot. 
The information to be distributed consists of a true copy of a 
proposed law or proposed amendment to the constitution and argu- 
ments or explanations, or both, for and against the proposal.'%’ 





127 On10 Gen. Cope § 4785-176. 

128 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-179. In such an instance, the legislative termi- 
nology becomes confusing since the section calls the additional signatures 
petition a supplemental petition. Thus one can file a supplemental petition 
to a supplemental petition. 

129 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b. 

130 Spahr v. Brown, 19 Ohio App. 107 (1925); 1925 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) 
p. 134; see also Rule 100, Rules of the Senate of the Ninety-Eighth General 
Assembly of Ohio (1949). 

131 Pfeifer v. Graves, 88 Ohio St. 473, 104 N.E. 529 (1913). 

132 Spahr v. Brown, 19 Ohio App. 107 (1925). 

133 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g. This provision was held to be self-executing. 
State ex rel. Hunt v. Hildebrant, 93 Ohio St. 1, 112 N.E. 138 (1915). Presum- 
ably, this does not require the secretary of state to issue copies of the law 




















1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 517 


The committee named in an initiative petition may prepare the 
arguments or explanations, or both, in favor of the measure pro- 
posed. The person or persons to prepare the statements against 
the proposal must be named by the general assembly, if in session; 
otherwise, by the governor.'34 The arguments or explanations, or 
both, must not exceed three hundred words for each side, and 
they must be filed at least sixty days before the date of the elec- 
tion.'55 There is no requirement that the accuracy of the state- 
ments be certified by any public officer. Unlike the expository 
statements required by statute for the benefit of prospective petition 
signers, this matter is argumentative. Should a statement contain 
slanderous remarks, it is doubtful that its authors would be 
liable.'36 

When the secretary of state receives any proposed law or 
constitutional amendment which would levy any tax or necessi- 
tate any expenditure of state funds, he must request of the tax 
commissioner an estimate of any prospective annual expenditure 
of public funds and the annual yield of any proposed tax.'3’? The 
tax commissioner must then prepare the estimate. The original 
is filed with the secretary of state. From it copies are made to be 
distributed with the publicity pamphlet discussed below. 

The constitution requires the secretary of state to cause the 
proposed law or amendment and the statements to be printed 
and to mail or otherwise distribute these materials to each of the 
electors of the state, as far as may be reasonably possible.'** Im- 
plementing legislation provides that the secretary of state shall, 
at least thirty days before the election, cause these materials and 
a form of the official ballot, which is to be used, to be printed in 





or provision to be amended, but rather to issue copies of the proposed amend- 
ment. See 1940 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 2275. 

134 The general wording of Art. II, § 1g is broad enough to require that 
arguments be prepared against proposed constitutional amendments but the 
section makes no provision for their preparation. Under a former statute 
the attorney general ruled that there was no authorization for the prepara- 
tion of such arguments. 1915 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 867. While this 
statute has been amended, it is doubted that it affects this ruling. See Ouro 
Gen. Cope § 4785-180a. 

135 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g; Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-180a. 

136 Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 NE. 2d 584 (1941). Bett- 
man, J., observed, obiter, that the governor, secretary of state and the official 
authors are absolutely privileged if the remarks objected to are pertinent to 
the occasion. The holding of the court was that if there be such a privilege, 
it does not extend to an outsider alleged to have conspired with the official 
appointees to defame the plaintiff. 

137 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-175a. 

138 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g. It has been ruled that this duty is manda- 
tory though the secretary is not instructed as to the details of the operation. 
1927 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1073. 





air bone what. 


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518 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


pamphlet form and must, at least twenty days before the election, 
mail or otherwise distribute the pamphlets, charges fully paid.'%° 
All costs of printing and distributing these pamphlets are paid 
by the state from its general revenue fund.!*° 


10. Submission to the Electors — Ballot 


When a sufficient initiative or supplementary petition has 
been properly filed the secretary of state must submit the pro- 
posal to the electors.'*! The secretary of state will not be enjoined 
from submitting a proposal because it might be inconsistent with 
the federal or state constitutions,'4? and should he attempt to 
withhold a proposal from the people, mandamus will lie to compel 
him to submit the measure.'*3 He is plainly not concerned with 
substance in the policy sense. It seems equally clear that he is not 
concerned with the question whether the proposal is inconsistent 
with any general limitation on legislative power such as consti- 
tutional guaranties of civil liberties. That is the province of the 
judiciary in proper cases instituted after the positive enactment. 
What, however, of limitations addressed specifically to the initia- 
tive, such as the ban on the single tax? May not the secretary 
of state properly maintain that he is under no duty to submit 
a proposal as to a subject which the constitution places beyond 
reach of the initiative? Or is his function simply the ministerial 
business of submitting any proposal which measures up in terms 
of procedure, technical form and signatures? 

The amendment or law proposed by the petition must be 
submitted in its original form unless, in the case of a proposed 
law, the supplementary petition proposes the law with one or 
more of the amendments made by either house of the general 
assembly. The only proposal which the constitution requires to 
be submitted is that which appears on the petition and the consti- 
tution permits no other to be submitted.'* 

The secretary of state has the duty of preparing the ballots.'*5 
While, as stated above, an initiated petition may propose two or 





139 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-180b. 

140 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-180c. 

141 Onto Const. Art. II, §§ la and 1b. 

142 City of Cincinnati v. Hillenbrand, 103 Ohio St. 286, 133 N.E. 556 (1921); 
Weiland v. Fulton. 99 Ohio St. 10, 121 N.E. 816 (1918); Pfiefer v. Graves, 88 
Ohio St. 473, 104 N.E. 529 (1913). 

143 State ex rel. Marcolin v. Smith, 105 Ohio St. 570, 138 N.E. 881 (1922). 

144 State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 187, 124 N.E. 172 


(1919). 
145 Ouro Const. Art. II, § 1g provides in part: “Unless otherwise provided 
by law, the secretary of state shall .. .” The general assembly has not seen 


fit to change this, but rather implements the provision by Section 4785-181 
of the General Code. 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 519 


more unrelated constitutional amendments or statutory sections, 
it is less clear whether such proposals may be combined on the 
ballot. Article II, Section 1g, provides that the secretary of state 
shall “cause the ballots so to be printed as to permit an affirmative 
or negative vote upon each law, section of law, or item in a law 
appropriating money, or proposed law, or proposed amendment 
to the constitution.” It has been held that a revised municipal 
home rule charter may be submitted as a whole with the voter 
having but one vote either for or against it.'4° Certainly two or 
more sections may be amended by unitary submission if there 
is but one fundamental change and the amending of the two or 
more sections relates to but a single plan.'*?7 However, the supreme 
court has said that two unrelated amendments must be so ar- 
ranged on the ballot as to permit the individual voter to voice 
his approval of each section separately.'*® This compromise seems 
logical, but the real problem is who is to say amendments are 
unrelated, or are parts of a single plan? It would appear that the 
initial decision is up to the secretary of state. Whether or not the 
courts would review such a decision is problematical; we are in- 
clined to the view that they would. 

Initiated proposals appear on a separate ballot, designated “Of- 
ficial Questions and Issues Ballot”, and state and local questions 
are grouped and arranged so that state questions appear at the 
top, county next, municipal next, township next and school district 
at the foot.'*9 Within this pattern the secretary of state decides 
the order of listing of state questions.'®° 


On the “Official Questions and Issues Ballot” the printed 
matter relating to each issue must be enclosed at the top and bot- 
tom by a heavy horizontal line. Below each top line must appear 
a brief title descriptive of the issue, such as “Proposed Consti- 
tutional Amendment,” or “Proposed Increase in Tax Rate.” Fol- 
lowing the title must be a brief statement of the percentage of 
affirmative votes necessary for the passage of the measure. Next 
in order comes the “text describing the question or issue.”!5! The 
statute provides that the “ballot title” of an initiated proposal 
shall be determined by the secretary of state but the person or 
committee sponsoring the measure may suggest a title which is 


146 Reutener v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 117, 141 N.E. 27 (1923). 

147 Resort has been made to this system quite often in the past. See, e.g., 
Ohio Election Statistics for General Election Held on the Second Day of 
November 1948, page 433 (Two sections of two articles in the constitution were 
amended by single vote). 

148 State ex rel. Hubbell v. Bettman, 124 Ohio St. 24, 176 N.E. 664 (1931). 

149 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-103 (Supp. 1949). 

150 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-181. 

151 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-103 (Supp. 1949). 








RS ee AEE ST OS 


estar eae 





520 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL {Vol. 11 


to be given full consideration.'? The secretary of state is instructed 
to prepare a true and impartial title, which would be unlikely 
to create prejudice for or against the proposal. 

Much controversy has arisen over the meaning of the phrase 
“text describing the question or issue” and its statutory prede- 
cessor, “in language sufficient to clearly designate it.” In the case 
of State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, it was declared that a 
submission of a proposed amendment to the constitution without 
substantial compliance with the provisions of the initiative and 
referendum sections of the constitution was invalid. It was not 
this innocuous statement that has created confusion, but rather 
the lack of a clear majority rationalization. The case has been 
cited as standing for the proposition that in the submission of a 
state initiative proposal to the voters the exact language of the pro- 
posal must be printed on the ballot.'%* Actually, the supreme 
court has limited this theory to initiative and referendum meas- 
ures on state constitutional questions.'55 In both instances, however, 
it was dealing with local matters and, as yet, has not definitely 
held that the proposition does not apply to initiated legislation. 
Short of printing the complete text of a proposal, it seems clear 
that all the essential elements or changes must be described on 
the ballot.'5 

This text must be placed on the right side of the ballot, be- 
neath the short title, and on the left there must be four enclosed 
rectangular spaces.'5? Each space is arranged in the general shape 
of a square or rectangle. In the space at the top right must ap- 
pear the word “yes”, while the word “no” is to appear in the space 
just below. The two spaces at the extreme left are provided for 
the marking of the ballot. The size of the spaces for affirmative 
votes and those for negative votes must be the same. 

The submitting of these issues to the voters generally follows 
the ordinary election procedures with but a few variations. A 
committee which advocates or opposes a measure may appoint 
a challenger and a ‘witness to the count in each precinct.'58 This 
procedure is handled on a county basis although the committee 
need not be a local committee. In order to obtain this privilege, 
the committee, acting in good faith, must file a petition with the 
county board of elections not later than five days prior to the 
election. Should more than one committee file, the board must 





152: Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-181. 

15399 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919). 

184 Reutener v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 117, 132, 141 N.E. 27 (1923). 

155 Ibid; Prosen v. Duffy, 152 Ohio St. 139, 87 N.E. 2d 342 (1949). 

156 State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919). 
157 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-103 (Supp. 1949). 

158 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-120. 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 521 


decide and announce its decision by registered mail to each com- 
mittee not less than three days preceding the election. This de- 
cision is not final; the aggrieved party may institute mandamus 
in the common pleas court of the county to compel the board to 
accept the appointees of such party. If more than three questions 
are submitted, the various committees may agree upon the appoint- 
ees so that not more than six challengers and six witnesses will 
represent each side of all issues. If the committees cannot so agree, 
the judges of elections must make the appointment so that in no 
case will there be more than six challengers and six witnesses 
appointed for any one election in any one precinct. 

The general election laws provide the usual methods for 
protests of elections on issues, for announcements of results, proc- 
lamations, and certificates. 

The constitution expressly validates a proposed amendment 
or law which has_ been submitted to the electors and received 
an affirmative majority notwithstanding any insufficiency of the 
petitions by which the submission was procured.'? It is to be 
noted that this applies simply to defects in petitions; it does not 
purport to obviate failure to comply with other constitutional pro- 
visions, such as those pertaining to the submission of initiated 
proposals.! 

11. Effective Date 

Any proposed law or amendment to the constitution submitted 
to the electors, if approved by a majority of the electors voting 
thereon, takes effect thirty days after the election at which it 
was approved.'*! While there is no apparent method of changing 
the technical effective date, the practical effective date could, 
no doubt, be delayed by inserting a clause in the proposed meas- 
ure which specified a later date for its provisions to become oper- 
ative. Thus, a tax measure might provide for the levy to become 
applicable the first day of the succeeding calendar year. 

As mentioned above, when the general assembly has enacted 
a proposal in amended form the effective date is suspended by 
the filing of a supplementary petition. Only the law as proposed 
in the supplementary petition goes on the ballot for approval or 
rejection. Should that measure be rejected, the law as enacted 
would go into effect immediately.'*? If, however, a majority 
of those voting on the submitted proposal should approve the 
measure, the legislative act would become a nullity, and the sub- 





159 Ouro Const. Art. II, § 1g. See also Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-182. 

160 See, e.g., State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N_E. 
172 (1919). 

161 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b. 

162 Ibid. 





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522 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


mitted measure would become effective as the law thirty days 
after the election. 


12. Conflicting Proposals 


The constitution provides that should two conflicting pro- 
posed laws or amendments be submitted at any one election, the 
one receiving the highest number of affirmative votes shall be 
the law or amendment adopted.'®’ Apparently, no one has standing 
to keep a measure from being submitted to the people because it 
duplicates or conflicts with another measure to be submitted. 
The reference to laws and amendments rather than conflicting 
portions thereof, could conceivably kill off a complete law by 
force of a conflict between one of its sections and a section of an 
almost entirely unrelated law or amendment. 


Another difficulty would be encountered should two proposals 
be made to amend one constitutional or statutory section. Article 
II, Section 16, of the constitution provides: “No law shall be re- 
vived, or amended unless the new act contains the entire act 
revived, or the section or sections amended.” While this section 
applies only to statutory material, it was indirectly used to support 
the theory that in Ohio when the whole revised text of a consti- 
tutional provision is approved the old unchanged portions are 
also passed upon by the assembly or, in case of an election, the 
voters.'% This theory was extended by ruling, in effect, that where 
two amendments to one constitutional section were proposed, even 
if the changes were consistent with each other, if one or both of 
the amendments were drafted so as to contain the entire section 
revived the proposals would be inconsistent and one must fail. 
Perhaps this result could be avoided as to constitutional amend- 
ments, by petitioning only for the changes rather than a revised 
section. It may be doubted, however, that this could be done as 
to initiated bills, as it might be held that the pertinent clause of 
Article II, Section 16, applies to them in view of the provision 
that the limitations on the power of the general assembly to enact 
laws shall be deemed limitations on the power of the people to 
enact laws.'® 

This inconsistency provision has also been said to apply to 
conflicts between amendments proposed by the initiative and the 
general assembly.'% 


While it would be incongruous to permit the governor to veto 
any direct action of the people, the constitution singles out in- 





163 Ibid. 


164 State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919). 
165 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1. 


166 State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919). 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 523 


itiated laws and expressly provides that they shall not be subject 
to such veto.!9 


13. Amendment and Repeal of Popular Legislation 

May an initiated measure enacted by the electors later be 
amended or repealed by the general assembly?!** Strong policy 
arguments can be made on either side of this question. While there 
is no authoritative ruling on it at the state level, cases which 
arose in the municipal sphere are suggestive. In non-charter mu- 
nicipalities the initiative and referendum are governed by general 
statute. This has been interpreted to leave the local governing 
body with power to repeal an amended ordinance.'® While the 
statutes providing for the initiative on a local basis differ con- 
siderably from the provisions for the statewide initiative, neither 
deals specifically with our problem, and it seems safe to assume 
that the general assembly may repeal or amend initiated laws. A 
municipality is free to regulate the subject by home rule charter!”° 
and in this way could assure the voters the last word on a particu- 
lar measure.'”! The question does not exist as to initiated amend- 
ments since all constitutional amendments, whether proposed by 
convention, initiative or the general assembly, must clear through 
the people. In Ohio, only two laws have been enacted by means 
of a supplemental initiative petition. The first of these related 
to aid to the aged.'”? Apparently the assembly never doubted its 
authority to change this act for it has since added sections and 
amended or repealed original sections. 


"REFERENDUM 


In framing referendum provisions, the Constitutional Con- 
vention of 1912 chose the optional-type referendum.'’3 In one 
area — that relating to the power of the general assembly to au- 
thorize associations with banking powers — compulsory referendum 
had been exacted by the Constitution of 1851.'4 Similarly, consti- 





167 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b. Apparently this is done to overcome any 
doubt in the particular area, since legislative acts are the only ones expressly 
made subject to the veto. See Onto Const. Arr. II, § 16. 

168 See Note 97 A.L.R. 1046 (1935). 

169 State ex rel. Singer v. Cartledge, 129 Ohio St. 279, 195 N.E. 237 (1935); 
1933 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 19. 

170 State ex rel. Daniels v. City of Portsmouth, 136 Ohio St. 15, 22 N.E 
2d 913 (1939). 

171 See, e.g., Section 48 of the Charter of the City of Columbus, Ohio, 
which provides that the city council may not amend or repeal an ordinance 
adopted by the voters for a period of two years after its passage. 

172 Onto Gen. Cope §§ 1359-1 et seq., as adopted by initiative November 7, 
1933. 
173 Onto Const. Art. II. 

174 Onto Const. Art. XII, § 7. 





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524 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


tutional amendments proposed by the assembly or constitutional 
conventions must be submitted to the voters.'75 The provision 
relating to associations with banking powers is obsolete; “banking 
powers” has been interpreted to apply only to powers employed 
in making or issuing paper money or, at most, to the powers ex- 
ercised by banks of issue.!7© In our present national system of 
banking and currency, there is no place for state bank notes serv- 
ing as a circulating medium. 

No express provision of the constitution authorizes the volun- 
tary referendum, whereby the legislature voluntarily submits an 
act to the people. It has been held that except for the provisions 
relating to the initiative and referendum, all legislative authority 
must be exercised by the general assembly alone.'”? The general 
assembly may not delegate to any other body or to the public di- 
rectly the power to pass laws.'78 Local option laws are a well- 
rooted exception to this general principle.!”9 

The referendum, with which we are concerned, is the cptional 
plan. 

The constitution reserves two powers of referendum to the 
voters of Ohio. The optional referendum is made applicable to 
the action of the general assembly in ratifying any proposed amend- 
ment to the Constitution of the United States.'8 This provision 
has been a dead letter since the Supreme Court of the United 
States decided that the federal constitution, in providing for rati- 
fication by the legislatures of the states, means action by repre- 
sentative assemblies and not the electors.!*! 





175 Onto Const. Art. XVI. 

176 Dearborn v. Northwestern Savings Bank, 42 Ohio St. 617 (1885); Ford- 
ham, Some Aspects of Constitutional Revision in Ohio, 23 Omo Bar 181, 189 
(1950). 

177 State ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 120 Ohio St. 
464, 473, 166 N.E. 407 (1929). See Note 76 A.L.R. 1053 (1932) on the problem 
of whether a referendum may be permitted on a general statute in the absence 
of a constitutional authorization. 

178 State ex rel. Godfrey v. O’Brien, 95 Ohio St. 166, 115 N.E. 25 (1917); 
State ex rel. Allison v. Garver, 66 Ohio St. 555, 64 N.E. 573 (1902); Railway 
v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77 (1852). 

179 Gassman v. Kerns, 7 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 626 (C.P. 1908), affirmed in 81 
Ohio St. 496 (Mem. 1909); Ely v. Williard, 2 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 571 (C.P. 1904). 

180 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1. 


181 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920). This doctrine was extended to 
preclude a referendum on an act of the general assembly calling a conven- 
tion for the purpose of deciding upon the ratification of a proposed amend- 
ment to the Constitution of the United States. State ex rel. Donnelly v. 
Myers, 127 Ohio St. 104, 186 N.E. 918 (1933). But certain state acts affecting 
the federal sphere are subject to referendum. Thus, in State of Ohio ex rel. 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 525 


The electors may, through the optional referendum, reject 
any law, section of any law or item in any law appropriating money 
passed by the general assembly,'*? except laws providing for tax 
levies, appropriations for the current expenses of the state, and 
emergency laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the 
public peace, health or safety.!*} These exceptions from the gen- 
eral rule, it has been said, must be construed strictly though 
reasonably.!84 


The exemption as to tax statutes has been confined in appli- 
cation to state tax levies which are self-executing imposts. The 
exemption does not apply to acts, which relate to taxation, as by 
regulating tax procedure or by authorizing or limiting local tax- 
ation, but do not actually impose tax levies.'*5 Thus, an act 
imposing a tax limitation upon local governments and creating a 
taxing agency is not excepted from the referendum provisions of 
the constitution.'** The fact, moreover, that an act contains certain 
sections which might be subject to referendum probably does not 
control as to the act as a whole.'8? While there are no actual deci- 
sions on the point, the attorney general has taken the view that 
an otherwise referrable section of a measure might be subject to 
referendum even if combined with sections excluded from the 
device.'88 The referendum would doubtless be available as against 
a measure repealing a state tax. This observation is offered de- 
spite its academic ring! 


With respect to the second exception, that for current ex- 
penses of the state, the court, by Robinson, J., has said, “Our 
conception of the phrase, as used in our constitution, is that ‘cur- 
rent expenses’, in addition to including the expenses incident to 
officering (sic) and maintaining the state government, includes 
the preserving in repair and maintaining of the property of the 
state government, and, as applied to roads, includes the main- 
taining and repairing thereof, as distinguished for new construc- 





Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916), it was held that a congressional 
redistricting act was referrable. And see 1917 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 
153, wherein it was ruled that an act of the general assembly extending suf- 
frage to women in presidential elections was subject to the referendum. 


182 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1. The referendum is limited to “laws” and bills 
not passed may not be referred. 1913 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 248. 


183 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1d. 

184 State ex rel. Keller v. Forney, 108 Ohio St. 463, 141 N.E. 16 (1923). 
185 Ibid. 

186 State ex rel. Schrieber v. Milray, 88 Ohio St. 301, 102 N.E. 959 (1913). 
187 State ex rel. Keller v. Forney, 108 Ohio St. 463, 141 NE. 16 (1923). 

188 1943 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 6207. 








526 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


tion.””!8° 

In the only case in which the court was directly faced with 
the problem of divisibility of an act, the court held that none of 
its provisions were subject to the referendum. Thus, where an 
appropriation bill for current expenses included a condition that 
certain vouchers must show that competitive bids were secured, 
it was held that this condition was effective immediately upon the 
passage of the bill and would not be subject to the referendum.'” 
While a capital outlay item in a general appropriation bill would 
be subject to referendum the court considered a condition attached 
to a current expense item a part, in effect, of that item. 

An entirely different attitude of the court is seen in its con- 
struction of the third exception— that dealing with emergency 
laws. The constitution provides that “emergency laws upon a yea 
and nay vote must receive the vote of two-thirds of all the members 
elected to each branch of the general assembly, and the reasons 
for such necessity shall be set forth in one section of the law, which 
section shall be passed only by a yea and nay vote, upon a sepa- 
rate roll call thereon.”!®! It will be seen that there is no specific 
requirement that there be a two-thirds vote on the emergency 
clause, but that is not a matter of moment since that quality of 
vote must be had on final passage.'®? It is the practice to have a 
two-thirds vote on the emergency clause before it is added to the 
proposed bill for final vote.'93 Should an emergency bill be passed 
by both branches of the general assembly in varied forms and 
neither house would accept the other’s version, the second vote in 
each house, after a conference committee had ironed out the dif- 
ferences, would again be subject to a two-thirds majority.’ 

The real difficulty encountered with respect to this exception 
is whether a legislative determination of an emergency is justi- 
ciable. In the first case in which this question could have been 
answered, the supreme court simply held that the reasons given 
for declaring the Conservancy Act to be an emergency measure 





‘ 

189 State ex rel. Janes v. Brown, 112 Ohio St. 590, 601, 142 N.E. 37 (1925). 
The attorney general has ruled that the costs of construction of a building 
for women at a state university cannot be deemed to be current expense. 
1919 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 308. 

190 State ex rel. The Davies Manufacturing Co. v. Donahey, 94 Ohio St. 
382, 114 N.E. 1037 (1916). 

191 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1d. 


192 But see 1915 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 159 to the effect that there 
must be a separate two-thirds vote for an emergency clause. 

193 See, e.g., Rule 63, Rules of the Senate of the Ninety-Eighth General 
Assembly of the State of Ohio (1949). 

194 Rule 16, Joint Rules of the Ninety-Eighth General Assembly of the 
State of Ohio (1949). 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 527 


were valid.'°5 Shortly thereafter the court by dictum, carried into 
the syllabus, stated that the emergency character of an act could 
be challenged “in a proper proceeding and at a proper time.”!% 
When first directly faced with the problem, the court split into 
three camps.'9?7 Two members believed that if the legislative 
formalities required were met, the determination of an emergency 
by the assembly would be conclusive. These two, joined by two 
others, were of the opinion that if the legislative determination 
were not conclusive, it should be presumed valid and any repug- 
nancy with the true situation must be obvious. In three strongly- 
worded dissents, the minority favored a complete examination 
and review of the determination of emergency. One saving element 
in the majority opinion (and undoubtedly approved by the minority 
judges) was the dictum that certain features of an emergency 
clause are justiciable; namely, that the necessary two-thirds vote 
was had, that the general assembly has set forth the reasons for 
such declaration,'®® and that the emergency clause passed upon 
a yea and nay vote on a separate roll call.'°% Sixteen years later, 
the court by a four-to-two vote, definitely held that the courts will 
not review a legislative determination of an emergency.” The 
court relied on the earlier case and a case”! dealing with an 
analogous code section. 

Further limitations upon the referendum power of the people 
might be found in the distinction between statutes purely legis- 
lative in character and those of an administrative or executive 
nature. No Ohio cases relating to statutes have been found. On the 
local level, it has been held that an ordinance fixing the rate for 
the furnishing of natural gas to a city, notwithstanding that it 
contained additional related matters concerning service, was neot 
subject to the referendum.”°? As already noted, the municipal 





195 Snyder v. Deeds, 91 Ohio St. 407, 110 N.E. 1068 (1914). 

196 Miami County v. City of Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215, 110 N.E. 726 (1915). 

197 State ex rel. Durbin v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 591, 133 N.E. 457 (1921). 
For a review of the Ohio and other state cases on this problem, see Comment, 
1 Onto Sr. L. J. 40 (1935). 

198In an analogous case involving a municipal ordinance, it was held 
that failure of the council to set forth the reasons for its declaration of 
emergency was fatal. A mere statement that the ordinance was necessary 
for the preservation of public peace, health and safety was considered but a 
conclusion, without reasons, and not sufficient. Goodman v. Youngstown, 
24 Ohio L. Abs. 696 (1937). 

199102 Ohio St. 591, 598, 133 N.E. 457 (1921). 

200 State ex rel. Schorr v. Kennedy, 132 Ohio St. 510, 9 N.E. 2d 278 (1937). 

201 Holcomb v. State ex rel. Coxey, Sr., 126 Ohio St. 496, 186 N.E. 99 (1933). 

202 The Union Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 33 Ohio Law Rep. 
214 (1930). It has been held that where a city has determined to construct 
a public utility, ordinances incidental to and in furtherance of the original 
measure are not subject to referendum under Section 5 of Article XVIII of 








528 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


initiative and referendum are apart from home rule charter pro- 
visions, controlled by statute. Even if the Ohio courts do adopt 
the general theory of excluding ordinances of an administrative 
nature, this should not affect their holdings on state legislation. 
There is no more basis here than in the case of the initiative for 
restricting the scope of electoral action by interpretation. The 
statute exempting certain ordinances from the referendum is 
worded much differently from Section le of Article II.?°> While 
the constitution reserves to the electors of the state the power to 
adopt “any law” the provision as to municipalities reserves the 
power “on all questions which such municipalities may now or 
hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action.”?™ 
(italics ours). 


Referendum Procedure 


Generally, the provisions, both constitutional and statutory, 
dealing with the initiative and referendum treat related features 
of each together. While the two systems are quite separate many 
of the procedural steps for the initiative apply equally to the 
referendum. Particular note will be taken here only of features 
of the referendum peculiar to that device. 

The initial steps of a one-hundred signature petition, summary 
and certificate of that summary by the attorney general are re- 
quired. A referendum petition, however, is limited to one act or 
part thereof.2°5 The printing, control, and payment for petitions is 
handled as in the case of initiative petitions. The secretary of state 
may, however, refuse to issue blank petitions against laws not 
subject to referendum and mandamus will not lie against him.?° 

The form of referendum petitions is slightly different. The 
words “referendum petition” are placed at the top of the petition.?°’ 
Unlike the initiative, the constitution requires no particular cap- 
tion for referendum petitions; this gap has, however, been filled 
by a statute requiring that following the date of issuance of the 
petition must come, the words, “To be submitted to the electors 
for their approval or rejection.”?°° Then follows the title, which 
must contain a brief legislative history of the law, section or item 





the constitution. State ex rel. Didelius v. Commissioner, 131 Ohio St. 356, 
2 NE. 2d 862 (1936), overruling State ex rel. Diehl, Jr. v. Abele, 119 Ohio 
St. 210, 162 N.E. 807 (1928). If the later ordinances materially modified the 
basic one that would be another matter. 

203 On10 Gen. Cove § 4227-3. 

204 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1f. 

205 State ex rel. Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872 (1933). 

206 State ex rel. Schorr v. Kennedy, 132 Ohio St. 510, 9 N.E. 2d 278 (1937); 
State ex rel. Durbin v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 591, 133 N.E. 457 (1921). 

207 Onto Gen. Cove § 4785-176. 

208 Ibid. 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 529 


of law sought to be referred. The remainder of the petition follows 
the form of initiative petitions,?°° except that following the text 
of the law to be referred appears the certificate of the secretary 
of state that the law, section or item of law, as shown, has been 
found to be a true copy of the enrolled bill or the pertinent part 
of it. 

The issuance of blank part-petitions to circulators and the 
related procedures are exactly the same as for initiative petitions. 

The constitution provides that petitions seeking to have a 
law or part of a law referred shall bear the signatures of six per 
centum of the electors.?!° Again, it is required that there be signa- 
tures of not less than one-half of the designated percentage of 
electors of each of one-half of the counties in the state. 

The requirements and qualifications for signers of these peti- 
tions are exactly the same as for initiative petitions. So it is with 
respect to the circulation and verification of petitions. 

Although all part-petitions must be filed together, the pro- 
visions relating to time of filing referendum petitions are quite 
different from those concerning initiative petitions. To be effective 
referendum petitions must be filed with the secretary of state 
within ninety days after the law which is to be referred shall have 
been filed by the governor in the office of the secretary.?!! This 
time is to be computed by excluding the date upon which the law 
was filed in the office of the secretary of state.?!? Further, the date 
of approval by the governor is not important or effective in de- 
termining effective dates of referrable statutes.?!5 By excluding 
the filing day and permitting petitions to be filed at any time on 
the ninetieth day, the petitioners actually have ninety-plus days 
in which to file. One court of appeals has taken the view that 
should the ninetieth day be a Sunday a further day is given.?!* 

While the constitutional provisions seem clear as to bills passed 
in the ordinary course and approved by the govenor, there is a 
void as to bills passed over a veto or allowed to become law by 
lapse of time. Only when the governor approves a bill is he specific- 
ally required to file the bill with the secretary of state.?'5 Yet 





209 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-176 provides in part: “The general provisions 
heretofore set forth relative to the form and order of an initiative petition, 
shall be, so far as practical, applicable to a referendum petition .. .” 

210 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1c. 

211 [bid. 

212 Heuck v. State ex rel. Mack, 127 Ohio St. 247, 187 N.E. 869 (1933). 

213 State v. Lathrop, 93 Ohio St. 79, 112 N.E. 209 (1915). 

214 State ex rel. Mack v. Heuck, 38 Ohio Law Rep. 33 (1933). The supreme 
court, in affirming, found it unnecessary to pass on this issue. Heuck v. State 
ex rel. Mack, 127 Ohio St. 247, 187 N.E. 869 (1933). Contra: 1927 Ops. Att’y 
Gen. (Ohio) No. 281. 

215 Onto Const. Art. II, § 16. 





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530 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


referendum petitions must be filed within ninety days after the 
governor has filed a bill. In the case of a bill passed over a veto it 
would seem logical to say that a petition could be filed within 
ninety days after that bill was filed with the secretary by officers 
of the general assembly. Since bills becoming law by lapse of time 
are in the hands of the governor, the burden of filing must be on 
him, and thus the ninety-day period would begin when he did file. 
While no authority can be found for these propositions, they have 
strong rational support. Measures not signed by the governor are 
not within the express exceptions to the referendum and the ques- 
tion here derives simply from a gap left in the drafting of the 
ninety-day clause.?!¢ 

As with supplementary initiative petitions, used when the 
initiated proposal is amended and passed, the filing of a refer- 
endum petition suspends the effective date of an act to be re- 
ferred.?!7 Whether the general assembly may repeal or amend an 
act while in this state of suspension has not been adjudicated.?'* 
When a referendum petition attacks only part of a law, the re- 
mainder goes into effect in the regular manner. If the voters approve 
the measure or part, as the case may be, it takes effect when the 
election results are determined.?!° 


The examination and rejection of petitions or signatures are 
administered in the same manner as those for the initiative.??° 
The same is true as to protests and supplementary petitions used 
for the ten-day period granted to obtain additional signatures. 

The provisions relating to information for the electors are 
the same as for initiative proposals save that the persons pre- 
paring arguments or explanations, or both, against a measure may 
be named in the petition while those preparing the material for 
the measure are named by the general assembly if in session, or if 





216 Onto Const. Art. II, § 16 reads in part: “No law passed by the general 
assembly shall go into effect until ninety days after it shall have been filed by 
the governor in the office of the secretary of state, except as herein provided 

. .” Since this last clause has been held to refer to Art. II, § 1d, which 
exempts certain legislative acts from the referendum, State v. Lathrop, 93 
Ohio St. 79, 112 N.E. 209 (1915), a very strict interpretation of the section 
would not only exclude bills passed over a veto from the referendum, but 
would also preclude such bills from ever becoming effective. 

217 Compare Onto Const. Art. II, § 1c with Art. II, § 1b. 


218 The attorney general has ruled that the assembly may amend an act 
after the governor has approved and before the ninety-day waiting period 
has elapsed, at least until a referendum has been ordered on it. 1915 Ops. 
Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 325. 


219 Onto Const. Art. II, § Ic. 


220 The secretary of state may, however, refuse to submit to referendum 
an act containing an emergency clause. 1914 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1124. 











1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 531 


not, by the governor.??! Various code sections, including the one 
dealing with publicity pamphlets,??? call for a printing of the 
text of the law to be initiated or referred. In the case of the refer- 
endum, confusion may result when but a section or item of a law 
is attacked. For publicity pamphlets the constitution requires that 
the secretary of state shall cause to be printed “the law, or pro- 
posed law, or proposed amendment to the constitution.”’> The 
statute, on the other hand, requires the printing of the “text of 
each measure to be submitted.’**4 Should but one section or item 
of a law be referred, it would be very confusing to have the whole 
law printed without clear identification of the part under attack. 
On the oter hand, the reading of one section of a law, without 
seeing the remainder, would usually not be very enlightening. A 
better method, and one which would doubtless be substantial com- 
pliance, would be to print the complete act, italicizing the parts 
to be deleted should the referendum be successful. 

The ballot is governed by the same provisions as in the case 
of the initiative. Referred bills are treated as initiated measures 
in that a “yes” vote is used to support the law. Due to the old 
voter’s creed, “in case of doubt, vote no,” this might seem inad- 
visable. The record of Ohio referrals might be shown to substantiate 
this danger; out of the ten bills referred to date, only one has 
been ratified. The ballot is printed so that the issue can be submit- 
ted to the voters at the next succeeding general or regular election 
in any year occurring subsequent to sixty days after the filing of the 
petition.2*5 It will be recalled that the attorney general has inter- 
preted a similar provision as to constitutional amendments to 
mean that the issue must be submitted in the year the petition 
is filed.226 This becomes important as to a protracted session of 
the legislature since one hundred fifty days from July 1, for ex- 
ample, would carry beyond election day. 

Should the voters reject a referred act designed to repeal 
or amend a law, that law would remain effective.??’ 

As already noted, a referred measure does not become effec- 
tive unless and until approved by the voters. There is no express 
provision making the veto applicable to the referendum, but it 
does not fit. If the governor had approved the measure the voters 
would simply be concurring. If the governor had failed to act or 
disapproved the bill he would already have had his chance and no 





221 Ouro Const. Art. II, § 1g; Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-180a. 
222 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-180b. 

223 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g. 

224 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-180b. 

225 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1c. 

226 See note 87, supra. 

2271915 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 725. 





amas 





532 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


reason can be found for giving him two chances to kill a measure. 

In contrast to the initiative provision, there is no express 
clause dealing with conflicting provisions caused by the referen- 
dum. Such a conflict might be caused, for example, by two petitions, 
one of which referred section one of an act and the other referred 
sections one and two. Should the first submission be approved, 
the voters would be expressing a desire that section one be the law; 
should the second submission be rejected the voters would be say- 
ing that section one should not be the law. 


CoNCLUSION 

In a paper of this character it behooves the authors to leave 
the reader to draw his own conclusions. The latter will readily 
discern, for example, that the initiative can be used to submit 
constitutional amendments without sifting by any deliberative 
body and, thus, that, in an important sense, Ohio takes greater 
care in legislative action than in modifying the organic law. He will 
observe, further, that the processes of popular legislation are rather 
ponderous but that the general assembly has considered it neces- 
sary to add refinements in procedure to preserve the integrity 
of the process. 

There are deeper policy considerations which should be ex- 
plored. We shall conclude by merely suggesting one or two of 
them in the form of questions. Is popular legislation any more 
free than representative action from the influence of pressure 
groups? Is it calculated to increase or decrease responsibility in 
our legislative assemblies? Does it consist with modern develop- 
ments, which provide various research and drafting aids for our 
legislatures and enable them to conduct the policy-making function 
on a more continuous non-fragmentary basis? Can the voters be 
expected to exercise informed judgment except on proposals in- 
volving clear-cut, easily understood issues? There is much interest 
in the short ballot. Are the short ballot and popular legislation 
consistent? , 











Continuous Code Revision in Ohio 
Wruarp D. CAmMpPpBELL* 


The history of code revision in Ohio clearly demonstrates the 
need not only for a complete revision which is now in progress but 
also a continuous recod:fication and revision of the statutes enacted 
by our legislature in years to come. 

Prior to March 27, 1875, there had been no legislation providing 
for a commission to revise the statutory laws of Ohio. While there 
had been a number of professed revisions before that date, nothing 
more had been attempted than the compilation in one chapter of 
the various provisions on any one subject and the collection of 
such chapters into a volume. The first such revision was made 
during the session of the Legislature which was held at Chillicothe, 
in the years 1804 and 1805. At the same session all the laws, with 
few exceptions, adopted by the Governor and Judges of the North- 
west Territory under the Ordinance of 1787, or enacted by the 
legislature under the territorial government, were repealed. That 
revision included statutes for the administration of justice, the 
conveyance of property, the collection of revenue, the organization 
of the militia, the punishment of crime, and other statutes prev- 
iously adopted or enacted which were being amended and re 
enacted. Succeeding legislatures made similar revisions of the laws. 

Then, beginning in 1833, several authors prepared editions of 
the statutes of a more permanent character. Salmon P. Chase pre- 
pared a chronological editian in 1833. From 1841 to 1868, Judge 
Swan made several compilations of the statutes, setting them up 
under 131 chapter headings alphabetically arranged. 

In the Constitution of 1851, provision was made for a commis- 
sion to revise, reform, simplify, and abridge the practice of the 
courts of record, and the 50th General Assembly, on March 11, 
1853, enacted a code of civil procedure prepared by such commis- 
sion.! In 1869, acts “providing for the organization and govern- 
ment of municipal corporations” and “establishing a code of Crimi- 
nal Procedure” were enacted.” 

Finally, in 1874, a bill was introduced by Representative 
George W. Boyce, of Hamilton County, to provide for a general 
revision of the statutes. Such bill failing of enactment, Senator 
Lucian C. Jones, of Trumbull County, introduced a similar bill 
in 1875, which was enacted.’ 


* Director Ohio Bureau of Code Revision. 
151 Ohio Laws 57 et seq. 
266 Ohio Laws 149 et seq. 
372 Ohio Laws 87 et seq. 








533 








534 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


The title of the act of March 27, 1875, was “To provide for 
the revision and consolidation of the statute laws of Ohio.” In 
conformity with the act the Governor appointed three commis- 
sioners to revise and consolidate the general laws. They proceeded 
to divide their work, “The Revised Statutes,” into four parts, “Po- 
litical, Civil, Remedial, and Penal.” An act of June 23, 1879,* pro- 
vided for printing and distributing the Revised Statutes, which 
were edited and annotated by the commissioners and were pub- 
lished for the state in two volumes. These Revised Statutes, as 
amended, supplemented, and repealed by succeeding general as- 
semblies, were in force from 1880 to the time of the adoption of 
the General Code of 1910. 

The 77th General Assembly, by an act passed on April 2, 1906,5 
provided for the appointment of three commissioners to revise and 
consolidate the general statute laws of Ohio. In December, 1906, 
the commissioners were appointed and began the codification of 
the laws of Ohio. Their work was submitted to and adopted by 
the legislature on February 14, 1910, as Senate Bill No. 2 of the 
78th General Assembly. The “General Code” was divided into the 
same four topical parts as the “Revised Statutes” had been. 

On March 23, 1910, the general assembly passed an act “to 
supplement section 779 of the General Code, by enacting Section 
779-1, relating to the publication of the laws,” and pursuant to 
such act the Commissioners of Public Printing published the 
“General Code of the State of Ohio.” 

On March 28, 1911, the 79th General Assembly enacted Sec- 
tion 772 of the General Code,° which authorized the Attorney 
General to prepare an appendix to the General Code to consist of 
certain acts and parts of acts not included by the commission in 
the General Code. The Attorney General, Timothy S. Hogan, em- 
ployed James E. Campbell and Lewis C. Laylin to prepare such 
appendix, which later became a part of the General Code by a 
supreme court decision.’ 

After a lapse df 34 years, the 96th General Assembly, in 1945, 
created the Bureau of Code Revision to provide for an additional 
service to the general assembly and its committees for the purpose 
of facilitating the continuous codification and revision of the statute 
law by the general assembly and the adaptation of new legislation 
to the form and arrangement of the General Code. 

The Bureau of Code Revision of the state of Ohio is made up 
of the Director and his staff and the Commission which is composed 
of three appointees of the Governor, three members of the Senate 





476 Ohio Laws 192. 
598 Ohio Laws 221. 
6102 Ohio Laws 46. 
7 State ex rel. v. LeBlond, 108 Ohio St. 41. 











1950] CODE REVISION 535 


and three members of the House of Representatives, which includes 
the Chairman of each Judiciary Committee of the two branches 
of our state legislature. The appointments of the Governor are 
for a period of six years, with one appointment being made each 
two years, thus assuring a continuation of the program and a con- 
tinuity of policy through the changes of legislative personnel and 
the leadership of each administration. The Commission selects its 
own chairman and appoints its director for a six year period. At- 
torney Charles D. Fogle of Marietta, an appointee of Governor 
Frank J. Lausche, is serving as Chairman of the Commission and 
the writer as Director of the Bureau. 

During the regular session of the 97th General Assembly in 
1947 the legislature repealed 898 sections of law upon the recom- 
mendation of the bureau.’ The legislature further passed a joint 
resolution? approving the plan presented by the bureau for the 
order, classification, and arrangement of the General Code, and 
another resolution!® directing the bureau to draft and submit to 
the general assembly, legislation consolidating the 39 separate 
municipal court acts. 

In the regular session of the 98th General Assembly 305 ad- 
ditional sections were repealed upon the recommendation of the 
bureau,'! and by resolution!” the legislature directed by the bureau 
to make research of the court opinions and needs of the state in 
the field of domestic relations and to draft and submit a bill re- 
flecting the recommendations resulting from this study. 

Under the act creating it,'!’ the bureau has taken over the 
former functions of the Attorney General as the codifier of the 
laws of the state, and each law passed since 1945, before being 
filed with the Secretary of State’s office, has been referred to the 
bureau and, if of a general and permanent nature, numbered by 
the Director of Code Revision so as to conform to the General Code. 

It becomes apparent from the above survey of our state his- 
tory that there is a great need for revision and that work on it is 
long overdue. It is much in order to note that before the turn of 
the century the legislature required that all petitions filed by a 
plaintiff in any cause of action must contain a statement of facts 
constituting the cause of action in ordinary and concise language.'* 
This legislative requirement for simplicity of language in petitions 
to be filed in our courts could well be applied to instruments of 





8S.B. 18, 19, and 25 (122 Ohio Laws 25-7). 
°9S.J.R. 10 (122 Ohio Laws 774). 

10$.J.R. 17 (122 Ohio Laws 767). 

11$.B. 119 (123 Ohio Laws). 

12$.J.R. 32 (123 Ohio Laws). 

13 Onto Gen. Cone §§ 76-1 to 76-8 inc. 

14 Onto Gen. Cope § 11305. ' 








536 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


their own creation. No one disputes the fact that our laws should 
not only be uniform, but constructed in ordinary and concise 
language devoid of complexity and free from ambiguous phrases. 

A great need for revision, rearrangement, and renumbering 
of the code is occasioned by a recognized change in the thinking of 
lawyers and the nature of the practice of law. The general practi- 
tioner has been in many instances replaced by attorneys in spe- 
cialized fields of law. Lawyers practicing in the fields of adminis- 
trative, labor, probate, criminal, or taxation law naturally desire 
that such be made available to them within one grouping and con- 
ceivably within one separate volume of the published code. There 
has been within recent years a definite trend to make a placement 
of law according to subject matter rather than under the political 
unit dealing with its administration. Schools, libraries, law en- 
forcement, taxes, drainage, and conservation have become state 
problems and pertinent legislation is no longer largely administered 
by local political units. These subjects, accordingly, require new 
placement under general headings rather than under the topics 
concerning districts, townships, and counties. The consecutive 
numbering system in the state of Ohio has occasioned many gaps 
in the numbering system by repeal of former enactments. These 
groups of unused section numbers have been frequently filled by 
former codifiers of the law without regard to illogical placement. 

Before discussing the effect of revision in Ohio and the nature 
of the work of the bureau, it seems desirable to make clear certain 
underlying principles governing the subject matter of revision of 
statutes which frequently are lost sight of by those who have not 
dealt thoroughly with the subject. The first of these principles is 
the distinction between “compilation of statutes,” as has been 
chiefly done in Ohio heretofore and a “revision of statutes” as is 
now authorized by the legislature for the bureau. 

A “compilation of statutes” is a mere bringing together of pre- 
existing statutes in the form in which they appear upon the books 
at the time, with the substitution of the latest amendments for 
the material amended, under an arrangement designed to facilitate 
consultation of them. No change in wording can be made in such 
a work. At times, by editorial authority only, statutes assumed to 
be superseded by later statutes are omitted from such a work, 
but the omission does not affect the actual efficacy of the material 
so omitted, and accordingly laws existing prior to the codification 
of 1910 and not repealed or reenacted thereby, have been checked 
by the bureau. Confusion of expression and inconsistency in stat- 
utes cannot be remedied in a compilation. Its one advantage is 
the bringing together of the statutes of a certain class, or those 
which deal with a certain subject matter, under a logical arrange- 
ment, usually in a publication which can be indexed and in which 











1950] CODE REVISION 537 


the difficulties of consultation are minimized. Compilation of 
statutes makes no change in their effect either upon other statutes 
or upon each other. 

“ ‘Codification’ is the process of collecting and arranging the 
laws of a state into a code, that is, into a complete system of positive 
law, scientifically ordered and formulated by legislative authori- 
ty."45. There is, accordingly, considerable difference between a 
code of laws in a state and a compilation of its statutes. The code 
is broader in scope and more comprehensive in its purposes. Its 
general object is to embody all the laws of the state from whatever 
source derived. When the General Code of Ohio was adopted by 
the legislature in 1910, it had the same effect as one general act 
containing all the provisions embraced in the three volumes. The 
General Code became then more than evidentiary of the law; it 
became the law itself. 

“Revision of statutes,” on the other hand, cannot be accom- 
plished except by enactment or reenactment of the finished product. 
It involves change in expression, and its purpose may be either 
to accomplish substantive change in the statute law or to improve 
its form. Viewed from the standpoint of the treatment of its sub- 
ject matter, revision is of two types, which are often confused. 

“Substantive revision” is the process by which the meaning 
and effect of preexisting statutes are changed so as to accommo- 
date them to changing conditions. This involves change in their 
effect, and the standard in such revision is that of the policy adopt- 
ed. Such revision should be,.and usually is, accomplished under the 
aegis of special commissions or groups interested in the activities 
controlled, or to be controlled, by the statutes to be revised. The 
revision statutes themselves usually are drafted by experts skilled 
in the law of the field affected. This type of revision is not the 
province of the bureau and in order to clarify any misapprehen- 
sion and to safeguard against any abuse of the general powers of 
the bureau, its functions are confined clearly to deal only with 
matters of form and not of substance. In all matters of recommen- 
dations for revision by amendment or repeal the bureau will not 
take any position with respect to changes in substantive law. State 
policies originate in the legislature and at no time will the bureau 
suggest changes in substantive law unless requested so to do by 
formal resolution or law enactment. Revision deals with details, 
not with fundamentals. 

“Formal revision of statutes,” on the other hand, deals solely 
with their form and expression and is carried on for the purpose 
of producing certainty and conciseness in expression and logic in 
arrangement of pre-existing statutes, so that they can be found 





1S Worps AND Purases, Vol. 7. 








538 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


readily and, when found, can be understood easily. Consolidation 
of overlapping provisions, correction of inaccurate, prolix, or re- 
dundant expressions, elimination of obscurities and conflicts, and 
the collection and enactment of the whole into a logical arrange- 
ment and compactness without change in effect, are the aims of 
the bureau in completing this type of revision in Ohio. 

From the standpoint of subject matter covered, formal revision 
of the statutes may be either topical or general. 

“Topical revision” is revision of those statutes which, by rea- 
son of their relationship one to the other, conveniently can be re- 
vised together as a topic or logical subdivision of the statute law. 
“General revision” is revision which includes all or a large body 
of the statutes in effect at a given time. This latter type of review 
has become necessary in Ohio by reason of the magnitude of the 
revision work to be done. 

“Continuous revision,” of course, is effected on a year-by-year 
or other continuous basis, usually in the form of topical revision, 
while “periodic revision” is that performed at given periods, and 
it usually is general in character. The continuous revision in Ohio 
necessarily contemplates a bulk revision followed periodically by 
topical revisions to conform to future legislative needs. 

The greatest obstacle encountered by the bureau in revising 
the code is the constitutional requirement in Ohio that all statutory 
changes be shown on the draft of the proposed enactment, and the 
deletions and additions to each sentence and word of the existing 
law must be marked so that the new measure can be compared 
with the old. Ohio, unlike most other states, has a provision in 
its Constitution which requires that “no law shall be revived or 
amended, unless the new act contains the entire act revived or 
amended, and the section or sections so amended shall be re- 
pealed.”!6 

This makes it impossible in Ohio to draw short revision bills 
by merely changing words or phrases of certain sections or para- 
graphs, Instead, it’is necessary to set forth the entire section in 
order to correct defects in any part of the section. In practice, if 
the section contains other provisions which are controversial, leg- 
islators do not like to bring such a bill out on the floor where the 
entire section is subject to amendment and debate. It is apt to 
take up too much of the legislature’s time in order to accomplish 
its original purpose. Consequently, legislative committees are slow 
to recommend such bills for passage unless there are serious defects 
which need immediate attention. This condition not only makes it 
difficult for the revisor to reconstruct an awkwardly-phrased sec- 
tion of law, but it necessitates the listing of all the thousands of 





16 Onto Constr. Art. II § 16. 














1950] CODE REVISION 539 


deletions and supplying the sections with language to conform to 
the remainder of the section. Every one of the present 19,722 sec- 
tions has te be rebuilt to show the deletions and additions made 
to each section. Some sections have as high as two hundred amend- 
ments and it is estimated that seventeen thousand require at least 
two amendments. A restatement of each of these sections of law 
covering its essential purpose would be far simpler than rebuild- 
ing the sections of the old statute by amendment in conformity 
with the constitutional requirement. Some sections of our law are 
beyond repair and must be repealed and new ones enacted, but 
this is exceptional and will be given special reference when the 
revised code is presented to the general assembly for their con- 
sideration. 

There are seven main objectives of a complete or bulk revi- 
sion which the Bureau of Code Revision seeks to accomplish. 

The first requisite in approaching the problem was to deter- 
mine what statutes were in effect and to establish a convenient 
master file containing true copies of the approximately 23,000 
original sections of the statutory law in the state. Some of these 
laws are not of a general and permanent nature, and hence have 
been improperly placed in the General Code, and others are omit- 
ted and contained only in the session laws of our state when they 
should be numbered and recognized in the General Code. The 
publishers correct many such omissions by giving them an unof- 
ficial number placed within brackets. The General Code of Ohio 
should contain all the statutory law in the state that is of a per- 
manent and general nature. If special in character, or limited in 
time to within two years operation by its own terms, it is neither 
general nor permanent, and hence is unnumbered and is to be 
found only in the session laws of the state published by the sec- 
retary of state after every regular legislative session. 

The second objective and logical step in a complete revision 
is to eliminate from the statutes the obsolete, unconstitutional, 
antiquated, and unnecessary sections of law. Over 1,400 of those 
recommended by the Bureau have been repealed by the past two 
sessions of the legislature.!’ 

Laws pertaining to passenger service on canal boats, or the 
creation of societies for the apprehension of horse thieves have no 
applicability to our present day economy. Many awkward and 
amusing statutes still remain in our code by reason of the contro- 
versial nature of their subject matter, but in the absence of their 
outright repeal will be amended to relate them to modern society. 

The third objective of the bureau is to determine, list, and cor- 
rect the many partially-obsolete sections contained in our laws. 





17 Senate Bills 18, 19 and 25 in 1947, and Senate Bill 119 in 1949. 








540 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


Over the years the legislature has made many changes in the names 
of different departments of government and the names of many 
abolished offices and departments have been inadvertently left in 
the statutes, causing imperfection in our law and confusion within 
the departments as to their proper functions. In many cases, duties 
and responsibilities of an abolished office still remain as part of 
our law. In some instances such duties were absorbed by another 
office or department, while in others they were ignored. One has 
only to refer to the office of state geologist to illustrate such an 
instance. That office has been abolished and its duties absorbed 
by other departments. It is the observation of the bureau that no 
greater need exists in the state today than that of a clarification 
and a simplified outline of the functions and duties of each depart- 
ment of our state government. The bureau has uncovered in the 
code 2,640 sections, which have been briefed and declared to be 
partially-obsolete to the extent that they contain obsolete phrases 
that require correction. Inasmuch as this would require separate 
amendments which would be a burdensome task for the legislature 
to consider in so many statutes, it is the opinion of the bureau that 
correction should be effected in connection with the general re- 
vision of the code rather than by the amendment of each section 
prior to the general revision. The so-called “partially-obsolete” 
are of six types. 

The first type of partially-obsolete sections is that which con- 
tinues to use the names of offices, boards, commissions, and de- 
partments which have been legally abolished. Illustrative of this 
group are sections in Part I (Political) of the General Code which 
contain phraseology made obsolete by the enactment of the Ad- 
ministrative Code in 1921.18 Many of the offices, boards, commis- 
sions, and other agencies of the state were abolished and new 
departments took over remaining powers by the provisions of the 
new law. Many sections, containing the original names, have not 
been amended to conform to the new names given the departments. 
This condition prevails in about 1,000 sections of the statutes. 
Further examples of this type are those sections that contain a 
reference to a specific “officer,” “board,” or “institution,” the 
name of which has been changed or abolished by a later enactment. 
Such names are obsolete and confusing when continuing to appear 
in other sections of the statutes. For example, the office of “county 
surveyor” was changed to “county engineer.”!® The legislature 
abolished the “Tax Commission of Ohio” in 1939 and vested its 
powers in the new “Department of Taxation,”?° which was com- 





18 Onto Gen. Cone § 154-1 et seq. 
19 Ouro Gen. Cope § 2782-1. 
20 Onto Gen. Cone § 1464. 











1950] CODE REVISION 541 


posed of the tax commissioner and the board of tax appeals, but 
the words “Tax Commission of Ohio” still persist in numerous 
sections of the code, and are confusing. The name “county infirm- 
aries” was changed to “county homes,” in 1919,?! which necessitates 
that numerous sections now using the term “county infirmaries” 
be changed by the bureau in the process of revision. 

A second type of partially-obsolete sections is that which con- 
tains “ambiguous” phrases. An outstanding example is the phrase 
“and/or” which appears in numerous sections of the code even 
though the courts have generally held such phrase to be “ambigu- 
ous” and “meaningless.”?? Most authorities have stated that while 
the use of the term “and/or” does not ordinarily invalidate a statute 
its use in statutes has generally been condemned. 

A third type of partially-obsolete sections is that which con- 
tains phrases such as “in sections one and two of this act.” These 
phrases have been used by the legislature in identifying parts of 
lengthy acts, the sections of which were not given code numbers 
by the legislature. Since the codifier of the laws of the state as- 
signed to such sections appropriate code numbers, and had no 
power to change or alter the language within a section, it resulted 
in the section references losing their identity when official numbers 
were assigned. 

A fourth type of partially-obsolete sections is that which con- 
tains paragraphs which have been held to be unconstitutional by 
a court of last resort, and yet the invalid phrases are separable 
from the remainder of the. section.”’ 

A fifth type of partially-obsolete sections consists of those 
which refer to other sections that have been subsequently repealed. 
Sometimes these sections are rendered totally “obsolete” by reason 
of the fact that the repeal of the section referred to renders the 
dependent section wholly ineffective. In most cases, however, the 
statute containing the reference to another section is not deemed 
totally obsolete but rather “partially obsolete.”?* 

A sixth type of partially-obsolete sections appears in acts 
creating boards or commissions in which the provision is made 
for the governor to appoint its members for original terms to be 
staggered so that they expire at successive intervals. After the 
provision concerning the expiration of these first terms, the acts 
further usually provide that succeeding members be appointed for 








22154 A.L.R. 869. 

23 On10 Gen. Cone §§ 504-3, 1081-17, and 1579-308. 

24See Onto Gen. Cope §§ 2293-86, 2293-14, 2435-1, 3005, 3108-2, 3196, 3203- 
33, 3298-53a, 6346-14, 8974. 











542 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


pointees, such sections retain these then meaningless provisions. 
There are many other statutes which contain provisions that are 
made applicable for a limited time and thereafter are of no effect. 

The fourth general objective in any revision is to bring to- 
gether, under a logical classification system, those statutes and 
parts of statutes which, because of similarity of subject matter, 
properly belong together. The proposed plan adopted by the legis- 
lature?5 divides the subject matter of the code into titles, chapters, 
and sections. The title represents the major and most general 
classification of subject matter in the new code which will be 
recognized as the Revised Code. Each title is divided into chapters, 
which are in turn composed of individual sections. The classifica- 
tion of our present code into four parts, fifty-eight titles, forty-two 
divisions, and six hundred and twenty-four chapters, with consecu- 
tive numbering of the sections has been abandoned by the proposed 
plan in order to gain greater simplicity and to apply a numbering 
system that will be both elastic and operate as a key to the arrange- 
ment of the titles and chapters. The present designation of the 
parts to the General Code as Political, Procedural, Civil, and Crimi- 
nal is in no way helpful in arriving at a logical plan of arrangement 
of our law or the classification of its subject matter. The titles in 
the new revision cover all the important concepts of our law and 
can become readily ascertainable by the users. 

The Revised Code will contain 29 titles, 511 chapters, and ap- 
proximately 18,500 sections of law. In rearranging the material 
from the 58 main titles into an understandable and useful classi- 
fication system of 29, it was necessary to transfer from one main 
title to another, and from one classification unit to another, not 
only whole chapters but frequently numerous sections or portions 
of sections of statutes in order to effect an orderly arrangement. 
Since the various statutory subjects, when they have been agreed 
upon, must be arranged in some kind of order in the statute pub- 
lication, it would seem desirable, in selecting the subjects, to fol- 
low a logical patterh. In other words, the main titles or subjects 
should be of equal magnitude, rank, or dignity, so as to indicate 
to the user of the statutes a distinct separation of the law into 
definite independent groups. The subjects should be such as to 
express by their very titles, the logic and reasoning which prompted 
their selection. 

The purpose of a statute classification is to make the statutes 
convenient and readily accessible, and if the user of the statutes 
cannot understand why the statutes have been separated into dif- 
ferent groups the classification will not perform its function. In 
this respect, the strictly alphabetical system of statute classification 





25$.J.R. 10-1947. 











1950] CODE REVISION 543 


fails to meet the test. The limitations imposed by the necessity of 
selecting a heading or title that will fit into an alphabetical order 
prevent the selection of broad, general subjects that are commonly 
known to the user. For example, there is no alphabetical heading 
that will adequately cover a group containing the statutes relating 
to the functions of state government, counties, or townships. Logi- 
cal considerations require these statutes to be brought together, 
but under an alphabetical system the functions of each political 
unit must be separated under several alphabetical headings. The 
alleged conveniences of the alphabetical system of classification 
rest in the fact that the alphabetical headings enable the user of 
the statutes quickly to find the particular subject for which he is 
searching. This necessarily implies that the headings are ones 
which would occur to the ordinary person. If that kind of heading 
is to be used, then the statutes cannot be brought together under 
main subjects of equal rank, because the English language does 
not supply suitable words with which to express such subjects 
(keeping in mind that the first word in the heading is the only 
one that counts in an alphabetical arrangement). On the other 
hand, if broad title headings are selected to cover major subjects, 
and those broad title headings are arranged in an alphabetical 
order, the alleged convenience of the alphabetical system is lost 
because the headings are not ones that the ordinary user of the 
statutes would think of from an alphabetical standpoint. The pro- 
posed Revised Code combines the logical with the alphabetical 
listing of its titles and lists the first four titles logically and the 
remaining 25 titles are run alphabetically with the use of short 
titles that anyone would think of as pertaining to the subject. The 
29 titles selected to cover the major fields of law in Ohio are as 
follows: 


TITLE 

ei cie 5 acca wise State Government 

BN obs ioe eae arte Counties 

A Ces Townships 

ds peckdgak Coane Municipal Corporations 

si ¢tenkhwedes meee’ Agriculture, Animals, and Fences 

SP sucha bt edasuasouen Banks and Building and Loan 
Associations 

CR ie tat iiciia hte bane de Commercial Transactions 

| Ee ere Conservation, Mining, Waters, and 
Watercraft 

iA tins triebaxedad Corporations and Partnerships 

cob awn seas uke Courts—Municipal, Mayor’s, and 
Justice of Peace 

A fi ira a's ial ak we Courts—Probate and Juvenile 

Re Courts—Common Pleas 

aig ee als od ale Courts—Appellate and Supreme 

RR ee General Court Provisions and 


Special Proceedings 











544 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


eee Crimes and Procedure 
ee Domestic Relations and Children 
5... siemens iecall Education and Libraries 

a oss cdwn ated Elections 

ere Health, Safety, and Morals 

(0 + Se Insurance 

reer Labor 

re Liquor 

ina a ct crenaiiiel Motor Vehicles and Aeronautics 
a akcwaie'eo-acmiba nein Occupations and Professions 
EG ss vccccssceeede Public Utilities 
ESTER ee Public Welfare 
reer ee Real Property 
ial Ni at gal made Roads and Bridges 

I ink edie tint alain Taxation 


All the existing law of our state of whatever nature can be 
logically placed within one of these twenty-nine titles. It has been 
argued that while the main subjects in a statute classification may 
be arranged either alphabetically or logically, the subordinate 
subjects or chapters should be arranged alphabetically under each 
title. This argument loses sight of the fact that a number of laws, 
such as the laws relating to civil procedure, contemplate that cer- 
tain steps will be taken in chronological sequence, and it is far 
better to arrange such laws in the contemplated sequence of the 
steps set forth in the laws. Also, an alphabetical arrangement of 
subordinate subjects would prevent arranging of laws in the order 
of their importance. 

In selecting the chapter headings, an effort has been made to 
provide for the grouping of sections according to the subject dealt 
with by the sections rather than according to the political unit or 
agency affected. The chief advantage of this is that it permits the 
elimination of duplications and lays a foundation for future uni- 
form legislation on the subjects among the various kinds of political 
units as the district, township, county, and state, whose boundaries 
are rapidly becoming less important in their effect on general 
governmental functigns. 


The pattern followed by the bureau was, first, to select the 
subjects under which the statutes are to be brought together, and 
second, to indicate to the users of the statutes, through the classi- 
fication headings and arrangement, the reasoning which influenced 
the selection of the subjects. If the classification accomplishes these 
two purposes the burden which the index must carry is substan- 
tially lessened. If a code is logically arranged and the numbering 
system keyed in with the subject matter the bench and bar will 
soon be able to ascertain and find any statute without resorting 
to an index. 


The fifth objective of the bureau is to simplify and clarify the 
statutes by restating them in clear and simple language, and apply- 



























































1950] CODE REVISION 545 


ing to their construction a uniformity of expression, capitalization, 
spelling, and punctuation. The revision of each of the present sec- 
tions of the statutory law of this state consists of amending the 
partially-obsolete sections, correcting misspelled words, incorrect 
grammar, ambiguous phrases, and applying consistent punctuation 
and paragraphing within the section of law. In order to make uni- 
form and facilitate the work of the research attorneys in the bureau, 
and to prevent any changes in language from affecting the sub- 
stantive law of the state, the bureau has promulgated extensive 
and detailed code revision rules? which must be rigidly complied 
with by the attorneys making any proposed changes in our present 
statutes. The work on each section of law is checked in three 
operations before being approved by the commission. 

Frequently in our present code, superfluous and redundant 
words appear and add to its complexity. In almost every section 
of the revised material some simplification of expression has been 
accomplished. Such phrases as 

“it is its duty to;” 

“are hereby required to;” 

“is hereby authorized and it shall be his duty to;” and 

“is hereby vested with power and authority and it shall be 

its duty in carrying out the provisions of this act to” 
can all be replaced by the word “shall” without any danger of 


misinterpretation of the meaning. Likewise the word “void” is 
just as explicit as the much used expression “absolutely null and 
void, and of no effect.” “Shall have power to” has been changed 
to “may.” The law of our.state should be relieved of complexity, 
redundancy, ambiguity and duplicity and should be set forth in 
plain language with a uniformity of expression and convenient ar- 
rangement. A modern code is just as important a working tool 
to the lawyer as modern equipment is in the factory or to the 
skilled workman. 

The sixth objective of the bureau is to apply a numbering 
enactments and yet supply a key for the ascertainment of the sub- 
system that will allow for a maximum of elasticity for future 
ject matter immediately by the citation of the number. The decimal 
system of numbering has long been recognized as the most adap- 
table type of numbering system arid has been adopted by many 
states and the Federal Government in various forms. Present 
section numbers like 5542-13b-1 of the General Code could be 
avoided in our proposed decimal numbering system. The number- 
ing system adopted by the Bureau of Code Revision and approved 
by the legislature is a system which uses only one decimal and not 
to exceed six digits for present existing sections. In the approved 
numbering system the digits to the left of the decimal indicate the 





261949, Report of Bureau to the Senate and House of Representatives, p. 38. 








546 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


number of one of the 29 titles, the number of each of which will 
become of common knowledge to those using the code. The first 
and second digits to the right of the decimal designate the chapter 
number, while the third and fourth digits to the right designate 
the section numbers. The first section in the first chapter of the 
first title will be numbered 1.0101. The last section of the last 
chapter of the last title will be numbered 57.4529. Applying the 
rule stated above, it is seen that the last section in the Revised 
Code is the twenty-ninth section in the forty-fifth chapter of the 
fifty-seventh title. In order to allow for the later insertion of re- 
lated new matter, the plan skips a title or chapter number after 
each title or chapter in the Revised Code. Because of this proce- 
dure the number of the final title in the Revised Code is LVII de- 
spite the fact that there are only twenty-nine titles. The system 
will accommodate an unlimited number of new sections by carry- 
ing to the right of the decimal additional digits. The plan thereby 
places at the disposal of the codifiers one million section numbers. 
Likewise, it is possible, to add entire chapters, either between ex- 
isting ones or after the last chapter in any title. The skipping of 
title and chapter numbers provides space for the insertion of ap- 
proximately ten thousand sections between any two titles, or of 
ninety-nine sections between any two chapters. It is believed that 
this plan represents a system of classification and numbering 
which will accommodate an ever-expanding body of laws for gen- 
erations to come. It is further advantageous in the fact that the 
revised titles and chapters will carry odd numbers which will 
allow not only unlimited expansion, but will afford the user the 
opportunity of ascertaining new legislation in years to come by 
its attachment to the presently unused even numbers. 


The seventh and final present objective of the bureau is to 
obtain the approval of the legislature of its work on the bulk re- 
vision as it will be presented during the next biennium. While 
the bureau can make a reclassification, rearrangement, and revision 
of the General Code, its work is meaningless and only a feeble 
gesture without enactment into law and a repeal of those laws 
which the bureau seeks to replace. 


In the consideration of a complete revision of our code the 
question arises whether to undertake a bulk revision or a topical 
revision. By bulk revision is meant a revision of the whole code, 
withholding the re-enactment of any part until the entire work is 
completed. By topical revision is meant revision topic by topic 
in accordance with the plan approved by the legislative and the 
re-enactment of the various topics as the revision of each is sepa- 
rately completed. Each method has advantages. The revisors of 
1910 after the completion of four years’ work recommended a 




















547 





1950] CODE REVISION 


bulk revision. The entire General Code of 1910 was presented to 
the 78th General Assembly in a single bill which was immediately 
enacted. The work of the revisors must have been accepted by 
the General Assembly largely on faith, for it is doubtful if even 
the most zealous legislator could have given the bill careful study. 
The present revision of our code is of necessity a bulk revision as 
was the revision of 1910. The bulk enactment by the legislature 
during that year repealed all the existing statutes and enacted 
13,767 sections of new law. 


The past forty years have proved that bulk revision without a 
continuous revision following its passage is not enough and not 
only proves to be inadequate but also precipitates much criticism. 
No rules of revision or statutory construction were adopted and 
published by the codifiers of 1910, so that their efforts were soon 
nullified by subsequent enactments and amendments during the 
eighteen succeeding sessions of our legislature without the assist- 
ance and direction of a permanent continuous service of revision 
and research. Elimination and prevention of verbosity, redundancy, 
and duplicated provisions cannot be accomplished in the next five, 
ten, or twenty years if hundreds of different individuals with in- 
adequate facilities for research in governmental functions and 
without knowledge of statutory construction and the rules govern- 
ing the style of the revised laws are independently drafting legis- 
lation. 


Uniformity cannot be maintained and a revised code will be- 
come a hodge-podge of statutory enactment if subsequent legisla- 
tion is to be passed without being screened and checked as to form. 
A bulk revision of statutory law receives some criticism by reason 
of the change made in the placement of particular statutes in the 
code, and changes of numbers necessitating the use for a time of 
cross references and comparative tables. It is to be noted that 
this temporary inconvenience would result from any rearrange- 
ment of the code irrespective of the type of numbering system 
adopted. The size of the work involved in a bulk revision and the 
expense incurred require that great consideration be given to a 
continuous revision in the state of Ohio after the immediate task 
of general revision is accomplished. The legislature provided in 
the creative act establishing the bureau that it become a perma- 
nent authority of legislative service. The legislature further pro- 
vided that after the bureau has formulated and prepared the 
definite plan for the order, arrangement, and classification of the 
code, it should prepare, and at the beginning of each regular ses- 
sion of the general assembly recommend the introduction of such 
bills to the general assembly, for the consolidation, revision, and 
other matters relating to the Generali Code or any portion thereof 




















548 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


as may from time to time be completed.”’ 

The bureau presently is charged with the responsibility of a 
continuous or a permanent revision of law in this state by the 
codification of each law after it is passed by the legislature and 
signed by the governor, the revision of statutes enacted at each 
session of the legislature, initiation of the repeal or amendment 
of unconstitutional laws as soon as possible after the court’s pro- 
nouncement is given, and research in connection with new legisla- 
tion after enactment to eliminate conflicts, duplications, ambigui- 
ties, and obsolete provisions. Unless requested by legislative reso- 
lution or committe action, the bureau has no authority to render 
any service in passing on the matters of form of pending legislation 
prior to enactment. This condition necessitates the reconsideration 
of each enactment by the legislature after two years to correct 
merely errors of form. 

In order to facilitate permanent revision it seems essential 
that every bill not only be codified after enactment as the law 
now provides, but that it be reviewed and checked as to form by 
the Bureau of Code Revision before enactment for the purpose 
of suggesting improvements designed to render the whole statute 
law clear and harmonious, so that bills enacted in the future be 
made to conform to the style and rules of construction established 
by the bureau. If the bureau were to render this service there 
would be no occasion for resubmitting each enactment for formal 
corrections. 

In addition to Ohio, systems of continuous revision of law 
now exist in at least nineteen other states.?8 The objective of such 
a system in most states like Ohio is to obviate the necessity of 
ever having to repeat in the future the arduous task and tempor- 
ary disruption of a bulk revision. 


Sutherland’s Statutory Construction?? recommends the main- 
tenance of official statutory revision by the following statement: 


Although few states now maintain official and continuous 
revision of their ¢odes this should be the objective of every 
state. The publication of session laws is not enough. Each 
state should establish an official code and incorporate the 
product of each legislative session into the code. The cost 
of infrequent code revisions is enormous while the cost of 
continuous code revision is relatively slight. It provides 
an efficient and thoroughly reliable source of statute law. 
Until the day is reached when every state has an official 
code which is brought to date after each legislative session 





27 Onto Gen. Cope § 76-6. 

28 Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, lowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington and Wisconsin. 

293rd Ed. Vol. 2, p. 258. 

















1950] CODE REVISION 549 


the improvement in the judicial process founded as it is 
today upon the statutes cannot be achieved. 

The initial task of code revision, long overdue, is so great 
that it has deterred most states from the undertaking. Sat- 
isfactory beginnings may be made, however, if codifications 
—— branches of the law were begun and contin- 
ued. 


To supplement the regular revision program, the legislature 
in 1947, not only authorized but directed the bureau by resolution*® 
to draft and submit to the General Assembly legislation consoli- 
dating the 39 municipal court acts of the state into standard acts, 
with such variations as local conditions require. The enactment 
of such a measure into law would not only afford the attorneys 
and jurists uniformity of practice and procedure in all municipal 
courts, but would eliminate from the code 1,584 sections of law 
which are of a special nature. Likewise in 1949 the legislature by 
resolution*! directed the bureau to analyze the laws of the state 
and decisions of the courts pertaining to the subject of domestic 
relations and the adoption of children. The bureau has made ex- 
tensive research, conducted public hearings, and will submit to 
the 99th General Assembly a drafted measure to reflect its work 
and resultant recommendations. In such cases the bureau makes 
findings and presents to the legislature changes in the substantive 
law, but as noted, only upon formal request. 

It becomes apparent during the course of the work that cer- 
tain types and groups of statutes are not suitable for revision be- 
cause of their controversial character, or cannot be properly re- 
vised in the course of a general revision of statutes because of 
their extreme complexity and the danger of making unanticipated 
substantive changes in bringing them into order. Such segments 
of our law can be corrected by the bureau in a separate topical 
revision after receiving a special mandate of the legislature or in 
conjunction with the work of a separate legislative commission or 
administrative authority. 


Necessary and recognized changes should be made over a 
period of time in the field of taxation, the functions of governmental 
departments, and the unification of the system of trial courts and 
law enforcement authorities. Laws pertaining to the functions 
of state, county, and township government are recognized as being 
inadequate, and yet deal with fundamental problems that go 
unsolved by reason of old statutory enactments which remain un- 
changed from one legislative session to another. Complacency and 
blind acceptance of statutory and some constitutional provisions 
which were adopted about a century ago (1851) have “proved to 





30 Am. S.J.R. 17. 
31S.J.R. 32. 








550 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


be the greatest weaknesses of our democratic system. We should 
not turn a deaf ear to reasonable requests upon the part of inter- 
ested citizens and groups for reform in our law concerning the 
executive branch of our government, or in the legislative procedure 
and judicial process as well as in other branches of human activity. 
There is much to be done by the legislature in future sessions in 
Ohio by the establishment of a pattern for a systematic topical re- 
vision of distinct fields of our law. Such can only be accomplished 
after much research, public approbation, and diligent study on the 
part of a permanent agency which is thoroughly familiar with the 
entire body of the statutory law and which has adequate facilities 
to conduct research and obtain pertinent facts. 











OHIO STATE 
LAW JOURNAL 


VOLUME 11 AUTUMN 1950 NUMBER 4 











Published Quarterly by the Faculty and Students of the College of Law 
The Ohio State University 


Subscriptions: $4.00 per Year $1.00 per Copy 





EDITOR-IN-CHIEF 


Joun A. Brown 


ASSOCIATE EDITORS 


ALLEN H. BecHrTex Rosert W. PHILLirs Georce W. STUHLDREHER 


EDITORIAL BOARD 


Ricuarp H. CHRISTIANSEN Jesse L. JENNINGS 
Jack V. DANAHER Rosert J. LEAVER 
Joun D. Durry FREDERICK D. Puckett 
James D. HAPNER WriiiaM E. RANcE 
Donato H. Hauser James H. TILBERRY 


Joserpx S. WIsE 


BUSINESS MANAGER 


G. Det Bates 














Ohio Participation in Interstate Compacts 


The interstate compact procedure was little used before the 
twentieth century. From the year 1789 to 1900, only sixteen com- 
pacts were adopted by the states. Since the turn of the century 
however, several times as many compacts have been contracted 
and the compact procedure is steadily taking on new significance 
as a means of interstate cooperation.! 

The United States Constitution? absolutely prohibits the entry 
by the states into any treaty, alliance or confederation. The same 
section of the constitution conditions the entry by the states into 
any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign 
power upon the consent of congress. 

The distinction between treaties, alliances or confederations 
and compacts or agreements is a very fine one and the differences 
have never been exactly or concretely defined. Justice Story dis- 
tinguished them in the following way: 

Perhaps the language of the former clause may be more 

plausibly interpreted from the terms used, ‘treaty, alliance 

or confederation’ and upon the ground that the sense of 

each is best known by its association (noscitur a sociis) to 

apply to treaties of a political character; such as treaties 

of alliance for purposes of peace and war; and treaties of 

confederation, in which the parties are leagued for mutual 

government, political cooperation, and the exercise of po- 
litical sovereignty; and treaties of cession of sovereignty, or 
conferring internal political jurisdiction, or external politi- 

cal dependence, or general commercial privileges. The lat- 

ter clause, ‘compacts and agreements’ might then very 

properly apply to such as regarded what might be deemed 

mere private rights of soverignty; such as questions of 
boundary; interests in land situate in the territory of each 
other; and other internal regulations for the mutual com- 

fort and convenience of states bordering on each other. 

Such compacts have been made since the adoption of the 

constitution .. .° 

As stated before, a state must have the consent of congress to 
legitimately enter inté a compact. This constitutional provision has 
been interpreted however, as meaning that the congressional con- 
sent may be either express or implied from congressional action 
and either prior or subsequent to the adoption of the compact by 
the states. In Virginia v. Tennessee,* the boundary line between 
Virginia and Tennessee was ascertained and adjusted by commis- 

1 Comment, 34 Yate L. J. 684 (1925). 

2U.S. Const. Art. 1, sec. 10. 

32 Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, sec. 1403 (5th ed. 1891). 
4 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1892). 





552 

















COMMENTS 553 





1950] 


sioners appointed in the two states. The boundary thus adjusted 
by the commissioners and confirmed by the two states was treated 
by congress as the true boundary when congress districted these 
states for judicial and revenue purposes. Although congress did 
not expressly give its consent to the adoption of this compact by 
these two states, the required consent was implied from the con- 
gressional action. In Green v. Biddle,’ a promise by a newly formed 
state to preserve the title to certain lands within its borders was 
upheld on the ground that congress had given its consent to the 
states entering into the compact by subsequently admitting the 
state into the Union. 

There is some authority supporting the proposition that con- 
gressional consent is not required at all unless the compact or 
agreement is “political” in nature.° The term must have a different 
meaning in this sense than it has in distinguishing compacts and 
agreements from treaties, alliances and confederations or the con- 
sent requirement would lose all its meaning. The result would 
otherwise be that congressional consent is required only when the 
agreement is a treaty, alliance or confederation, in which case it 
is invalid regardless of congressional consent. 

An interstate compact can be terminated in several different 
ways. The easiest and most definite method of termination is to 
specifically provide for the termination of the compact after the 
expiration of a certain length of time from the date of entry. But 
a compact may also be terminated by subsequent inconsistent 
federal legislation. In Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Company,’ 
Virginia and Kentucky had entered into a compact with the con- 
sent of congress regarding the free navigation of the Ohio River. 
Still, subsequent federal legislation requiring officers and crews 
of vessels navigating the Ohio River to regulate their vessels so 
as not to interfere with the elevation or construction of bridges at 
Wheeling and Bridgeport at their then height and position, was 
held to be the legitimate exercise by congress of its constitutional 
power to regulate interstate commerce. This legislation was not 
invalid by reason of the interstate compact entered into with the 
consent of congress. 

If an interstate compact is terminated by subsequent federal 
legislation inconsistent with the terms of the compact on the theory 
that the consent of congress is thereby withdrawn and that the 
continuing consent of congress is necessary for the existence of a 
valid interstate compact, congress could terminate a compact merely 





5 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823). 
6 Note, 23 Iowa L. Rev. 618 (1938). 


7 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 (U.S. 
1855). 














a en 
wicncicnsitnily Toate naan 
: . 


554 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


by withdrawing its consent. Inconsistent legislation would be un- 
necessary. But if congressional consent is only a condition prece- 
dent to the existence of a valid interstate compact, congress could 
not terminate the compact merely by withdrawing its consent.’ In 
Georgetown v. The Alexandria Canal Company,’ the supreme court 
held that citizens of states which were parties to a compact were 
not parties and could not object to the termination of the compact 
by the mutual consent of the state parties. 


Subsequent inconsistent legislation by one of the state parties 
cannot terminate an interstate compact. It was held in Green v. 
Biddle,'° that the legislation was invalid on the theory that inter- 
state compacts are within the contracts clause of the federal con- 
stitution." 

An interstate compact can be enforced or its validity ques- 
tioned by the state parties to the compact!? or by individuals,'’ who 
would otherwise be injured. Subject to the usual requirements 
for jurisdiction, an action to enforce or question the validity of an 
interstate compact may be brought in the state'* or lower federal 
courts.'5 The action may also be brought in the United States 
Supreme Court when the state is a party under the constitutional 
provision!® granting original jurisdiction to the supreme court of 
any suit to which a state is a party. 


The Ohio Legislature, in 1937, established the Ohio Commis- 
sion on Interstate Cooperation.'’? This statute was amended in 1949 
and, as amended, the commission consists of the seven members 
of the senate committee on interstate cooperation, a similar house 
committee and the seven members of the Governor’s committee on 
interstate cooperation. It is expressly made one of the functions 
of this commission'® to endeavor to advance cooperation between 
Ohio and other units of government whenever it seems advisable 
to do so by formulating proposals for and by facilitating the adop- 
tion of interstate compacts. Also in 1937, Ohio adopted the Pyma- 
tuning Lake compact." This compact was the first to which Ohio 





8 Note, 23 Iowa L. Rev. 618 (1938). 

9The Mayor, Recorder, Alderman and Common Council of Georgetown v. 
The Alexandria Canal Co. and William Turnbull, 12 Pet. 91 (U.S. 1838). 

10 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823). 

11U.S. Const. Art. 1, sec. 10. 

12 South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876). 

13 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823). 

14 State v. Cunningham, 102 Miss. 237, 59 So. 76 (1912). 

1S Aicheson v. Endless Chain Dredge Co., 40 Fed. 253 (E.D. Va. 1889). 

16U.S. Constr. Art. 3, sec. 2. 

17 Onto Gen. Cope §§ 1379-1 to 1379-12. 

18 Onto Gen. Cope § 1379-6. 

19117 Ohio Laws 508 (1937-1938). 








1950] COMMENTS 555 


was a party.” It was entered into with Pennsylvania for the pur- 
pose of establishing a recreation district with concurrent penal 
jurisdiction and also to conserve water. On September 17, 1937, 
Ohio entered into another compact.?! Under the terms of this 
compact, the judicial and administrative authorities of a state, a 
party to the compact, are to permit a person convicted of an of- 
fense within such state and placed on probation or released on 
parole to reside in any other state party to this compact under 
certain conditions contained in the compact. All the states except 
Nevada, North Carolina and Texas adopted this compact. Con- 
gressional consent was previously granted on June 6, 1934. 

Since 1937, Ohio has adopted two other compacts. One was 
entered into with the twenty oil and gas producing states to prevent 
the physical waste of oil and natural gas from any cause.?? This 
compact was to expire September 1, 1947, but was extended for 
four years to September 1, 1951, by the Governor who was author- 
ized in the original bill to extend the expiration date of the com- 
pact. The other was the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Com- 
pact,?5 the purpose of which is the control of future pollution in 
and the abatement of existing pollution from the rivers, streams 
and water in the Ohio River basin which flow through or border 
upon any of the states, parties to this compact. Congress author- 
ized the adoption of this compact on June 8, 1936. Conditioned 
on the adoption by New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia, Ohio 
entered this compact on August 31, 1939. Ohio, West Virginia, 
New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Kentucky and Virginia are the 
parties to this compact. 

In the case of State v. Sims,?4 the Supreme Court of West 
Virginia rendered a decision in connection with this compact which 
could make it practically impossible to achieve interstate coopera- 
tion by use of the compact procedure. This was a mandamus ac- 
tion to compel the auditor of West Virginia to honor a requisition 
for West Virginia’s contribution to the Ohio River Valley Water 
Sanitation Commission which was appropriated by the legislature 
of West Virginia. The majority of the court held that legislation 
authorizing West Virginia to become a party to this compact was 
invalid as violative of the West Virginia Constitution because the 
state by entering the compact would delegate to the commission a 
substantial part of the state’s police power and the compact, if 
valid, would create a contract binding on future legislatures. 

Judge Given, in a strong dissenting opinion, stated that inter- 

20 Comment, 73 U.S. L. Rev. 75 (1939). 
21 Onto Gen. Cope § 108. 

22120 Ohio Laws 203 (1943-1944). 

23 Onto Gen. Cone § 14881. 


24 State ex rel. Dyer et al. v. Sims, 58 S.E. 2nd 766 (1950). Certiorari to 
US. Supreme Court. 











means ena 


- we 9 p> na np 
oo rood Se eee eet 








556 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


state compacts are an essential and often-used part of our form 
of government. He argued that granting to the commission the 
power to enforce its orders as to the disposition of sewage against 
municipalities, corporations, persons and entities of the member 
states was not an unconstitutional delegation of the state police 
power because of the following limitation on this power in Article 
9 of the Compact: “No such order shall go into effect unless and 
until it receives the assent of at least a majority of the commission- 
ers from each of not less than a majority of the signatory states; 
and no such order upon a municipality, corporation, person or 
entity in any state shall go into effect unless and until it receives 
the assent of not less than a majority of the commissioners from 
such state.” The commissioners from each state are representatives 
of that state, responsible only to the authority of that state and 
are subject to removal as such commissioners by the governor of 
that state. 

It was also argued by Judge Given that entering the compact 
did not “create a debt” or bind future legislatures to make appro- 
priations since the last clause of Article 5 of the compact provides: 

The commission shall not incur any obligations of any kind 

prior to the making of appropriations adequate to meet the 

same; nor shall the commission pledge the credit of any of 

the signatory States, except by and with the authority of 


the legislature thereof. 
The majority opinion states that the creation of a state com- 


mission which requires an appropriation of public funds to carry 
out its purpose is usually not treated as the creation of a “debt” 
within the constitutional provision that no debt shall be contracted 
by the state except to meet casual deficits and other specified sit- 
uations, although the continuation of such commission for an in- 
definite period necessarily involves future appropriations. In the 
majority opinion however, they held the compact to be entirely 
different because it was between sovereign states and the Federal 
Government, treating it as a contract which the Supreme Court 
of the United States, in a suit between states has power to en- 
force. They said it was a contract binding on all the parties thereto, 
the obligation of which continues so long as that contract exists. 

Although late in initiating its participation in interstate com- 
pacts, Ohio may still become a leader in the field due to the estab- 
lishment of the Ohio Commission on Interstate Cooperation unless 
Ohio follows the decision of the Supreme Court of West Virginia 
in State v. Sims. This is not likely however, due to the fact that 
interstate cooperation is becoming increasingly more important 
because of improved methods of transportation and communication 
and the greater complexity of our society. The future will probably 
see interstate compacts, along with uniform and reciprocal state 
legislation, take on greater and greater significance. 

John Duffy 














Lobbying—A Definition and Recapitulation of 
Its Practice 


For lack of an appropriate word the law is sometimes prevented 
from changing, but when a good word is coined and it catches 
on, often times it has a catalytic effect on legal growth.! Some 
words become so popular to law’ and laity alike’ that they event- 
ually come to mean all things to all people. This results in such 
ambiguity that any attempt to use the word intelligently must 
necessitate retreat to such a level as to render the word impotent 
if not altogether meaningless. The term lobby is an example of 
just such a word that has “caught on”, and wide and indiscriminate 
use has so broadened its meaning as to require re-definition for 
the purposes of this article. 


Although the historical origin of the term lobbying connotates 
the buttonholing of elected representatives to government office, 
even in its infant days the term was ambivalent.’ Today lobbying 





1 Lev1, AN Intropuction To Lecat REasoninc 6 (1949). 


2See FepeRaAL AND StaTrE Laws On Lossyinc, prepared for the Assembly 
Interim Committee on Government Efficiency and Economy (1949), for an 
insight as to how our law makers interpret the word. 

3 See 28 Lire (June 12, 1950), in which America’s children are depicted 
as the country’s most ruthless pressure group against their own parents for 
the purchase of Hopalong Cassidy paraphernalia; The Right to Petition, 28 
Lire 34 (June 26, 1950). J 

4Zeller, State Regulation of Lobbying in THe Boox or THE States 124 
(1948-49), “Few statutes provide clear specific, and meaningful definitions of 
what constitutes lobbying. In Louisiana and Texas a person is guilty of lobby- 
ing who privately or secretly attempts to influence a legislator except by 
appealing to his reason! In addition, actual practice in Georgia and California 
is in direct contradiction to their constitutions which still contain the obsolete 
language that lobbying ‘is declared to be a crime’ (Georgia) or seeks ‘to in- 
fluence the vote of a member of the legislature by bribery promise of reward, 
intimidation or any other dishonest means’ (California).” Although lobbying 
is a crime in Georgia, lobbyists are allowed to register as such by the payment 
of a $250.00 fee. Ga. Cope § 92-508 (1933). Although registrations number 
as high as 900 per year (Wisconsin), in 1947 the Georgia secretary of state 
reported “that the State of Georgia did not have anyone to register under 
the State Lobbying Law.” 

5 Note, Federal Regulation of Lobbyists, 15 Gro. Wasu. L. Rev. 455 (1947). 
“The late Senator Caraway from Arkansas once said, ‘There are no good lob- 
bies—I have made up my mind. It is all wrong.’ Bellows once wrote, “The 
very term lobbying is in itself suggestive of sinister methods.’” 

Comment, Improving The Legislative Process: Federal Regulation Of Lob- 
bying, 56 Yate L. J. 304 (1947). “Whereas the old style lobby, confined almost 
entirely to representatives of business interests, operated secretly and depend- 


557 











558 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


labels create even more confusion because they cover not only a 
multitude of sins, but also embrace an equally commendable num- 
ber of worthwhile and necessary activities. Actually there is noth- 
ing any more fundamentally evil and sinister about the use of lobby- 
ing than there is for instance in the use of our national currency. 
However, there is not so much widespread confusion as to what 
our currency is and how it operates as exists concerning lobbying. 
One reason for such misunderstanding is the attempt to treat 
lobbying as an isolated problem rather than as a problem so funda- 
mental that it is virtually a segment of our way of life. Another 
reason is the failure to understand the political and economic de- 
velopment of this country. When drafted, the Federal Constitution 
provided in theory that the interest of individuals be expressed 
through their elected legislators. These representatives were elec- 
ted on a geographical-political basis, and if it is true that this was 
an adequate means of evaluating the various interests of the com- 
ponent members of society in 1789, it is patently clear that this 
is not the situation today. The failure of the constitution to provide 
group representation lies in an overlooking of the fact that individ- 
uals identify themselves and their interests not only with state or 
political sub-divisions but more importantly with their business, 
economic, social, professional, religious, and fraternal groups. As 
the country’s means of communication and transportation im- 
proved, its citizens’ group interests have proportionately expanded 
and interests confined to political or geographical boundaries have 
correspondingly decreased. Increasing complexity of legislation 
today — legislation which often is only fully understood by the 
affected groups—has given rise to extra-legal machinery for 
achieving group aims, and the survival of geographical-political 
representation to a large measure obscures the real basis for legis- 
lative action today.’ The failure of our two party system to pro- 





ed for its success upon personal solicitation of legislators, often corrupted by 
bribes, such methods are obsolete today.” 

In the old days, impecunious Senators were said to have received outright 
bribes passed to them across card tables in the form of card winnings in the 
old Hall of the Bleeding Heart Pool Room on Pennsylvania Avenue in the 
nation’s capital. 2 Poore, Pertey’s REMINISCENCES 515 (1886). 

6Lerner, Minority Rule and the Constitutional Tradition, 86 U. or Pa. 
L. Rev. 457 (1938). 

7 Two groups have advanced remedies designated to reconcile the existing 
fact situation with political theory. See MacDonatp, A New CONSTITUTION FOR 
A New America (1921); GatLoway, ConcrEss aT THE Cross Roaps (1946); 
Simmons, Reorganization of the Federal Government, 31 A.B.A.J. 63 (1945). 
The first group seeks a means by which group interests can be fitted into the 
formal pattern of government, a system of functional representation as a sub- 
stitute for, or supplement to, existing political institutions. A second group 
regards the problem of representation as subordinate to a rationalization of 








1950] COMMENTS 559 





mote opinion and policy, together with very real obstacles placed 
before embryo group interest political parties to qualify for state 
and national elections*® has created a need which coupled with the 
people’s constitutional right to petition their government?’ has not 
unstrangely resulted in various forms of group petition. Thus a 
basic legislative problem is the adjustment of the conflicting in- 
terests represented by state and national organizations of “interest 
groups”: teachers organizations, labor organizations, farm organi- 
zations, religious organizations, veteran organizations, pension or- 
ganizations, business organizations, real estate organizations, public 
utility organizations, etc. 

Consequently, today the term lobbying embraces three general 
areas of activity for the purpose of defeating or influencing pas- 
sage of legislation: (1) citizens expressing individual opinion on 
legislation,'® (2) citizens organized into groups for the purpose 
of expressing collective opinion on legislation; and (3) the paid 
legislative agent, against whom most lobbying regulation is di- 
rected. Since the privilege of the individual to express his opinions 
on legislative matters is such a time honored custom as well as a 
fundamental constitutional right,'’ group one of the above three 
categories can be dismissed without further consideration. It is 
within groups two and three that the real lobbying problems exist. 
Thus lobbying may be defined as being the processes used by or- 
ganizations to stimulate such activity by their members (and by 
the general public as well) as will impress legislators with their 
serious interest in the sponsored legislation. The word lobbyists, 
on the other hand, may be defined as being those organizations and 
their employees (who may be individuals, firms, or corporations) 
who utilize the above lobbying processes. 

The most highly publicized activity is that of the professional 
lobbyist!? who undertakes to “buttonhole” congressmen, but this 





the whole legislative process. Their emphasis is upon administrative efficiency, 
extension of federal research, and information services. 

American history is full of examples of legislation passed at the instance 
of and for the benefit of special interests. Odegard, Lobbies and Current 
History, 31 Current History 690 (1930); Zetier, Pressure Powirics in New 
York (1937); Chamberlain, The President, Congress, and Legislation, 61 Pot. 
Scr. Q. 42 (1946); Herrmnc, Group REPRESENTATION Berore Concress (1929). 

8 Onto Gen. Cope, § 4785-61. 

9U.S. Const. Amenp. I. “Congress shall make no law abridging the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a re- 
dress of grievances.” 

10 See note 9, supra. 

11 See note 9, supra. 

12 Sometimes referred to as legislative counsel if a member of the bar 
and therefore exempt from lobbying registration requirements in many states. 
See Onto Gen. Cone, § 6256-5. 














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560 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 11 


is considered by some writers’? as being the least important phase 
of lobbying activity.'* Of primary importance, it is thought there- 
fore, are the activities which encourage members of organizations 
(or members of the general public) to write or speak to their con- 
gressment in behalf of a particular point of view.'® 

Legislators are not usually seriously concerned with attitudes 
of particular interest groups but if voters of their own districts 
display serious concern as to a particular legislative issue they 
may, and probably will be spurred to action. For this reason state 
and national pressure group organizations spend considerable time 
and money in efforts to stimulate their members (and members of 
the public) to display great interest in their sponsored legislation, 
so that the legislators may become aware of “grass roots” interest 
in the measure.!® 

It probably bears re-emphasis at this point that lobbying, prop- 
erly conducted, is not only a perfectly legitimate exercise of con- 
stitutional prerogative, but can be a benefit both to legislative 
bodies and to the country at large.'!’ In addition to providing an 
unofficial form of functional representation, pressure groups which 
throw light on current legislation, call attention to the voting rec- 
ords of our legislators, and inform the members of their organiza- 
tions and incidentally attempt to so inform the general public as 
to the meaning of legislative proposals, are quite a benefit and 
service to our society.!8 





13 Futor, An Analysis of the Federal Lobbying Act, 10 Fev. B. J. 366 
(1949). 

14 Comment, The Federal Lobbying Act of 1946, 47 Cot. L. Rev. 98 (1947). 
“The perennial problem of legislative lobbying has changed significantly during 
the past sixty years. Where the lobbyist once bribed he now uses public opin- 
ion as a lever.” 

15In 1935, the excesses of the utility lobbies attracted nation-wide atten- 
tion. Of their activities, the House Rules Committee said on Feb. 27, 1936: 
“|. . the campaign to influence utility holding company legislation was prob- 
ably as comprehensive, and as well financed as any in the history of the coun- 
try.” Hearings before Congress on House Rules on H.R. 2081, 74th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 3 (1936). 

16 Passage of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act came after dis- 
covery that the bulk of the opposition came from trumped-up Utility propa- 
ganda. The holding companies spent about $134,000 instigating last minute 
telegrams and phone messages. Names were taken directly from phone direc- 
tories and signed to telegrams. Discovery of fake messages may have turned 
the tide and made possible the passage of the bill. It passed the Senate by a 
single vote. Hearing before a special Committee to investigate lobbying activi- 
ties. 74th Con., Ist Sess. 1007 (1935). 

17 Witness the fight of the oleomargarine lobby at both state and national 
levels to have repealed discriminatory taxes on this product. 

18 Zeller, State Regulation of Lobbying in THe Boox or Tue Srates 124 
(1948-49). “Under our democratic form of government, lobbies have a legiti- 
























































COMMENTS 561 





1950] 


Today, legislative agents or counsel represent every conceiv- 
able business, economic, and social group. They usually perform 
their services openly and frankly, and to some measure rely upon 
genuine public opinion, oftentimes of course, stimulated through 
judicious use of publicity and propaganda, whether to influence 
or merely to expedite legislative action.!? Legitimate pressure 
groups depend on the number of votes which they can control and 
consequently have nothing to gain from concealing their identity. 
Fake lobbyists, on the other hand, try to work both ends against 
the middle. They either solicit contributions from gullible sources 
for a cause they do not or cannot represent, or they attempt to in- 
fluence legislation on behalf of non-existent organizations created 
for their own purposes. These lobbyists, therefore, do not welcome 
publicity about their activities, and are forced to resort to consid- 
erable subterfuge. 


The problem then is of balancing two opposing interests: pre- 
venting lobbying abuses without at the same time hindering the 
right of citizens to petition their representatives. The evils dis- 
closed by legislative investigations of lobbying fall roughly into 
two categories: (1) activities which leave the public and legislat- 
ors with inadequate or unbalanced information on which to make 
decisions, and (2) activities which coerce or corrupt legislators. 
Since almost universal bribery statutes cover this latter activity, 
it need not be considered further in this article. 

In considering the activities of the paid legislative agent it is 
first necessary to understand at least in a cursory manner the pro- 
cess by which our laws become enacted. For illustrative purposes, 
let us consider a typical bill as it goes through the Ohio House of 
Representatives. With but a few minor differences, the procedure 
is the same in the Ohio Senate. In Ohio, laws may be initiated in 
two ways: (1) by introduction of a bill in either house by a mem- 
ber of that house,?° or (2) by petition of electors under our Ohio 
constitutional provisions for the initiative?! This discussion will 
be limited to the more usual legislative process of our legislator 
sponsored measures. 


The order of business of the Ohio House of Representatives 
provides, besides other matters, for introduction of bills,?? introduc- 





mate and indispensable role to play . .. (but) Because some pressure groups, 
as organized minorities, thwart the public will, or act generally in a predatory 
fashion, some governmental control is necessary. 

19 Logan, Lobbying, 144 Annats 73 (1929 July Supp). 

20Rule 39. Rutes or THE House OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOINT RULES OF 
THE 98th GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF Onto. Hereinafter called Oxto 
House RULEs. 
21 Onto Const. Art. II, Sec. 1, 1b. Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-175. 
22 Onto House Rutes Rule 3, Sec. 8. 





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562 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


tion of motions and resolutions,?5 and introduction of petitions and 
memorials.?4 Since, procedurally, motions, resolutions, petitions, 
and memorials are introduced in much the same manner as bills, 
only bills will be discussed further. A bill must be either authored 
or sponsored by a legislator in the house of which he is a member. 
A constitutional requirement?’ provides that the bill must be read 
three times, each reading to be on a separate day. When a bill is 
introduced it is read the first time by title only. If opposition to 
the bill at this time is expressed by any member, the question is 
put by the speaker of the House, “Shall the bill be rejected?’”’® If 
the bill is not rejected by a majority vote of the members present, 
it has survived its first test, but as a practical matter seldom is 
this question ever put to the members on introduction of bills. 
After a bill has been read the first time it is then sent to the 
Reference Committee which at its discretion may either report 
the bill back to the House for its return to its author,?” with reasons 
for its rejection, or report it back to the House with recommenda- 
tion for reference to the proper standing committee of the House.’® 
At this time the bill is read the second time by title only. Generally 
if the Reference Committee does not approve the bill, it takes no 
action at all and merely holds onto the bill. If the bill is returned 
to its author, the House may still by a majority vote order it re- 
ferred to an appropriate committee.”° 
Let us assume that the bill is reported back to the House fa- 
vorably by the Reference Committee, and its recommendation is 
followed as to which standing committee shall further consider 
the bill.3° The committee now holds hearings on the bill at which 
time the general public is permitted to appear and testify. If the 
bill is not reported out of committee it is dead. However the 
House, by a majority vote of all the members elected, may relieve 
the committee of the bills! If the committee reports back to the 
House any measure referred to it, it may make amendments, or 
may even submit a complete substitute bill. Whatever is reported 
back then goes to the Rules Committee which has the duty of 
placing it on the daily calendar for a third reading. However, due 
to the press of daily business, the Rules Committee schedules the 
bills which are to be heard on particular days. These are accord- 





23 Onto House Rutes Rule 3, Sec. 9. 
24 Onto House Rutes Rule 3, Sec. 10. 
25 Onto Const. Art. II, § 16. 

26 Onto House Ru es 39. 

27 Ouro House Rutes 40. 

28 Onto House Rutes 41. 

29 Outro House Rutes 40. 

30 Onto House Rutes 66. 

31 Ibid. 








1950] COMMENTS 563 


ingly placed “above the black line” printed on the calendar. All 
bills listed below this black line may not be considered by the 
House until placed above the line by the committee. Thus, if a 
bill is never placed above the black line on this daily calendar by 
the Rules Committee, it dies a natural death, unless the Committee 
is relieved of the bill by the House by a majority vote of all the 
members elected.*? If the bill is placed above the black line it is 
read for the third time by title only and is now up for House con- 
sideration. The House itself may now amend it in part,>> substitute 
a new bill, or have the original bill recommitted to the same com- 
mittee or another committee** where it once again must face and 
overcome all the obstacles originally encountered, plus the ob- 
jections of the House. If not recommitted, the question presented 
by the Speaker of the House is, “Shall the bill pass?” If the bill, 
after its third reading, passes the House, it is then sent to the Senate 
where it must be subjected to practically the same procedure as 
above described. 

Following passage by both houses, the bill then becomes an 
“act’”’3® and is sent to the governor for his signature. If the governor 
signs the act, it then becomes a law but does not go into effect 
until ninety days after it is filed by the governor in the office of 
the secretary of state.’ However, within this ninety day period, 
unless the bill is an emergency measure or an appropriation mea- 
sure, a petition signed by six per cent of the electors of the state, 
filed with the secretary of state, can order that this law be sub- 
mitted to the electors of the state for their approval or rejection.** 

If the governor disapproves the bill and returns it to the 
House unsigned, with his objections to the measure, the Speaker 
of the House then presents the question: “Shall the bill pass, not- 
withstanding the objections of the governor?”3? If both houses pass 
this bill without the governor’s signature by the required margin 
it becomes a law but is still subject within ninety days to the Refer- 
endum under the conditions referred to above. Without investigat- 
ing the many parliamentary procedures, dodges, and stalling tech- 
niques available to opponents of a bill, the above account, then, 
describes briefly the gauntlet which a bill must run in order to 
become a law of the State of Ohio. 

With the above discussion in mind, let us now consider just 





32 Onto House Rute 20 provides for 22 standing committees. 

33 Onto House Rute 51. 

34 Onto House Routes 52. 

35 Onto House Rute 53. 

36 Onto House Rute 57. 

37 Oxto Const. Art. II, Sec. 1c. 

38 See note 35, supra. Emergency laws are not subject to Referendum. 
Onto Const. Art. II, Sec. 1d. 

39 Onto House Rutes 50. 








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564 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


where the professional lobbyist fits into the picture. If he doesn’t 
have permanent offices at the state capital, he probably will set 
up temporary headquarters in a convenient downtown hotel and 
then swing into action. Armed with a bill either written by himself 
in his own office, or drafted with his assistance and advice, the 
lobbyist’s first move is to contact a friendly legislator, show him 
his bill and ask him to sponsor it. If the bill is not objectionable 
to the legislator or is not against the interest of his constituents, 
he may agree to sponsor the bill. Once this has been taken care 
of, the lobbyist must then contact members of the Reference Com- 
mittee if he can and attempt to prevail on this committee to refer 
his bill to the standing committee most favorably disposed toward 
the measure. If the House wishes, however, it can send the bill 
to a committee unfriendly to the measure and that will be the 
end of the bill. If the lobbyist is successful, however, in steering 
his bill to a friendly committee, his next task is to get before this 
committee when it has a hearing on the bill in order that he may 
impress them with its meritorious content, and persuade them to 
report the bill out favorably.*° Once it is reported out favorably, 
getting the Rules Committee to place the bill above the black 
line on the daily calendar is his next job. When the bill is finally 
read for the third time, the lobbyist must be alert to avoid crippling 
amendments from the floor, or opposition inspired motions to 
recommit to another committee, to table, or to postpone to a day 
certain, or indefinitely.*! 

While the lobbyist is thus keeping his eye on the progress of 
his bill at the state capital, the lobbying organization is getting 
its heavy artillery into action. Their job is to focus the attention 
of the legislators on carefully molded and articulate public opin- 
ion, in an attempt to persuade them that what they want is what 
the public wants.‘? The techniques and devices available for this 
job are only limited by the imagination and integrity of the lobby- 
ing organization involved. Utilization may be made of mass chan- 
nels of propaganda provided by the newspapers, the radio, the 
school, the theatre and the church.*? Constituents are prompted 
to bring pressure to bear by writing letters or sending telegrams.** 
At election dates, candidates, regardless of part affiliation, con- 
sidered favorably disposed toward group interests can be supported 





40 The Lobby’s Part in Democracy, Nations Business Mar. 1946, p. 78. 
41 Onto House Rutes 62. 


42 Comment, The Federal Lobbying Act of 1946, 47 Cor. L. Rev. 98 (1947). 

431 Pusiic Opinion QuarTerty 64; SmirH, LasswELL AND CaAsEy, Propa- 
GANDA, COMMUNICATION, AND PusBLic OPINION (1946). 

44 Zeller, Modern Pressure Groups, 29 Am. Las. Lec. Rev. 152; Bellows, 
In Defense of Lobbying, 172 Harpers 96 (1935); 26 Wortps Work 540 (1913). 








1950] COMMENTS 565 


by the organization.45 When the measure is up for consideration 
and the issue is in balance, refreshments and services may be 
provided in a nearby hotel for those legislators amenable to such 
conveniences. 

It can be readily seen that such tactics at the disposal of un- 
scrupulous groups can be used against the best interest of the 
public. Worthy organizations, in order to get results, must of ne- 
cessity fight for their measures with the same weapons used by 
their opposition. What then is the answer to this lobbying prob- 
lem? Every state and at least one territory has struggled with 
it.46 In 1946, for the first time in its history, the federal govern- 
ment enacted a law which it hoped would cope with lobbying 
abuses. Unfortunately, the measure was hastily drawn and did 
not draw upon the experience of states who have been legislating 
against lobbying for over one hundred years!*”? State lobbying 
provisions*® have at least established the principle that the public 
has a right to know who are the paid lobbyists and what is the 
source of their funds. The majority of lobbying statutes require 
registration of paid professional lobbyists, and sometimes their 
employers; a filing of expenses incurred in lobbying; and provides 
for fines, and imprisonment, or both for failure to comply.*? These 
provisions are all right as far as they go, but unfortunately they 
do not go far enough. 

Publicity has proved to be the most effective means of com- 
bating sinister lobbying practices, but only a few states make any 
effort to keep even their own legislators posted as to lobbying ac- 
tivities5° Ambiguous wording of lobbying statutes also makes en- 





45 Odegard, Political Parties and Group Pressures, 179 ANNALS (1935). 

46 See the tabulation of state measures for enforcement of lobbying fol- 
lowing this comment. 

See Zeller, State Regulation of Lobbying, THe Book Or Tue States (1948- 
49), THe Boox Or Tue Srartes (1949-50). 

47 For excellent analysis of the Federal Lobbying Act of 1946 see Futor, 
An Analysis of the Federal Lobbying Act, 10 Fen. B. J. 366 (1949); Zeller, The 
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 48 Am. Pox. Scr. Rev. 239 (1948). 

48 See FepERAL AND STATE LAws ON LOBBYING PREPARED FOR THE ASSEMBLY 
InteRIM COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY AND EcONOMY OF THE LEGIS- 
LATURE OF CALIFORNIA (Dec. 1949). 

49 See note 45, supra. 

50 Wisconsin in 1945 amended its statute to provide for detailed weekly 
statements of disbursements of lobbyists during the season. 

Onto Gen. Cope § 6256-4 provides for an itemized statement to be filed 
within thirty days after the final adjournment of any session of the general 
assembly. It does not provide for publicizing this information, analyzing it, 
or even checking the truthfulness of the statements filed. An examination by 
the writer of 281 financial statements filed following the 98th General Assem- 
bly revealed general confusion as to the information required to be disclosed. 
Apparently, filing a statement regardless of its disclosure is accepted as being 





PN SD ect II 











566 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


forcement difficult,5! but failure to appropriate funds for enforce- 
ment, coupled with failure to designate a specific enforcement 
agency, makes the job just about impossible.*? 

Experience has shown that regular enforcement agencies are 
not suited for enforcement of lobbying laws, and without special 
staffs to analyze registrations and expenditures, prosecutors are 
reluctant to prosecute and courts are not prone to convict violat- 
ors.53 In states such as Ohio where supervision of registration of 
lobbyists is delegated to a single clerk, in addition to her other 
regular duties, and where her only duty in this regard is limited 
to placing these registrations and financial reports in a filing cabi- 
net, it is safe to conclude that lobbying laws can be and probably 
are violated with impunity.*4 Furthermore, most state lobbying 
laws are directed at the paid professional lobbyist, whereas there 
is practically no attempt to control what is considered by some 
writers to be the most important phase of lobbying — those lobby- 
ists who initiate propaganda without necessarily being present in 
the state capital.55 

Another source of lobbying which is usually overlooked is 
that done by our own state representatives. A large number of 





in compliance with the statute. Such statements as “the usual fee”, “full time 
employee”, or the overworked “no receipts, no expenditures” are accepted as 
disclosures of lobbying expenditures! 

51 This writer could find no true case in Ohio of a prosecution or a con- 
viction for violation of any lobbying statute! 

52It is perhaps unrealistic to expect appropriations for the enforcement 
of lobbying statutes in states which are not even adequately interested in the 
collection of back taxes. 

53 See note 48, supra. 

54It is clear that the secretary of state, to whom custody of these records 
are relegated, does not have the administrative organization to analyze relevant 
information submitted under lobbying statutes, make pertinent extracts from 
it, and adopt an efficient classification and index system. But efficient ad- 
ministration would be merely a prerequisite to preparing the data revealed 
into concise and comprehensible statements which would be made available 
to press and radio services. If the public is to be informed of the facts dis- 
closed by registration, these facts must get the widest possible circulation in 
a simplified and intelligible form. 

55 Pressure group propaganda aimed primarily at influencing the public 
is often characterized by misrepresentation or distortion of fact, made more 
effective by concealment of source —thereby making an evaluation of possi- 
ble bias very difficult. Special interests have often employed such question- 
able practises as controlling newspaper editorials by placement or with drawal 
of advertising. See Williams, Mr. Cleveland, 28 LIFE 130 (Mar. 13, 1950); 
sending free “canned copy” to country presses which is used as cheap fill, 
31 Current History 690 (1930); hiring radio commentators and columnists to 
express favorable views; educators to write text books; speakers to address 
clubs, schools, and churches, without revelation of the contract of employ- 


ment. 








1950] COMMENTS 567 


state legislators are practicing lawyers. The controversy over the 
activities of law-legislators who write laws for clients or represent 
them in transactions with the state government led the state of 
Michigan to enact a statute declaring it a felony for legislators 
to be employed by persons interested in current legislation for 
more pay than non-legislators would receive, or to accept payment 
for services in connection with the passage or defeat of bills.‘’ 

Any improvement in legislative reference services designed 
to supply legislators with data impartially collected will diminish 
the likelihood of lobbying abuses. Legislators are incapable of 
personally investigating every legislative proposal, especially those 
which require technical knowledge of complicated subjects. In the 
absence of such a service legislators have no choice but to rely on 
experts for information in the fields of their special interest. This 
information is of course many times biased. 


CONCLUSION 

A few states such as Wisconsin are taking the lead in coping 
with this lobbying problem, but whether or not other states will 
follow their lead will depend on results obtained. At the present, 
however, results are too inconclusive to evaluate. The first requisite 
is a will to see the law work — sometimes this is all that is nec- 
essary. When this is the climate of opinion, appropriations to es- 
tablish adequate research facilities, investigating staffs, accounting 
and auditing staffs, and publicity staffs, coupled with laws which 
are flexible enough to stay abreast of new and improved lobbying 
techniques, are all steps in the right direction. When, however, 
there is no interest in the intent and objectives of such regulatory 
legislation either by the people or by their representatives, no mea- 
sures in this area can be expected to be undertaken. 

To get the ball rolling when this is the case probably requires 
a “lobby for the regulation of lobbying”, but apparent disinterest 
in correcting the system as it functions today indicates remedial 
measures to be unlikely in the foreseeable future. 

James H. Tilberry 





56 Micu. Acts, § 41lb (No. 146) (1945). 

57“One is reminded of the statement of ex-Governor Lehman of New 
York when he called public attention to the fact that several lawyer-legislators 
were blocking his anti-crime program: ‘One perceives in them a still more 
sinister conspiracy than that of politics— the conspiracy of lawyer-legislators 
to perpetuate for their profession the obstructions to justice by which it pros- 
pers.” Zeller, State Regulation of Lobbying, in THe Boox or Tue States 124 
(1948-49). 





OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 


STATE REGULATION OF LOBBYING 


[Vol. 11 








Improper Registra- “Counsel” Financial 





Fines 


Penalties for Violations ——____, 


Imprison- 


ment 





* 


+ + e+ F 
* 





Not less than 
500 and 


Not over 
$1,000° and/or 


Not over 
$1,000 and/or 


Not over 
$200 and 


$200- 
$1,000 or 


Not over 
$5,000 and/or 


Not over 
$5,000 and/or 
Not over 
$1,000¢ 
$200-$2,000 
and 
$100--$500 
$100-$1,000 
$100-$1,000 
$200-$1,000 
or 


Not over 
$1,000 and/or 


$100-$500 
an 


Not over 
$1,000¢ and/or 


1-2 yrs. 


Not over 
5 yrs. 


Not over 
yr. 


Not over 
20 yrs.4 


Not over 
mos, 


Not over 
mos. 


3 mos.- 
1 yr. 


Not over 
1 yr. 


Not over 
yrs. 


6 mos.- 
2 yrs.! 


3 mos.- 
1 yr. 


Not over 
3 yrs.i 
Not over 
6 mos. 


10 da.- 
1 yr. 
Not over 
5 yrs. 


Not over 
i yr. 





RSS EAS a SY NT OSE LOS Fh Oa RA RET 


ae 


A Ria Ol PN ae gy EC 











Nevada 
New Hz 


New Je 
New Me 


Rhode | 


South C 


South I 








1950] COMMENTS 569 


STATE REGULATION OF LOBBYING*—Continued 




















Laws Legal — Penalties for Violation_——- 
Limited Distinction: Three Years 
to Registra- “Counsel Financial Disbarment 
Corrupt tion and Report ; Imprison- After 
State Practicesn Required “Agent” Required Fines ment Conriction 
Nevada............ nee < .% cane ean 
New Hampshire.... ae ” ead * Not over Not over 
$1,000 5 yrs.4 
New Jersey.......- 
New Merxico........ 
New York.......... oa Not over Not over 
$1,000¢ and/or 1 yr. 
North Carolina..... * * $50-$1,000 Not over 
and/or 2 yrs. 
North Dakota...... ces ak aie pied $100-$ 1,000i ee * 
$200-$5,000¢ 
ieee vedseaes * -_ $200-$5,000 1-2 yrs, 
and/or 
Oklahoma......... re 5 a ees ape $200-$1,000 10 da.- 
or 1 yr. 
Ds 60606008600 * — Sai pees $50-$500 or |3 mos.-1 yr. 
Pennsylvania...... nee eves eevee oes cove - 
Rhode Island...... — * * * $100-$1,000 Seite * 
$200-$5,000° er oeon 
South Carolina.... wines _ er * $25-$100 or - qver 
da. 
South Dakota...... fas * * * $100-$1,000 we * 
$200-$5,000¢ 
Tennessee......... m bane none ae’ nen 2-5 yrs, 
rer ooe8 we one chee $200-$2,000 6 mos.- 
and 2 yrs. 
sb d0guse obese oe ene ae ee $500-$10,000« Not over 
yrs. 
Vermont........... woee * * _— $100-$500 on 
Virginia........... ese * meee * $50-$ 1,000 Not over 
and/or 1 yr. 
Washington........ sue ‘ies é<av enaie ence eee 
West Virginia...... . ana otis ions $50-$200 and 10 da.- 
6 mos. 
Wisconsin......... oeee _ sees * $100-$1,000! Sess * 
$200-$5,000¢ 
Wyoming ......... bone ee ie jase ies ey enue 
. 
RD 66668 08v0i ro _ * — $100-$1,000° Not more a 
$200-$1,000 or than 1 yr. 





* Reprinted from THe Book or THE StTaTEs 1950-51, pp. 135-6. 














Recent Decisions 


ADMINISTRATIVE LAw — APPLICATION Or FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
Procepure Act To Heartncs In Deportation CASES 


Plaintiff, a native and citizen of China, was arrested on a 
charge of being unlawfully in the United States through having 
overstayed shore leave. A hearing was held before an immigra- 
tion inspector who recommended deportation. This was approved 
by the Acting Commissioner and affirmed by the Board of Immi- 
gration appeals. Plaintiff sought release by habeas corpus on ground 
that the hearing was not in conformity with the requirements of 
the Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946, 60 Srar. 237, 
5 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. Held, reversing the District Court for the 
District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals, writ sustained. 
Deportation proceedings must conform to the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act if resulting orders are to have valid- 
ity. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 

Plaintiff relied on Section 5 of the APA, which provides, “In 
every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined 
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,...(c)... 
No officer, employee or agent engaged in the performance of in- 
vestigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in any case 
shall, in that or in factually related cases, participate or advise 
in the decision. ...” 60 Srar. 237, 240, 5 U. S. C. § 1004 (c), and 
§ 11, 60 Srar. at 237,244, 5 U.S.C. § 1010, which provides for the 
appointment of examiners. 

The Government admitted noncompliance, but asserted, first, 
that Section 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, 
39 Star. 874, 889, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) — which author- 
izes deportation—does not expressly require a hearing, and 
therefore deportation proceedings are not an “adjudication re- 
quired by statute” under Section 5; and, second, even if they 
are, Section 7 (a),,”...but nothing in this Act shall be deemed 
to supersede the conduct of a specified classes of proceedings in 
whole or part by or before boards or other officers specially pro- 
vided for by or designated pursuant to statute....” 60 Srar. 237, 
241, 5 U.S.C. § 1006, excludes such proceedings from the require- 
ments of the Act. This argument is based on the assertion that 
immigrant inspectors are “specially provided for by or designated 
pursuant to” Section 16 of the Immigration Act, which provides, 
“..and the examination of aliens arrested within the United States 
under this Act, shall be conducted by immigrant inspectors, ex- 
cept as hereinafter provided in regard to boards of special in- 


570 








1950] RECENT DECISIONS 571 


quiry...” 39 Srat. 874, 885, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 152. 

The court, in holding that this was an instance of “adjudication 
required by statute,” pointed out that without a hearing there 
would be no constitutional authority for deportation. An admin- 
istrative officer, when executing the provisions of a statute in- 
volving the liberty of persons, may not disregard the fundamental 
principles of due process of law as understood at the time of 
the adoption of ‘the Constitution. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 
189 U.S. 86, 100, 101 (1903); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 
454, 459 (1920); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 160 (1945) (con- 
curring opinion). The constitutional requirement of procedural 
due process of law permeates every valid enactment of Congress. 
The limitation to hearings in Section 5 exempts only those hear- 
ings which administrative agencies may hold by regulation, rule, 
custom, or special dispensation; not those held by compulsion. 
The limiting words exempt hearings of less than statutory author- 
ity, not those of more than statutory authority. 

In determining the second question, that of whether Sec- 
tion 7(a) excludes deportation hearings, the court stated that 
nothing in the Immigration Act specially provides that inspectors 
shall conduct deportation hearings or be designated to do so. The 
language directs them to conduct border inspection and author- 
izes functions which are indispensible to investigations and in 
preparation of complaints for prosecutive purposes. If hearings 
are to be had before employees whose responsibility and author- 
ity derives from a lesser source—than those whose responsi- 
bilities and duties as hearing officers are established by other 
statutory provision — then they must be examiners whose inde- 
pendence and tenure are so guarded by the Act as to give the 
assurances of neutrality which Congress thought would guarantee 
the impartiality of the administrative process. Mr. Justice Reed, 
dissenting, found it obvious that the exception in Section 7(a), 
of the APA covers immigration inspectors dealing with the ar- 
rest of an alien for violation of the Immigration Act. 

Thus the Court, in its first interpretation of the many prob- 
lems raised by the Hearings section of the APA, has resolved 
a lower court conflict in favor of the minority. See Orlow, Habeas 
Corpus In Immigration Cases, 10 Onro Sr. L. J. 319, 62 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1060 (1949). 

The case which caused the greatest disturbance to the Immi- 
gration Service was Eisler v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 610 (D. C. 1948), 
cert. denied sub nom. Potash v. Clark, 338 U.S. 879 (1949). 
There, in holding the APA applicable to deportation proceedings, 
the decision was based entirely on Section 5, that a hearing is an 
integral part of the Deportation Act, and no mention was made 











572 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


of the exception, “specially provided for by or designated pur- 
suant to statute,” in Section 7 (a). 


The problem of applicability of the APA to the Immigration 
Act also has become significant in determining what form of judi- 
cial review is available in immigration matters. Orlow, supra, 328- 
334. Section 10 makes available any applicable form of legal action, 
“Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) 
agency action is by law committed to agency discretion...”. The 
question has been whether the Immigration Act, 39 Srar. 890 
(1917), 8 U.S.C. § 155 (1946),” .. . the decision of the Attorney 
General shall be final. ..,” precluded judicial review. Cases which 
have held the APA Section 10 not applicable are: Prince v. Com- 
missioner of Immigration and Naturalization, 87 F. Supp. 53 (N. D. 
Ohio 1949); Valenti v. Clark, 83 F. Supp. 167 (D. C. 1949) and 
Yiakoumis v. Hall, supra. Other cases have allowed judicial re- 
view under the APA on the ground that the due process concept 
has always made habeas corpus available to those adversely af- 
fected by deportation orders. These cases include United States 
ex rel. Camaratta v. Miller, 79 F. Supp. 643 (S. D. N. Y. 1948); 
United States ex rel. Trinler v. Caruse, 166 F. 2d 458 (3d Cir. 
1948); United States ex rel. Lindenau v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp. 
216 (S. D. N. Y. 1947), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. United 
States ex rel. Poetau v. Watkins, 164 F. 2d 457 (2d Cir. 1947). 
In view of the court’s argument in the principal case — quali- 
fying the Immigration Act with the judge-made requirements of 
a hearing, so as to bring the Act within the APA — it would seem 
that the same argument applies to the judge-made requirement 
of review, thus bringing the Act within Section 10 of the APA, 
on the ground that the Attorney General’s decision is not final 
within the exception in Section 10. 

A similar problem as that in the principal case has been 
raised in connection with the mail fraud order statutes. 39 U.S.C. §§ 
259, 732 (1946). Bersoff v. Donaldson, 174 F. 2d 494 (D. C. Cir. 
1949), held that since the fraud order statutes do not in terms 
require a hearing, Sections 5 and 8 (b) of the APA are inappli- 
cable. Here the Postmaster General issued a fraud order after a 
hearing before a trial examiner, and plaintiffs sought to enjoin 
enforcement of the order alleging that they could not file ex- 
ceptions to the recommended decision of the examiner, as pro- 
vided by Section 8 (b) of the APA. The case is discussed in 62 
Harv. L. Rev. 1060 (1949). In this field courts, without directly 
holding, have indicated a hearing would be required. Pike v. 
Walker, 121 F. 2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 
625 (1941); Donnell Mfg. Co. v. Wyman, 156 Fed. 415, 416 (C. C. 
E. D. Mo. 1907). Cf. Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511 (D. C. Cir. 











1950] RECENT DECISIONS 573 


1945). It would seem that here, as in the principal case, “the con- 
stitutional requirement of procedural due process” would per- 
meate the fraud order statutes, thus making them an instance of 
“adjudication required by statute,” and thereby bringing them 
within the requirements of the APA. 

The present APA was introduced in 1945. S. 7, H.R. 1203, 
79th Cong., 1st Sess. It is largely a compromise between the two 
reports of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative 
Procedure, which was named by presidential direction in 1939. 
The Act adopted the recommendations of the majority, rather than 
the more thoroughgoing separation of agency functions recommend- 
ed by the minority. See S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 55-60 
(1941). One purpose of the Act was to secure a greater uniform- 
ity of procedure and standardization of administrative practice. 
McFar.tanp, ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
Act, FepeRAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINIS- 
TRATIVE AGENCIES 16, 22 (N.Y.U. 1947). More fundamental, how- 
ever, was the problem of the commingling of functions, and the 
desire to separate the prosecution, investigation, and adjudication 
functions as pointed out above. See Sung, supra, 450. For argu- 
ments both for and against such separation see, CARRow, BAcK- 
GROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE Law 95. It is with these considera- 
tions in mind that one should approach the instant decision. 

As the court pointed out, the legislative history of the Act is 
very conflicting. However, the exception in Section 5 was meant 
to exclude “ . . . the great mass of administrative routine as well 
as pensions, claims, and a variety of similar matters in which 
Congress has usually intentionally or traditionally refrained from 
requiring an administrative hearing.” S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 
2d Sess. 22 (1946). Deportation hearings traditionally have been 
required by the Immigration Act as interpreted under the proce- 
dural due process requirement. 

Section 7 (a), at first appearance, would seem to include immi- 
gration inspectors provided for in Section 16 of the Immigration 
Act. Senator McCarran, in commenting on Section 7(a), stated, 
“. . the committee desires that Government agencies should be 
put on notice that the provision in question is not intended to 
permit agencies to avoid the use of examiners, but only to pre- 
serve special statutory types of hearing officers who contribute 
something more than examiners could contribute, and at the same 
time to assure the parties fair and impartial procedure.” S. Doc. 
No. 248, supra, at 325. 

The question then turned on an interpretation of Section 16, 
and the decision was that immigration inspectors conducting de- 
portation hearings were not specifically provided for in Section 





— 








574 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


16. That this was the basis of the decision was pointed out in 
United States ex rel. Frisch v. Miller, 18 U.S.L. Weex 2466 (1950), 
decided subsequent to the principal case. There it was held that 
Section 7(a) excluded alien exclusion proceedings before a special 
board of inquiry provided for in Section 17 of the Immigration Act. 

In view of the long history of the APA, the great desire and 
the stated necessity of separating the adjudicating functions, the 
court in the instant case followed the stated intent of the framers 
of the Act. To have held otherwise would have allowed Section 
7(a) to have become the loophole for avoidance of the examiner 
system which the legislators warned against. The decision retains 
the uniformity of procedure and the separation of functions which 
the Act was framed to accomplish. 

“The immediate effect of the . . . decision was to bring into 
question the validity of certain other hearings in deportation pro- 
ceedings in which the subject alien has not been deported.” Jef- 
ferys, The Wong Yang Sung Decision, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALI- 
ZATION Service Montuiy Review, April, 1950, p. 131, 137. The 
number of cases decided since September, 1946, and thereby af- 
fected, was found to be 10,000. Newsweek, March 6, 1950, p. 18, 
19. 

The Immigration and Naturalization Service has adjusted its 
regulations to conform to the APA, with Hearing Examiners ap- 
pointed under Section 11. 15 Fen. Rec. 1297-1302; 18 U.S.L. Week 
2405 (1950). 

Several bill were introduced in the last two sessions of 
Congress attempting to exempt the Immigration Service from the 
APA, but Congress adjourned without taking action. 

Thus the battle rages in the administrative branch of govern- 
ment, the battle which dates from 1610 when Coke, in Dr. Bon- 
ham’s Case, said, “one cannot be Judge and attorney for any of 
the parties.” 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652. 

Richard E. Bridwell 


‘ 


PROCEDURE—SUIT TO COMPEL DECLARATION OF DIVIDENDS— 
JOINDER OF PARTIES 


Defendant corporation is a citizen of Delaware doing business 
in Pennsylvania. It had outstanding 100,000 shares of $6 cumu- 
lative preferred no-par stock, 120 of which were held by plaintiff, 
a citizen of New York. Also outstanding were 456,576 shares of 
no-par common stock, 92% of which were held by four large 
users of defendant’s products. Defendant defaulted on dividend 
payments for several consecutive periods, until dividend arrearages 











1950] RECENT DECISIONS 575 


on the preferred shares amounted to $57.75 per share. Plaintiff 
then brought action to compel the declaration of dividends. In 
his complaint plaintiff alleged and offered to prove that defendant’s 
financial condition would easily permit the payment of dividends, 
and he further alleged that the directors of the corporation were 
“unreasonable and arbitrary” in that they were expanding pro- 
duction facilities in order to benefit the four large customer- 
stockholders. At the commencement of the action plaintiff served 
the corporation but not the individual directors. The trial court 
held that a majority of the board of directors must be served, and 
granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. Only three out of a total 
of twelve could be served in Pennsylvania, and in no other single 
jurisdiction could a majority be served. Held, on appeal, that 
the directors are not necessary parties. Kroese v. General Steel 
Castings Corporation et al, 179 F. 2d 760 (C.A. 3rd 1950); certio- 
rari denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950). 

A failure to pay dividends when due, even those on preferred 
shares, is not an uncommon occurrence in the financial world. 
Aside from the most obvious precluding factor, that of insufficient 
surplus out of which dividends can be paid, there is an added 
reason why the stockholder may not realize any income from his 
investment in a corporation. This is the fact that the declaration 
of dividends is, with very few exceptions, a function of the board 
of directors, and whether or not they are declared is a matter 
within the board’s discretion. 1935 Det. Rev. Cope Section 2066; 
Outro Gen. Cope Sections 8623-38 and 8623-55; Jones v. Van Heu- 
sen Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 246 N.Y.S. 204 (1930); Hastings 
v. International Paper Co., 187 App. Div. 404, 175 N.Y.S. 815 (1919). 
Prior to this declaration of dividends by the board of directors, the 
individual stockholder has no legal right in the surplus of the cor- 
poration. In re Goetz’s Estate, 236 Pa. 630, 85 A. 65 (1912). Thus, 
so long as the power of discretion is wielded in good faith, the fact 
that the directors have decided upon another legitimate use for an 
existing surplus should not give rise to judicial intervention. 1 
MoraAweEtz, Private Corporations (2nd Ed. 1886) Section 460. 


However, if the failure to pay dividends, assuming sufficient 
surplus, is part of a general scheme to defraud the stockholder, 
or if there is any bad faith or arbitrary use of the power of dis- 
cretion, it is well settled that a stockholder may invoke the aid of 
equity in a suit to compel the declaration of dividends. Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919); Barclay v. 
Wabash Railway Co., 30 F. 2d 260 (C.C.A. 2d 1929); Mitchell 
v. Des Moines and F. D. R. Co., 270 F. 465 (C.C.A. 2d 1920); 
Kassel v. Empire Tinware Co., 178 App. Div. 176, 164 N.Y.S. 1033 
(1917); Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., supra. In the Dodge 











576 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


case supra, the court went so far as to order that a common 
stock dividend of a specified amount be declared. Whether or 
not a court goes too far when it actually determines the amount 
of the dividend is a serious question, but one that is not presented 
by the instant case because it is an action on preferred stock with 
a dividend rate of $6 per share. 


The court of equity, acting in personam, cannot invade the 
province of the directors by actually declaring a dividend. The 
judgment of the court must take the form of a mandatory injunc- 
tion, ordering that a dividend be declared. Kales v. Woodworth, 
32 F. 2d 37 (C.C.A. 6th 1929). It still remains the function of 
the board, therefore, to meet and go through the motions of a 
formal declaration in compliance with the decree of the court, 
and also to satisfy the statutory requirement of most states that a 
dividend must be voted upon and passed by the directors. For 
this reason the courts, prior to the instant case, have consistently 
enunciated the rule that there must be personal jurisdiction over 
at least a majority of the directors, in addition to jurisdiction over 
the corporation. Gesell v. Tomahawk Land Co., 184 Wis. 537, 
200 N.W. 550 (1924); Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 
(C.C.A. 6th 1947); Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., supra. In 
the opinion of these courts, there was no other method by which 
the directors could be forced to “exercise their discretion” by 
declaring a dividend by the required number of votes. Schuck- 
man v. Rubenstein, supra. The problem then would seem to be 
one of enforcement only. 

In the opinion of Judge Goodrich the question of how to make 
the decree effective is not a difficult one to answer. He said: “To 
doubt its effectiveness is to doubt the power of a court of equity 
wielded by a chancellor with legal imagination.” Kroese v. Gen- 
eral Steel Castings Corporation et al, supra, p. 764. The case holds 
that so long as the court has jurisdiction over the corporation and 
its property lying within the state the decree of the court becomes 
the controlling factor. The corporation is no longer guided by the 
discretion of its directors but is instead bound by the court’s in- 
junction. It continues to be subject to the power of the court even 
though the directors fail to comply with the order. The court points 
out the fact that a creditor of a corporation does not need a meeting 
of the board of directors to make his judgment valid. Even though 
in the present type of case the directors must still perform the 
ministerial function of making a formal declaration for the sake of 
the records and to satisfy the statutory requirements, their failure 
to do so would certainly not vitiate the court’s power over the 
corporation. Since the corporation is so affected by the decree, 
what is to prevent the court from using enforcement procedure 








1950] RECENT DECISIONS 577 


against the corporation itself, even though jurisdiction over the 
directors is lacking? The court suggests that sequestration of the 
corporation’s property lying within the jurisdiction should prove 
to be a very effective means of coercion. Continental Mortgage 
Guarantee Co. v. Whitecourt Construction Corp., 164 Misc. 56, 297 
N. Y. S. 338 (1937). It would seem that as to the directors of a 
corporation this method of enforcement should be just as compel- 
ling as any that could be used by a court with personal jurisdiction. 

The court in the instant case recognized the Schuckman case, 
supra, as a contrary holding by another federal court, but an at- 
tempt was made to distinguish the two cases on the basis of a dif- 
ference between the statutes of Delaware and those of Ohio. 1935 
Det. Rev. Cope Sections 2041 and 2066, and Onto Gen. Cope Sec- 
tions 8623-38 and 8623-55. These sections, aside from specifying 
the funds out of which dividends may be paid, also provide that 
if dividends are declared the declaration shall be made by the 
board of directors. It is a matter of discretion with the board in 
either case and it is difficult to see wherein the statutes differ 
in their application to the present problem. It would seem, there- 
fore, that the two cases are definitely in conflict and that a choice 
will have to be made between the two opposite holdings. The 
denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court adds some weight to 
the instant case but leaves the matter still unsettled. 

It would appear that the decision in the present case is to be 
preferred over those of the older cases. The rule so consistently 
adhered to in the past placed too great a burden on the stockholder 
with an otherwise justiciable case. It is common knowledge that 
the large corporations of today may be governed by directors who 
are citizens of widely scattered jurisdictions. To serve a majority 
may often be an impossibility, and to leave the stockholder without 
a remedy would be inequitable. It is true that hard cases should 
not make bad law, but the rule of the instant case should not be 
labeled as such. Although sequestration was never before used in 
this field, it is certainly not a device that is unknown to courts of 
equity. 2 Danrett, CHancery Practice 690 (Am. Ed. 1846). There 
would seem to be no hardship inflicted upon the corporation by 
the rule of this case, other than to make it amenable to suits by 
persons with legitimate causes of action. 

Frank E. Kane 


Torts—Lasetinc A Man A CommunistT—Liset Per SE 

Plaintiff, Ward in his petition stated, inter alia, that he is 
a member of the American Federation of Labor. That he earns 
his livelihood from his employment as Secretary of the Painters 
District Council No. 6 in the city of Cleveland and that said posi- 








578 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


tion is subject to election by the free and popular vote of the 
members of the Painters Union. That defendant, League for Jus- 
tice, under the direction of defendant, John P. Moran, caused 
to be published a pamphlet entitled, “League For Justice Informa- 
tion For Americans”, in which the plaintiff was depicted as one 
of the most active and treacherous Communists in Ohio and further 
charging that he was affiliated with Russian Communism and had 
performed various acts as a tool for Stalin in the furtherance of 
his objectives. Plaintiff made no averment of special damage. 
Defendants filed a general demurrer which was sustained by the 
Court of Common Please of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, on the ground 
that the words published were not libelous per se, and there being 
no averment of special damage an action in libel was not main- 
tainable. Held, reversed on appeal to the court of appeals. The 
appellate court holding that it is libelous per se to write of a man 
as a Communist, that label tending to taint him as a man of dis- 
repute. Ward v. League for Justice et al, 57 Ohio L. Abs. 197 (1950). 


Early in the common law both written and oral defamation 
were included under slander. Later in 1690 libel was recognized 
as a separate branch of the law of defamation. Slander, in modern 
usage, has been limited to defamation by words spoken, and in 
this sense may be defined as the speaking of base and defamatory 
words which tend to the prejudice of the reputation, office, trade, 
business, or means of getting a living of another. 53 C.J.S. Libel 
& Slander, § 1, b, p. 33. Libel is broader than slander and em- 
braces many things affecting reputation which are not slanderous 
when spoken. Libel is frequently defined as a malicious publica- 
tion, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs and pic- 
tures, tending either to blacken the memory of one dead or the 
reputation of one who is alive, and expose him to public hatred, 
contempt or ridicule. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander, § 1, p. 31. From 
its inception libel has been considered written defamation and has 
been treated as a more serious wrong because of permanence of 
form or potentiality df harm. 


In the law of defamation the words per se were first used to 
designate those slanderous words which would be actionable 
without proof of special damages, namely: the imputation of seri- 
ous crime, the imputation of certain loathsome diseases, and im- 
putations affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, profession 
or office. All other unprivileged, slanderous words were action- 
able upon proof of special damages. 8 Mont. L. Rev. 76, 78 (1947). 
However, at early common law any libel, as opposed to slander, 
was actionable without allegation and proof of special damage. 
Hughes v. Samuels Bros., 179 Iowa 1077, 159 N.W. 589 (1916); 
Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Pub. Corn.. 242 N.Y. 208, 151 











1950] RECENT DECISIONS 579 


N.E. 209 (1926); see Neweitt, SLANDER AND Lisex § 775 (4th ed. 
1924). 

Today, the words per se and per quod are being applied to 
libel law by many courts and the distinction is expressed in two 
forms. Some courts make the differentiation on the basis of evi- 
dence and define libel per se as words defamatory on their face 
while libel per quod is said to be words defamatory only in the 
light of extrinsic circumstances. Others distinguish the two on 
the basis of pleading and hold that words libelous per se do not 
require allegation and proof of special damage, while those libel- 
ous per quod do require such allegation and proof. Prosser, 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAw oF Torts 790, § 91 (1941); Harper, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAw oF Torts 518, 519, § 243 (1940). In the 
majority of jurisdictions, however, any libel is still actionable 
per se, irrespective of whether any special harm has been caused 
to the plaintiff’s reputation. Prosser, Torts 797 (1941); ResTate- 
MENT, Torts § 569, comment c (1938). 

Many criteria exist for determining what libelous words fall 
into the category of libel per se. As a general rule words, written 
or printed, are libelous per se if they tend to expose a person to 
public hatred, contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, induce an 
evil opinion of him in the minds of right thinking persons, and 
deprive him of their friendly intercourse and society. 53 C.J.S. 
Libel and Slander, § 13, p. 57. 

Courts have long held that a political epithet might tend to 
defame. In 1889 it was libelous per se to write of a man as an 
anarchist. Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News, 139 Ill. 345, 28 N.E. 
692 (1891). To write of one as a socialist was considered libelous 
per se in 1915. Ogren v. Rockford Star, 288 Ill. 405, 123 N.E. 587 
(1919). Similarly in 1926 it was libelous per se to write of a 
man as a “red.” Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 Pac. 736 
(1926). When these cases were decided such affiliations were 
considered contemptible in that they advocated lawless methods 
in sabotaging and attempting to overthrow the American political 
and economic system. Likewise, the term “Nazi” or “Fascist” 
before or during World War II was held to be libelous per se since 
anyone characterized as such suffered immediate loss of reputa- 
tion and prestige, with exposure to hate and possible violence. 
Derounian v. Stokes, 168 F. 2d 305 (C.C.A. 10th 1948); Levy v. 
Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 148 (1941); Devany v. Quill, 
187 Misc. 698, 64 N.Y.S. 733 (1946); Luotto v. Field, 49 N.Y.S. 2d 
785 (1944). 

In 1929, the first case appeared indicating that labeling a 
man a Communist might be libel. Hays v. American Defense So- 
ciety, 252 N.Y. 266, 169 N.E. 380 (1929). In 1939, a lower New 








580 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


York court held that charging a man with being a Communist 
would not support an action in libel. Garriga v. Richfield, 174 
Misc. 315, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 544 (1940). Russian-United States rela- 
tions had improved in the interim. In 1941, another New York 
lower court refused to follow the Garriga decision. Levy v. Gelber, 
175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 178 (1941). At this time the German- 
Russian Pact of August, 1939 was in effect. A little later in 1942, 
a New York court in Boudin v. Tishman, 264 App. Div. 842, 35 
N.Y.S. 2d 760 (1942), adopted the view of Levy v. Gelber and is 
now generally considered the law in New York on the subject. 

Elsewhere, in other jurisdictions, because of the obloquy 
and reproach connected with such affiliations, it has almost con- 
sistently been held to be actionable in libel or slander to charge 
a person with being a Communist. Whether or not it is libelous 
per se is determined by the effect of the word “Communist” upon 
the ordinary person of average intelligence in the light of the 
then public attitude toward Communism. See Note, 171 A.L.R. 
709. In sounding this public opinion the courts have looked to 
polls, studies and legislation relevant to Communism. In a For- 
tune survey, Fortune, February, 1940, p. 136, of these disposed 
to curtail free speech, approximately 40% would prohibit Com- 
munism as a subject and Communists as speakers. Exec. Order 
No. 1835, Part V, § 1, 12 Fep. Rec. 1938 (1947) outlined a pro- 
cedure for the discharge of those employees as to whom reasonable 
grounds exist for the belief that the person involved is disloyal to 
the government. For a list of others see 24 Notre Dame Law. 
544 (1949), notes 11 and 12; 32 Minn. L. Rev. 413 (1947), notes 
6, 7, 8 and 9. The recent “Communist Control Bill” will also aid 
in pointing up the public attitude toward Communism. Pub. L. 
No. 831, Internal Security Act 1950. There are those who believe 
that under the theory of the prosecution in the recent trial of 
eleven Communist leaders and as a result of conviction in that 
case, membership in the Communist Party is now a crime. 50 
Cou. L. Rev. 526, 528 (1950). Notwithstanding the above, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court very recently held that to call a 
man a Communist is not libel per se. McAndrew v. Scranton Re- 
publican Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504, 72 A. 2d 180 (1950). This 
decision, however, was based on dictionary and logical connota- 
tions of Communism and did not take into account the existing 
social norms and antipathies in ascertaining whether a falsification 
has the capacity to bring another into disrepute. 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
931 (1950). 

In the instant Ohio case, the court of appeals relied consider- 
ably upon State v. Smily, 37 Ohio St. 30 (1881), which stated that 
although the matter published might not, without averment and 
proof of special damage, be actionable, if only spoken, yet if pub- 











1950] RECENT DECISIONS 581 


lished, and it be of a character, which, if believed, would naturally 
tend to expose the person concerning whom the same was pub- 
lished, to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or deprive him of 
the benefits of public confidence or social intercourse such pub- 
lication is a libel, and an action will lie therefor although no special 
damage is alleged. The court then passed to a consideration of 
cases from other jurisdictions, some of which have already been 
mentioned, and concluded that the publication concerning plain- 
tiff, Ward, if believed, would naturally tend to expose him to 
public hatred, contempt and ridicule, and deprive him of the 
benefit of public confidence and social intercourse, and such pub- 
lication is therefore libelous per se and an action will lie therefor 
although no special damage is alleged. 

Defendant gave notice of appeal, but although the Ohio State 
Supreme Court had not passed upon the question of calling a man 
a communist as libelous per se, it did, on October 18, 1950, overrule 
defendant’s motion to certify the record, and in effect, upheld the 
decision of the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County. Notwith- 
standing the fact that the case law in Ohio is somewhat precarious 
relevant to this question, it is submitted that had the court passed 
directly upon the matter, it would have had little difficulty in 
rationalizing its present position. A consideration of some of the 
Ohio cases will tend to indicate the pattern that has been develop- 
ing in Ohio with respect to libelous statements. 

In an action for libel the question whether the publication is 
or is not libelous per se is a question for the court. Mark v. Brund- 
age et al, 68 Ohio St. 89 (1903). “Libelous per se” embraces 
words of three classes: imputing an indictable offense involving 
moral turpitude or infamous punishment; imputing a contagious 
or offensive disease or condition tending to ostracize; or tending 
to injure one in one’s occupation. Hunt v. Meridian Printing Co.., 
320 Ohio C. D. 151, 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. (N.S.) 293 (1910). To be 
libelous per se the publication must reflect upon the character of 
a person by bringing him into ridicule, hatred or contempt, or 
affect him injuriously in his trade or profession. Cleveland Leader 
Printing Co. v. Nethersole. 89 Ohio St. 118, 95 N.E. 735 (1911). 
More recently, a publication which charges one with utterances 
that bring him into contempt, ridicule or hatred, is not actionable 
without alleging special damages, unless it liberally and not tech- 
nically construed charges utterances which are a violation of the 
laws of the land or of good morals. Sweeney v. Beacon Journal 
Pub. Co., 66 Ohio App. 475, 35 N.E. 2d 471 (1941). Later in West- 
ropp v. E. W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E. 2d 340 (1947), 
the court quoted with approval 1 Coo.ey, Torts (4th Ed.) 491, § 
145, words to the effect that any false and malicious writing pub- 
lished of another is libelous per se when its tendency is to render 











582 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 


him contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or expose him 
to public hatred. Also on page 501 of the same authority, that “in 
determining whether the words charged are libelous per se, they 
are to be taken in their plain and natural import according to the 
ideas they are calculated to convey to those to whom they are 
addressed, reference being had not only to the words themselves, 
but also to the circumstances under which they were used.” Fur- 
ther insight into the Ohio pattern may be obtained through a 
study of still more recent decisions. Writing of a man as a Com- 
munist is libelous per se and special damages need not be alleged. 
Burrell v. Moran, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 465, 82 N.E. 2d 334 (1948). It 
is not a crime in Ohio to be a member of the Communist Party. 
Fawick Airflex v. United Electrical Workers et, Kres., 56 Ohio 
L. Abs. 432 (1950). And finally, courts now take judicial notice 
that whoever is a Communist is by reason of that fact a member 
of an organization the international purpose of which is to destroy 
the Government of the United States. Dworken v. Board of Edu- 
cation (Cleveland), 57 Ohio L. Abs. 449 (1950). 

Some of the above holdings seem to indicate that there is 
a tendency to harmonize libel per se with slander per se. Be that 
as it may, the definition of libel per se adopted by the supreme 
court in the Westropp case seems to be broad enough to include 
the label “Communist” imputed to a plaintiff. Likewise, if damage 
to character, violation of law or morality is to form the test, the 
growing willingness to recognize communistic affiliation as synony- 
mous with governmental overthrow would seem to satisfy these 
criteria. 

The major obstacles which deter the holding that calling a 
man a Communist is libel per se have been overcome by most 
courts. The fact that the Communists may function as a legally 
recognized party is immaterial. 32 Munn. L. Rev. 412, 414 (1947). 
Illegality of the act charged is not a requisite of libel. Stevens v. 
Snow, 191 Cal. 58, 62, 214 Pac. 968, 969 (1923). That the word 
“Communist” has no definite meaning is untenable. 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. 
Rev. 513, 516 (1947). 

Another difficult question is the one of policy. Can we expect 
a greater net gain by protecting reputations of individuals at the 
expense of making it more difficult to detect subversive communist 
elements, than would result if we relaxed the enforcement of the 
law of libel per se with respect to a charge of Communism and 
thereby make it easier to expose these groups and individuals? 
Also in our political make-up there are left-wing liberals who are 
not Communists but who stand to have their reputations ruined 
by being portrayed as such. Their protection negatives any re- 
laxation in the enforcement of the rule of libel per se when applied 
to the Communist epithet. 











1950] RECENT DECISIONS 583 


The Ohio Supreme Court’s refusal to review Ward v. League 
for Justice constitutes a revelation of Ohio’s judicial attitude on 
this current policy question. Ohio has recognized that in the 
present era a Communist label can ruin a reputation, ostracize 
one from society, and in some cases lead to the individual’s physical 
abuse. However, as times change, relationships vary, and words 
take on new meanings. Only the future can disclose when the 
Communist label will be shorn of its ephemeral capacity to damage 
a reputation and thence be relegated to the habitude of words of 
libelous impotency. 

Cornelius W. Dillon 





OHIO STATE 
LAW JOURNAL 





COLLEGE OF LAW 
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY